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This is a study of the meaning and syntax of non-(lexical)verbal causation. Macroscopically, it 
examines the preposition ‘from’ as attested in contexts like “X is/comes from Y”. Syntactic 
diagnostics are applied to formally distinguish the causative from the spatial interpretations of 
‘from’-PPs in Greek, English, Dutch, and German. The syntactic landscape of causative ‘from’ 
will turn out to be very minimal with ‘from’ directly selecting the Cause-DP, in contradistinction 
to its spatial counterpart, where ‘from’ always selects for another PP layer. More microscopically 
then I focus on the causative interpretations only, which are particularly revealing because (i) 
they give an in-depth view of CAUSE, stripped of all verbal layers⎯traditionally considered the 
locus of CAUSE⎯suggesting that the source of causation in non-(lexical)verbal environments 
has to be the preposition per se and (ii) they single-handedly provide a rudimentary structure for 
causation, where ‘from’ introduces the Cause in its complement and is predicated of the Causee. 
Finally, with a basic predicational structure in place, I offer a detailed cross-linguistic account for 






The birthplace of this work is footnote 40 in Koontz-Garboden (2009). It would not have 
matured to a dissertation, however, had it not been for the ἀγχίµαχο και φράδµων Marcel den 
Dikken. I am exceedingly thankful for his patient guidance and his invaluable teachings—the 
most prominent of all being his razor-blade comments on all my drafts. His unique skill to 
find rhyme and reason in chaos has always been a source of inspiration.  
A sincere thank you to my committee members Christina Tortora and Bill McClure. It 
was their spot-on comments, questions, and suggestions during the different stages of this 
dissertation that literally changed its direction at crucial points, but also kept it on track until 
the end. I am also extremely thankful to Tom Leu for serving as an external member, but 
more so for always being ready to put his thinking cap on and for bringing in the most daring 
ideas and comments during the writing years. 
In the process of working over drafts, parts, and subparts of this project, I had valuable 
input, suggestions, and comments from: Artemis Alexiadou, Alan Dench, Anastasia 
Giannakidou, Björn Lundquist, Jason Merchant, Andrew Nevins, Phoevos Panagiotidis, 
David Pesetsky, Maria Polinsky, Gillian Ramchand, Florian Schäfer, and Arhonto Terzi. But 
also from all the authors cited in my references whose works helped me build this thesis to 
completion. I am most thankful to all. 
  The completion of a dissertation, however, is rarely only an academic 
accomplishment. It is the constellation of people and circumstances, and I have been 
exceedingly lucky to have had the best of both.  
So let me start by wholeheartedly thanking my ‘long-distance’ family for the truly 
selfless support and constant encouragement all these years. They believe in me more than I 
believe in myself! And a warm thank you to my ‘short-distance’ family, Tina and Lakis, for 
making all this real.  
I am equally thankful to my ‘partner in crime’, David, for without him I would have 
given up long ago on New York and on Greek food. And to my ‘partner in adventure’, Lucia, 
who can single-handedly turn any trip—be it to the Caribbean or to the corner deli—into a  
life experience and publishable material.  
A special thank you is due to my three-year roommate Giulia. Few things compare to 
hitting rock bottom, putting a wig on, and singing “everything’s beautiful on 
Steeeeinwaaaay”! 
I’ve also been extremely lucky to have friends like Rachel. Thank you so much you for 
those great machine-gun conversations y las aventuras en México. And of course Veronica, 
who has been making sure I get some free-range air, and who packed me up (in architectural 
dimensions) in just one evening. I’d take a road trip with you guys anywhere! 
Also a big thank you to my little Roman friend for changing my life in the most 
unforeseeable ways.  
Lastly, I must really thank my evil angel, Libs, who endured lexicon’s labor’s lost and 
did not let me faff about during the last stretch of a long dissertation. You’ve been amazing! 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1 AITIOLOGY……………………..………………………………….…... 1 
1.1   P AS IN PANACEA ……………………………………………………… 1 
1.2 A GROSS ANATOMY  ……………………………………….…..……….. 8 
CHAPTER 2 DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY OF CAUSATION  ……………………..……... 11 
2.1 A LEXICAL TREATMENT ………………..………………….……..……... 11 
2.2   DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS.…………….…………….……….……….... 16 
2.3  THE COORDINATION TEST .…………………….……………..……….... 20 
2.4  THE PROPOSED TREATMENT  ……………….………………….………... 24 
CHAPTER 3 IDIOSYNCRASIES OF ‘FROM’ IN CAUSATION……………………….….... 29 
 3.1 THE COMPOSITION OF MAKE……………………..…………………….. 29 
 3.2  IDIOSYNCRASIES OF ‘FROM’ IN AND OUT OF CAUSATION  ……….……... 31 
3.2.1 ALTERNATIONS: A GOLD STANDARD TEST? …………..…….…... 31 
3.2.2 AGENT/CAUSER INHIBITIONS  …………...……………..…….….. 39 
3.2.3 CORRELATION NOT CAUSATION………………………………….. 43 
    3.2.4  CONNECTIVITY SIDEEFFECTS  ………………………..……….….. 49 
 3.2.5  EVALUATION OF EARLIER TREATMENTS  ………………....…….. 53 
  3.2.5.1  AGENTIVITY REVISITED……………………..…....…….. 61 
 3.3 INTERIM SYNOPSIS  …………………………………………….….…….. 64 
3.4   A THEORETICAL DIAGNOSIS  …………………..……………………….. 66 
CHAPTER 4 COMPLEMENT-TESTING ‘FROM’ …….………..……………………….. 71 
4.1  WH-EXTRACTION  ………………………………………….………..….. 73 
4.2 TH-WORDS  ………………………………………………..…….…..….. 75 
4.3 THAT AND THERE/WHERE  ……….………………………..……….….. 76 
 4.3.1 THE VAN RIEMSDIJK METHOD  …………………….………..….. 76 
 4.3.2 THE BENNIS METHOD  …………………………………….…….. 78 
 4.3.2.1 CASE ASSIGNMENT………………….………………….. 82 
4.3.3 NULL-HEADED PPS TRIGGER AGREEMENT  ……………….…….. 84 
4.3.4 DISTRIBUTION    ……………………………..……………….…... 87 
 4.3.5 “ARTIFICIAL” SUBSTITUTES ………………….…..………….…... 91 
   4.3.6 P-MODIFIERS  ………………………….…………………….…... 92 
  4.3.6.1 AN ABOVE-THE-‘FROM’ EXAMINATION……….……….. 93 
  4.3.6.2  A BELOW-THE-‘FROM’ EXAMINATION………………….. 98 
   4.3.7 A MOLECULAR ANALYSIS  ……………………………………….. 101 
  4.3.7.1 TH/WH/D  …………………………….…….………….. 101 
  4.3.7.2 R  ………………………………………...…………….. 101 
  4.3.7.3 E  ……………………………………………………….. 102 
   4.3.8 THE RECEPTOR OF R (RP) ………………..……………………….. 103 
 4.3.8.1  R-GENERATION: HIGHER THAN DP, LOWER THAN PPLOC.. 104 
 4.3.8.2  R HAS ITS OWN HEAD  ……………………………..….. 106  
 4.3.8.3 THE MOLECULAR STRUCTURE OF RP  ……………..….. 107 




5.1 AN X-RAY OF CAUSATIVE ‘FROM’-PPS  …………………………..…….. 111 
5.2 AN X-RAY OF SPATIAL ‘FROM’-PPS  …………………………………….. 115 
5.3 FURTHER STEPS FOR AN ACCURATE DIAGNOSIS  …………….………….. 123 
5.3.1 ARE DPS LOCATIONS? ………………………………………..….. 125 
5.3.1.1   LOCATIONAL NOUNS: A FALSE POSITIVE? ……………... 126 
5.3.1.2 WHAT DOES WHERE QUESTION?  …………..…….….. 136 
5.3.1.3 LEXICAL CLONING CONSIDERATIONS  …………..….….. 139 
5.3.2 WHAT’S IN AN EMPTY HEAD? ………………………………….... 140 
5.3.2.1 TRICEPHALOUS REGIONS  …………………………..….. 141 
5.3.2.2 LOCATIVE MUTATIONS  …………………………….….. 143 
5.3.2.3   NATURAL SELECTION UNDER HOMOMORPHISM  ……..... 147 
CHAPTER 6 THE PROPOSED TREATMENT UNDER THE MICROSCOPE  ………….….. 156 
6.1 FROM’S ANATOMY  ……………………………….…………………….. 156 
6.2 VITAL SIGNS FOR PREDICATION  ……………………………..………….. 160 
6.3 THE RECEPTOR OF PREDICATION (RP) ……………………….………….. 163 
 6.3.1 FIRST TRIAL: POVERT  …………………………………..…….….... 165 
 6.3.2 SECOND TRIAL: PNULL  ……………………………………..…….. 166 
 6.3.2.1 THE INVISIBLE PØ ATOM  …………………………..….. 166 
 6.3.2.2 DISSECTING PARTICLE VERBS  ……………………..….. 168 
  6.3 WHAT WE SAW UNDER THE MICROSCOPE.. ……………………….…….. 171 
CHAPTER 7 CLINICAL PROFILE OF CAUSE ……………………………………….. 172 
  7.1 OVERVIEW DISCUSSION………….…………………….…………….….. 172 
  7.2 GENERAL CONTRIBUTIONS ………………………..……….………….… 179 
  7.3 FUTURE RESEARCH……………………….………………………….….. 180 
 
 
REFERENCES  ………………………………………………………………………….. 184 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES  
 
TABLE  
1.1  Frequency of use of ‘from’ in English, German, Dutch, and Greek …………….. 2 
4.1 wh-relativizers of locatives vs. nominals in German  ……………..…………….. 73  
4.2  wh-extraction  ………………………………………………………..………….. 74 
4.3 Ablative/Causal suffix forms in Pama–Nyungan languages  ……..…………….. 118 




CHAPTER 1 AITIOLOGY 
Although the grammar of causation has received considerable attention in the past decades, it 
still invites re-analyses and ramifications in order to account for empirical data cross-
linguistically as well as language specifically. Causative constructions are present in all human 
languages (Shibatani 2001), a fact that both reinforces the importance of this cognitive category 
and provides a platform for a potentially universal theory of its grammar.  
Within the realm of causative structures, several typological (Comrie 1981; Song 1996; 
Haspelmath 1987; Shibatani 2001; a.o.), lexical (Simpson 1983; Levin and Rappaport 1998, 
a.o.), semantic (Dowty 1979; Bittner 1999; Levin and Rappaport 1995; Moreno 1993 a.o.), and 
syntactic works (McCawley 1971; Kratzer 1994, 1996, 2003; Pylkkänen 1999, 2002; Alexiadou 
et al. 2006, 2010, a.o.) are available. Refined subcategorizations and numerous semantic 
dissections of causative verbs have provided descriptive definitions of causativity and numerous 
different definitions. 
A point of convergence for all causation analyses, however, is that any given causative 
construction necessarily involves at least two parties: a Cause (αἴτιον aition) that brings about an 
event or a change of state and a Causee (αἰτιατόν aitiaton) that undergoes this event or change as 
in John boiled the eggs, in contradistinction to events that do not entail any change of state, as in 
John thanked the boy, which are consequently considered non-causative.  
Note that it is not the case that in every sentence with two participants they will necessarily be a 
Cause and a Causee. Nor is it the case that every transitive verb will necessarily be causative, 
although, on the other hand, many intransitive verbs are able to convey a causative meaning in 




1.1  P AS IN PANACEA   
In this thesis I will focus one a type of causative constructions where the caused event precedes 
its inflicting cause, which is, in turn, introduced by the preposition ‘from’ as in:  
(1) My headache was from the wine.  
(2) The fire was from negligence.    
Although the base ingredients of such causative utterances are ubiquitous in natural language, 
namely ‘is’ and ‘from’, they were never center-stage in the study of causation (to my 
knowledge). With the copula being a predicational pivot, my interest is naturally focused on the 
treatment of the preposition ‘from’, which is one of the most frequently used preposition but also 
words in general1. With a ranking as high as 10 in the list of most frequently used words (in 
Greek, for example2), one can imagine the multitude of ‘from’’s semantic dimensions, provided 
that its grammatical identity is the same. This thesis, however, will focus on one interpretation of 
‘from’, namely the causative. 
The correlation of causation with directionality morphemes is a pre-explored idea with cross-
linguistic representative examples. Universally there are many instances of grammaticalization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  The following table summarizes the rankings of ‘from’ in the four languages under 
consideration in terms of: (a) its frequency in the entire word corpus and (b) its frequency among 
the set of prepositions in each language.  
The statistics reported come from: Saint-Dizier (2006) for English, Randall&Tschirner 
(2006) for German, Keuleers et al. (2010) for Dutch, and the Hellenic National Corpus for 
Greek. 
Frequency rank: in the entire corpus among prepositions 
English: from 29 9 
German: von 11 3 
Dutch: van 11 1 
Greek: από 10 2 
Table 1.1: Frequency of use of ‘from’ in English, German, Dutch, and Greek. 
2 Note that this statement is true only for the prepositional uses of ‘from’, not as a particle, for 




of prepositions that initially expressed spatial and temporal concepts to extend their use to causal 
relations. One of the earliest studies on the relationship between causative affixes and directive 
or benefactive morphemes in Tibeto-Burman languages is offered by Wolfenden (1929). 
Wolfenden argues that the Tibetan causative affix s- is derived from a directive element which is 
also present in other complex verbal forms (s-pro-ba ‘to make go out’, s-neg-pa ‘to run to’) 
denoting either direction into a state/condition or an action towards/for an entity. Some 
additional data is recorded from two other languages: (i) Burmese, where the directive element 
and causativized verbs are phonologically marked with aspiration of the initial consonant. And 
(ii) Ao (a language in the Tibeto-Burman family), where the causative affix dâk-tsa- is analyzed 
as a combination of cause and direction. More specifically the morpheme dâk- is an affix 
etymologically related to the Tibetan verb ajug-pa ‘to cause’, while -tsa- is the dative directive 
affix denoting transition of a causal action from the actor to a benefactor. These observations 
lead Wolfenden to draw a parallelism between directive elements and the notion of causation.  
Similar parallelisms are very often encountered in the Indo-European languages. Smith (1992) 
distinguishes accusative-marked from dative-marked arguments in German based on the images 
they invoke with regard to a source-path-goal schema [O→O]. The claim is that while accusative 
is generally used in prepositional phrases that describe a path-goal schema [ __→O], dative is 
preferred in source-path configurations [O→__ ]. Support is drawn from the use of dative to 
connect two entities in a causal relation (as well as in physical source-denoting interpretations) in 
German sentences like:  
(3) Ich bin müde von der ArbeitDAT      GERMAN 
‘I am tired from working.’  
(4) Die Verbrennung ist von der SonneDAT  




Analogous observations can be made for Ancient Greek, where we find the Dative of Cause or 
Purpose, which was used to directly mark3 the final or ultimate cause-DP (ΚΕΓ 2006):  
(5) µὴ θαυµάζετε ὅτι χαλεπῶς φέρω τοῖς παροῦσι πράγµασινDAT       A. GREEK4 
‘do not wonder why it is I am sad from the current situation’  [Xen. 1.3.3] 
(6) ἀλλ’ αἰσχροκερδίᾳDAT καὶ πλεονεξίᾳDAT καὶ ὕβρειDAT […] ταῦτα φανήσονται 
πράττοντες  
‘it will be proven that their actions are due to profiteering, greed, and arrogance’   
[Dem. 54.67] 
Luraghi (2006) argues that the archetypal meaning of prepositions is location and space and via 
a process of ‘semantic bleaching’ we derive meanings within more abstract domains, like time or 
cause. According to Meillet (1921), the reason behind this ‘bleach’ is the frequent use of 
prepositions, which erodes their lexical meaning. The first meaning that prepositions extend to, 
according to Luraghi (2003, 2006) is the temporal. She considers this semantic evolution to be 
ubiquitous in natural languages and links it to the tendency humans exhibit to map the plane of 
time onto the plane of space.  
As a further evolution, Luraghi suggests that space prepositions can extend their meaning to 
even more abstract domains like causation. Interestingly, she pinpoints the onset of this semantic 
extension in Homer and attributes it to the semantic flavor of the complement of the P5. More 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Probably directly by the verb which pre-empts the need for prepositional structure. This dative 
of the cause, however—as well as other uses of dative, e.g., in double object constructions—can 
alternate with their respective, in terms of their interpretation (source vs. goal/recipient), 
prepositional phrase. For the causative cases, the respective P is apo ‘from’, which denotes 
source/cause but which is always construed with genitive (unlike the German equivalent von, 
which preserves the dative case on the cause):  
(i) αὔχηµα µὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀµαθείαςGEN εὐτυχοῦς καὶ δειλῷ τινὶ ἐγγίγνεται  [Thu. 2.62.4] 
 ‘even a coward can boast due to his ignorance, which is supported by luck’.  
4 Transliterations for the Ancient Greek examples will not be provided. 
5 Luraghi (2006) refers to the complement of the P as the Landmark, which I will not use here in 




specifically, the abstract nature of the noun in (7) forces the causative interpretation of an 
otherwise spatial preposition εκ ‘from, of’, thus bridging the plane of space with the plane of 
causation: 	  
(7) ἐξ  ἀρέων µητρὸς κεχολωµένος    A. GREEK 
out of  cursesGEN motherGEN bittered 
‘bittered from his mother’s curses’          (Iliad 9.566)6	  
Although I believe that the direction of the investigation in Luraghi (2006) is correctly geared 
towards the complement of the preposition expressing the cause, I will rather focus on the 
internal structure of the causatively interpreted ‘from’, in contradistinction to other possible 
interpretations. This idiosyncratic characteristic of ‘from’ to convey cause constitutes its 
apomorphy within the more general and encompassing meaning of Source—which would be the 
clade in evolutionary biology terms.  
In Luraghi (2003) we find an explicit link between Source and Cause. Exploring how causatiοn 
is encoded in spatial-motion configurations, she describes this link as the Origin/Source 
metaphor, where events or state of affairs are perceived as moving entities. The Source or point 
of origin of motion is, in fact, the Agent or Cause. At this conceptual level it is not important to 
make a detailed distinction between the two. This of course does not mean that there is not any. 
In fact, Luraghi explicitly emphasizes the need to keep the causal roles: Agent, Cause, and 
Instrument separate in any language-specific description throughout her work. The take-home 
idea is that both Agents and Causes are responsible for the state of affairs of the Caused event 
and they are strongly associated with spatial dimensions, in particular, Source expressed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ultimately the same. I also want to avoid confusion with Kracht’s (2002) Landmark, which is 
only a case of homonymy. 
6 I have provided the translation in English based on Polilas (1923), which renders the causative 




means of locative prepositions. Whether Agents or Causes end up readily combining only with 
some prepositions in certain configurations today (i.e., ‘from’ favors Causes over Agents, as it 
will be further discussed in section 3.1.2) is a matter of semantic selection and historical change, 
as suggested in Luraghi (2003) who gives examples of both Agents and Causes interchangeably 
being the arguments of ‘from’ in causatives.  
The mental representation and map of apo ‘from’ in Ancient Greek below is provided as a cross-
linguistic platform for the Source metaphor, where apo encodes a point or region from which a 
vector (or trajector) moves away (8a): 
(8) a.   apo:      b. 
  SOURCE          EVENT 
      
 
Luraghi emphasizes the locational/spatial nature of Source and ‘branches out’ at least three 
major meanings: Time, Origin, and Cause. The adjusted cladogram of Source in (8b), which is 
based on Luraghi (2003:130), shows the main semantic branches (the apomorphies) of Source 
according to the meanings offered up to now.  
DeLancey (1982) investigates a similar semantic connection between causation and spatial 
source instantiated by the ablative from. He claims that from has prevailed over the use of of 
because of its identical marking for spatial source (and by extension, cause), thus of is limited to 
a very small subset of causal uses compared to from.7 He also points out that independently of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The relation between of and from seems to be very similar to that of ek and apo, all conveying 
the general meaning of ‘from’. Their main difference is related to case marking (overtly 
instantiated in Greek) and specificity according to Luraghi (2003). As far as case is concerned, 
               Cause  
Space      Origin    Agent   Time 








the predicate, both prepositions introduce “inactive causes”, a term referring to non-agentive 
causes: [−volition/−control/−animacy].  
This featural composition of an “inactive cause” describes the properties of the complement of a 
causative ‘from’, which I will refer to as Cause. Note, however, that in the literature, Causes are 
interchangeably referred to as Causers. The main distinction of Causes and Causers here will be 
their animacy feature. Also a Causer could be an Agent (which is now a subcategory of Causers) 
depending on the rest of the features [control, volition].  
The subcategorization presented in (9) below will be useful to distinguish between these 
arguments in this thesis. The assignment of animacy features, however, should not be taken 
axiomatically (exceptions will be presented later on):  
(9)             CAUSERS          CAUSES 
[+animacy]               [−animacy] 
     AGENTS 
 
The following central assumptions have been distilled up to now, which I will formally discuss 
in detail in this thesis: (i) Causation is both spatially and dynamically conceptualized, while it is 
grammaticalized via prepositional elements like ‘from’ (ii) ‘from’ is semantically associated with 
different notions like cause, space and time and (iii) ‘from’ resists Agents (cross-linguistically) 
but welcomes Causes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(causative) ek has an elative value and is always construed with genitive, while (causative) apo 
has an ablative value and is usually construed with accusative. Additionally, ek denotes a specific 
point within the point/landmark of origin, in fact the ultimate one. On the other hand apo is less 
specific as to the exact point of initiation of the event. Luraghi claims that “this lesser specificity 
makes it a particularly versatile preposition, which can also substitute for the more specific 




An important note here is that although ‘from’ may be associated with different meanings, I do 
not assume that there are different lexical entries for each intereptation. So any reference to a 
causative, spatial or temporal ‘from’ does not imply that we are dealing with two or more 
different instances of ‘from’. There is only one ‘from’ and it means Source. All other 
interpetations are derived from differences either in the internal structure or in its functional 
domain. 
1.2 A GROSS ANATOMY 
Given the broadness of the range of topics that pertain to causation (e.g., expressions of 
causation across languages: morphological and lexical; verbal vs. non-verbal causation; 
anticausative alternations; direct vs. indirect causation; change of state verbs; etc.), it is possible 
to only consider one piece of the puzzle at a time so the scope of this thesis will extend only to 
the study of Cause expressed only in non-lexical verbal environments and its difference with 
other possible interpretations. Before presenting an analysis on any kind of causative 
construction, it is essential to first attempt to describe causation in a formal way. Only then will 
we be able to discuss different predictions and analyses in a clear and formalized way. The 
desideratum here is for any formalization of causative structure to abide by uncontroversial 
tenets of the generative grammar literature. This work will focus on the syntax of causative 
constructions with a ‘from’-PP within the minimalist framework. 
The exploration of Cause will start out in Chapter 1 by undertaking a close look at the 
preposition ‘from’ itself, its etymology, semantics, and uses. As a first step it will be important to 
link ‘from’ with Cause by showing that natural language uses directionality morphemes or cases 
to grammaticalize causation cross-linguistically. What will be interesting is that ‘from’ is not 




the remaining chapters: What the syntax of causative ‘from’ is and how it is different from 
spatial ‘from’. 
Chapter 2 starts out by examining one of the current syntactic accounts for lexical-verbal 
causation. Based on the assumptions made there, I will evaluate how causative ‘from’-PPs fit 
into this schema and what kind of problems we may run into. Unlike the verbo-centric approach 
where the Source of Cause is attributed to the functional projections of the verb (or the verbal 
root), in a prepositional approach, the Source of Cause is the P itself. Two major concerns will 
be: when and how is the argument of ‘from’ understood as the Cause and what is the structural 
position of these ‘from’-PPs in the lexical causative schema. The first concern will lead to a 
preliminary description of different interpretations of ‘from’, ascertaining whether they can be 
somehow distinguished and categorized. This exercise will offer insights that will serve the 
second concern and will eventually lead me to the main proposal of this thesis, namely that 
causative ‘from’-PPs are predicative introducing the Cause, with the Causee as the subject. 
The next step in Chapter 3 will investigate in depth the idiosyncrasies of causative ‘from’. I will 
try to establish a more dependable diagnostic that will set it apart from other possible 
interpretations, discuss the kind of arguments it is compatible with, distinguish it from ‘with’ 
which is sometimes also interpreted as causative, and finally theoretically examine the validity of 
the proposal put forward. 
Assigning a specific structure or describing the idiosyncrasies of causative ‘from’-PPs is not 
sufficient to pinpoint the distinction responsible for the different interpretations of two (in many 
respects) similar sentences: 




So Chapter 4 will compare one-to-one two main interpretations of ‘from’, the causative and the 
spatial one trying to fathom out the reason we understand these two sentences differently. For 
this I will focus on a microscopic investigation of the PP structure. Some useful tools will be wh-
extraction and th-word compatibility. From the study of these diagnostics an cross-linguistically 
constant pattern will emerge; that Space is always associated with a PP elements, while Cause 
with a nominal elements.  
Chapter 5 will then establish that this association is not accidental, but it crucially reflects the 
underlying structure and consequently the different interpretations of the examples in (10) as 
repreoduced below:  
(11) [PP ‘from’CAUS  [DP  Cause]]    vs. [PP ‘from’SPATIAL  [PP  Ø  [ DP ]]] 
These PP structures suggest that a causative ‘from’-PP always selects a DP argument, while a 
spatial ‘from’-PP selects for another PP which can be unpronounced (in (10) for example). This 
hypothesis will be tested in terms of distribution, the semantics of the complement DP, and the 
availability of empty heads.     
With a clear description of which are causative ‘from’-PPs and what their internal structure is, in 
Chapter 6, I will attempt to extend this account to explain an interesting cross-linguistic 
phenomenon: overt causative ‘from’ alternates with a null P in the presence of particle verbs 
(this covers lexical-verbal cases as well as the aspectual ‘come’), followed by a case change on 






CHAPTER 2  DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY OF CAUSATION 
This section will attempt to draw some general guidelines regarding what causation and 
causative constructions that feature the preposition ‘from’ are and how we can discern them from 
non-causatives. For ascertaining the causative nature of a construction some diagnostics have 
been offered in the past (Bittner 1999; Shibatani 2001; Dowty 1979). Most of them are of a 
descriptive and semantic nature, while the syntactic ones are fewer. Some older diagnostics and 
definitions will be discussed with an eye to distill some valid syntactic tests for causativity. 
2.1 A LEXICAL TREATMENT 
The aim of this section is to provide a very brief description of more “main-stream” approaches 
to lexical causation and address some issue that arise with regard to the treatment of ‘from’-PPs. 
Although lexical causatives are not the principal interest of this thesis, they are, however, the 
meat of almost every work on causation. The intent of this section is to bring up an 
incompatibility with regard to the Source of Cause (verbal vs. prepositional), and its theoretical 
and structural consequences.  
One of the latest versions of an overarching syntactic representation proposed for causatives, 
passives and anticausatives (or change-of-state verbs) can be found in Alexiadou (2010). The 
model has two main ingredients, a functional Voice head and an eventive v (previously referred 
to as vCAUS): 
(1)         VoiceP 
  DP         Voice′ 
              [±AG]Voice        vP 
             DP    v′ 
          v         Root 
 
The structure in (1) is used for all change of 
state verbs. Since most examples used up to 
now involve anticausatives, I will focus mostly 




So based on this configuration, anticausatives are realized either in the lower part only or project 
a Voice head with a [±AG] agent feature, depending on whether they are morphologically 
marked or not across languages. The functional Voice head projected above vP has basically two 
functions: (a) it introduces an external argument (Agent/Cause) in its Spec position (following 
Kratzer 1996), and (b) it specifies the type of the construction as causative, anticausative, or 
passive, based on its presence and on the value of its [AG] feature.  
So how does causation come about in (1)? In previous analyses (Alexiadou et al. 2006, 2007, 
2009) the v was represented as vCAUS/CAUS and it was used to introduce a causal relation 
between a causing event and a resultant state denoted by what is marked as [Root] in (1). The 
CAUS head was present in both causatives and anticausatives (just like the v is also present in 
both) with the only difference being in the availability and features of the Voice head. The 
semantics of that vCAUS are not encoded in v8, in other words, causation is not in the head.9 
This v is an eventive head which introduces an event and selects a stative root. The abolishment 
of the vCAUS head, used for explicit demarcation of causatives vs. non-causatives, relegates the 
burden of conveying a causative interpretation to the entirety of the syntactic configuration in 
(1). Although the mechanisms of such a schema are not described in much detail, the main 
syllogism is that if (1) realizes the structure of all change-of-state verbs, and if Cause is 
essentially defined as bringing about a change-of-state, it is then deduced that (1) is also the 
structure of Causation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Note here the difference with Marantz (1997) and Pylkännen (1999) who attribute causation to 
v itself. 
9 Unlike in works where causation heads its own projection CauseP, taking the caused event as 
its complement: [CAUSP  CAUS [VP  V   [DP    ]]]  (see for example Miyagawa 1998; Harley 1995 
a.o.). In such a configuration, Cause relates the caused event (a non-causative predicate VP) with 




But let us concentrate now on how this model accommodates a Causative ‘from’-PP. As per the 
licensing of causative from-PPs, the argumentation line in Alexiadou (2010) is that since they are 
present in anticausative configurations (the door opened from the wind) and since all 
anticausatives have a v head (in contradistinction to a Voice head, which is not always available 
as indicated in (1)), ‘from’-PPs have to be licensed by the functional v, which is also responsible 
for the door. So questions that immediately arises is how is the ‘from’-PPs licensed and why is it 
causative? Although verbal causation is not within the scope of this thesis, some concerns 
regarding the licensing of causative ‘from’-PPs certainly fall within its range.  
The main problem with the v scenario licensing a cause-PP is that in the radical absence of any 
verbal structure we can still find causative PPs. For example, causative ‘from’-PPs can be found 
in nominal (the headaches from the wine) and non-lexical verbal environments (the headache is 
from the wine). 
Alexiadou et al. (2009) do entertain the possibility of having cause-PPs in the absence of 
functional structure (that is v), but only for cases of derived nominals (not simple nouns), where 
an n head takes a VP complement: “in the absence of such functional structure [vP], PPs can be 
licensed via an interplay of the encyclopaedic meaning of the root involved and the properties of 
the preposition itself”. These are cases like the destruction of the coral reef by the tsunami, 
where a verbal root is present (i.e. destroy) and actively participates in the licensing and 
interpretation of that cause-PP (i.e., by-PP). As per the role of the “properties of the preposition”, 
this refers to the semantic properties that dictate the interpretation of the complement rather than 
its licensing (i.e. by introduces an Actor/Agent). This will be an important concern as 
prepositions can introduce all sorts of different arguments. In this case by is not only related to 




Den Dikken (2007) notices that if the encyclopedic meaning were sufficient for the licensing of a 
cause-PP, this would render the need for functional heads superfluous. To take this a step further, 
the necessity of having either some functional structure (VoiceP or vP) or a verbal root for the 
licensing of a cause-PP is seriously undermined by the fact that causative from-PPs are found in 
structures that are radically void of either. 
Firtly, if we took the interpretation of a ‘from’-PP as causative to solely depend on its licenser 
vCAUS/v, then we would expect Alexiadou et al.’s (2009) prediction regarding the unavailability 
of a causative reading in purely nominal environments to be borne out. This means that when a 
‘from’-PP appears with a simple noun (meaning that it is not a derived one by a verbal root), it 
cannot take up a causative interpretation. This is not borne out as ‘the malaria’ in (2) is the cause: 
(2) [[NP  o piretos apo tin elonosia] ton exasthenise]. 
‘The fever from malaria  weakened him.’ 
[http://www.sentragoal.com.cy/article.asp?catid=19017&subid=2&pubid=82900675] 
The example provided in Alexiadou et al. (2009) in support of the unavailability of a causative 
reading of ‘from’-PPs in nominal cases is: a book from Chomsky. The preferable reading of this 
example is indeed a non-causative one, but notice that in this case agentivity comes into play as 
well as pragmatic considerations10. I will return to these examples in section 3.1.1. Additionally, 
compare a book from Chomsky to Mailer’s book from Nixon. Although the first phrase is not 
causative, it has been argued that the second is, in the sense that ‘Nixon’s actions gave Mailer 
material for a book’. The bottom line is that lack of verbal or aspectual heads does not guarantee 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 It must be noted that many native speakers have reported that a causative reading is not 
entirely unacceptable, although the unambiguous way to express that Chomsky actually wrote the 
book would be to use the preposition by. To eliminate pragmatic biases on these judgments 
(given Chomsky’s prolificness), one would have to test a book from Bill, which starkly 




a non-causative reading for a ‘from’-PP, especially when an agentivity/causativity variable is 
added in the equation.  
Secondly, if the complement of a ‘from’-PP is interpreted as a Cause when the PP is in the 
structural environment of the functional head v or as Alexiadou (2010) suggests, the causative 
interpretation is conveyed by the “properties and realization of the pieces of structure (1) that are 
the building blocks of anti-causatives”, then what is responsible for setting causative from spatial 
PPs apart? In other words, what can be held responsible for the different interpretation of (3) and 
(4) if they are structurally identical: 
(3) It broke from the weight of the leaves […]     [Causative] 
[http://www.englandrevisited.net/points/72] 
(4) It broke from the top […]      [Non-causative]	  
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xZv8dz3s0-Y] 
Since both these sentences express a change of state (break), their underlying representation 
should look like (1). Nonetheless, it is only in (3) that the argument of ‘from’ argument is 
interpreted as the Cause. In (4) no Voice head is projected, since English anticausatives are 
morphologically unmarked, thus the ‘from’-PP has to be licensed somewhere in the v 
domain⎯just like in (3). But there is simply nothing that specifies the exact position of the from-
PP or how it ends up introducing a Cause. What is important here is that if we accept the 
structure in (1) to underlie (3−4), we will not be able to pinpoint how the two ‘from’-PPs are 
different or how tey end up being licensed even in the absence of v. 
Discussing one approach to the syntax of verbal causatives we have seen that a ‘from’-PP is not 
the complement of its licenser head v because the licenser already has an argument, that is, the 
Root. Logically there is one available position left as things stand in (1) for a ‘from’-PP, namely 




‘from’-PP cannot be an adjunct. In fact the non-verbal cases crash immediately in the absence of 
the ‘from’-PP: *the headache is. Such considerations lead us to assume that at least in this 
environment, the ‘from’-PP has to be the predicate. This will be studied and argued for 
throughout the thesis. 
Clearly in the literature on the syntax of verbal causation there is not one standard practice, but 
different approaches trying to account for language-specific phenomena. That said, this chapter’s 
purpose was to pinpoint some major issues that immediately arise when considering the syntax 
of verbal vs. non-verbal causation. Some main problems discussed were: (i) the Source of 
Causation—if there is a unique one—and (ii) the licensing of causative ‘from’-PPs in causative 
verbal environments.  
2.2 DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS 
A ‘from’-PP may participate (either optionally or in some cases obligatorily) in causative and 
non-causative constructions and, importantly, it may introduce causal as well as other kinds of 
complements. These permutations seem to complicate the landscape of ‘from’-PPs, so this 
section will put various ‘from’-PPs in a line-up in order to identify which are causative and 
which are not (diagnosis), discuss some possible problems and methods to differentiate these 
categories, and finally propose a possible structural approach (therapy).  
In (5) below there are some representative cases of causative ‘from’-PPs mined from different 
internet sources11. (5a&b) involve a non-verbal configuration and a stative predicate. Importantly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Throughout this work I have used Google extensively for mining different examples, a 
practice that has become quite popular in the field of linguistics, especially when trying to find 
expressions that are not frequently used or easily elicited in everyday language. Admittedly, 
some linguists have raised their concern regarding the use of search engines as dependable 




in both cases the argument of ‘from’ is understood as the Cause. Notice also that in (5a) the 
‘from’-PP does not introduce an optional cause. This will be vital in ascertaining the nature of 
the PPs. Also most lexical verbal examples involve anticausatives12 like melt and crack in (5c): 
(5) CAUSATIVE: 
a. Her fever is from the flu shot.        
[http://pediatrics.about.com/od/weeklyquestion/a/05_flu_shot_rxn.htm] 
 b. She is tired from the day’s activities. 
  [http://stoyasfamily.blogspot.com/] 
 c. The plastic lights and gauges melted and the […] windows cracked from the heat. 
[http://www.fs.fed.us/eng/pubs/pdfpubs/pdf97512817/pdf97512817pt01.pdf] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the following reasons: Firstly, alternative sources—one of the very few ones is the Hellenic 
National Corpus (HNC/ΕΘΕΓ)—are simply not comprehensive enough yet. Secondly, Greek 
presents a salient challenge due to its grammatical, morphological and orthographical 
complexity, which makes any search exponentially more difficult. Thirdly, most search engines 
nowadays have access to a wide variety of periodical publications and book contents, 
consequently search results cover a wider range than most official corpora available. Therefore, I 
decided to report selected examples from Google searches mined during the period 2010–2012. 
For all and every example that does not have a source cited, I have obtained a native speaker’s 
judgments and for this I am most indebted to: Marcel den Dikken, Tom Leu, Tanja Nagler, Nath 
Buschen, Uli Futchik, Thomas Sølling, David Haase, Rachel Varra, Elizabeth Praat, Syelle 
Graves, Giulia Bencini, Elisabeth Johnston, Veronica Qureshi, Ayana Smythe, Michelle 
Johnson, Anastasia Giannakidou, Arhonto Terzi, Katerina Chatzopoulou, Elissavet Mouhayari. 
12 Anticausatives (the term is often used interchangeably in the literature with inchoatives or 
inchoative-causals) are intransitive verbs that describe a change of state denoting “the result 
situation of the causal verb” (Haspelmath 2008). In most cases they have a transitive causative 
alternant (there are some cases, like blossom, that have no morphologically related causative 
alternant although they do give periphrastic causatives make something blossom) whose internal 
argument is identical to their external one: 
(i) John broke the vase.  [causative] 
(ii) The vase broke.  [anticausative] 
Importantly, although they can convey causation in the sense that they describe some change of 
state of the patient, unlike transitive causatives, the cause is not always overtly expressed. As per 
their analysis with regard to their structure, whether they are derivationally related or what the 
directionality of this derivation is, there are different accounts available. Grimshaw (1982), for 
example, derives anticausatives via a process of inchoativization, a specified derivational 
direction which deletes the CAUSE operator and cause argument of a causative change of state 
lexeme. To the diametrically opposite side, we find Rákosi (2010) who argues that anticausatives 




Not all instances of ‘from’, however, have a causative interpretation. Although the range of 
interpretations is very wide, it will suffice, for the purpose of contrast, to show some major 
categories of interpretation, which are common in English—as well as in Greek, German, and 
Dutch, languages that will be most pertinent to the analysis of the ‘from’-PPs under 
consideration here. Three major interpretations are easily distinguishable: Causative, Spatial, 
Temporal. The examples below cover the latter two: 
(6) SPATIAL: 
a. If the income is from Arizona, […] [Origin/place] 
 [http://www.city-data.com/forum/washington/745601-1099-income-wa.html]  
c. I can’t find flights from New York to Thessaloniki. [Location/place] 
(7) TEMPORAL: 
a. From Monday to Friday [Starting point]  
b. I will start from tomorrow onwards.      
[http://abchomeopathy.com/forum2.php/222177/] 
Although some of these examples are readily categorized, for some others it is harder to discern 
a clear interpretation. Compare for instance the causative in (5a) and the locative (or more 
generally spatial) with an origin interpretation in (6a). What is in fact different between these two 
and how do we describe this difference? The answer to this question will be discussed in detailed 
in chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation.  
Even if we could always categorize each ‘from’-PP and no tests were needed for ascertaining 
their nature, we would still run into another problem, namely ambiguity. Alexiadou et al. (2009) 
consider the co-occurrence of a verb with a P (specifically ‘from’) with a causative interpretation 
as evidence for that verb’s causative nature. Two immediate problems arise: (a) a ‘from’-PP can 
be ambiguous between a locative and a causative interpretation and (b) causatively interpreted 




(8) Reports suggest that the vulnerability comes from the internet […] [Causative] 
[http://news.oneindia.in/2009/07/07/microsoft-security-warning-pc-ie-excel-powerpoint.html] 
(9) All my news comes from the internet.  [Locative] 
[http://www.crunchgear.com/2009/12/17/are-us-unmanned-drones-really-being-spied-on-with-a-satellite-internet-downloader/] 
The interpretation of the prepositional phrase from the internet is not necessarily alike in each 
example. In (8), the internet is the cause responsible for the vulnerability. In (9), on the other 
hand, a locative meaning is ascribed to the from-PP referring to the internet as the virtual space 
of the news and not as the cause of the news. Also although the PP in (8) is causatively 
interpreted, come never delivers a causative meaning, which shows why co-existence with a 
‘from’-PP is not sufficient to diagnose causativity in any verb.  
The different interpretations of what seems to be one and the same ‘from’-PP indicate that we 
need to look more closely into the PP in order to gauge	   its causal nature. According to 
typological studies, ‘from’-PPs have been shown to convey an array of interpretations—
directional, temporal, causative, partitive, comparative—which are independent of the verbs they 
are a complement of. 
Having shown that the presence ‘from’-PP is not a sufficient indication on its own for 
causativity, as shown in (8), our attention is then logically oriented towards the verb in order to 
ascertain the causative nature of the sentence. This avenue, however, will not always lead to 
definite answers either, since it is entirely possible for a verb to participate in both interpretations 
(i.e., the verb come in these examples, which is not even considered a causative verb) and bring 
about ambiguous interpretations: 
(10) A lot of business comes from the internet.   [Causative/Locative] 
[http://www.shopatlola.com/news/a-lot-of-business-comes-from-the-internet/] 
Example (10) could be ambiguous between a directional reading akin to (9)—where a lot of 




instance—and a causative interpretation similar to (8)—where a lot of business is the outcome or 
the effect the internet may have as a medium of communication and dissemination of 
information and services which consequently generates business. Since there is not always a 
clear separation between causatives and non-causatives, some criteria will have to be established 
in the following sections, in order to ascertain	  the causative nature of a sentence and importantly 
to identify the “Source of causation”, which will a central theme in this dissertation.  
2.3 THE COORDINATION TEST 
In search of a method to ascertain whether two ‘from’-PPs are equivalent or not with respect to 
their interpretation, I will take advantage of the Law of Coordination of Likes (LCL) (Williams 
1978).  
The general interpretation of LCL assumes that in natural language, the coordinated conjuncts 
should in some sense be ‘like’ constituents. This equality can be manifested in different levels: 
syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, prosodic. Here I will follow a general semantically-flavored 
interpretation of the LCL based on Munn (1993), who proposes that the conjuncts in any 
coordination construction should belong to the same set of categories.  
The set of categories Munn (1993:168) tentatively proposes include: Manner, Time, Place, 
Event, Question, Proposition, and Predicate. These categories and the semantic types of 
conjuncts predict the well-formedness of the coordination. So the conjuncts in: John walked 
[slowly] and [with great care], although they belong to different syntactic categories are able to 
be coordinated based on their semantic compatibility because they both belong to the Manner 
category and are of type <<e,t>,<e,t>>. If the LCL allows only similarly interpreted constituents 




meanings (and by extension belonging to different semantic categories) should yield 
unacceptable or infelicitous sentences. This will serve as a first test for identifying similarly 
interpreted ‘from’-PPs. 
In (11) below I have tried to coordinate different types of PPs to test whether they are 
compatible. The judgments prove that semantic compatibility is indeed a correct test: 
(11) a. ??Mary left from the garden & from the cold [Place&Cause] 
b. ??Mary left from the garden & the cold  [Place&Cause] 
c. ??Mary left from early March & from the cold [Time&Cause] 
d. ✓ Mary left from the garden from the cold [No coordination] 
e. ✓ Mary left (both) from her jealousy & from the cold weather13 [Cause] 
The judgments for (11a–c) show that Cause is not compatible with Spatial or Temporal ‘from’-
PPs and, as predicted, their coordination fails. Although (11a) and (11c) only suggest that the 
semantic difference is between the two coordinated PPs, it is noteworthy that (11b) is equally 
degraded. This is important because it points to a completely different research avenue, namely 
that there has to be some sort of incompatibility between the arguments of ‘from’ themselves and 
not just the whole ‘from’-PP. Pursuing a semantic account alone for the incompatibility of the 
garden and the cold would soon raise problems. Recall here the discussion in the previous 
section about ambiguous PPs. If the interpretation of an NP were entirely independent of its 
selecting P, then we would be forced to assume that each NP carries inherent lexical properties 
responsible for its selection and interpretation. Practically we would not be able to derive the 
ambiguities seen in the previous chapter, nor would we be able to use those NPs in any thematic 
position other than the one designated for the particular interpretation. This is particularly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Note that the cold weather cannot be ambiguous any more between a causative interpretation 




problematic in these examples because cold is not always interpreted as a cause, i.e., the man 
that came from the cold is not causative. And ideally we would rather have a uniform account for 
the judgments in (11a–c) instead of individual assumptions about each instance of each NP. 
The only readily acceptable examples are (11d&e). Crucially, (11d) is no longer an instance of 
coordination. Although these from-phrases occur concomitantly, they are not conjuncts of some 
coordination construction with a null-head, since the spell-out of that alleged head would always 
yield an unfavorable judgment, as afore-shown in (11a). Instead in (11d), the first from-PP is 
predicated of “she” and the second from-PP, which is interpreted as the Cause, is predicated of 
“leave”. So it is impossible to coordinate these two from-PPs: 
(11d′) [PredP1 [VP leave [PredP2 she [Pred2' [Pred2 ] [PP from the garden ]]]] [Pred1' [Pred1 ] [PP from the 
cold]]]  
The nature of the relation between the Cause-PP and the Causee was suggested in 2.1 to be 
predicational. I have adopted this relation for (11d′) as well. This will be further supported in the 
following sections, but for now what is significant is that PP1 and PP2 cannot be coordinates. The 
immediate consequence of this is that they do not fall under the LCL restrictions, hence the two 
differently interpreted PPs can coexist.  
Finally, (11e) shows that coordinating semantically similar ‘from’-PPs, in this case causative, 
yields an acceptable outcome, as predicted by the LCL. 
Throughout examples (11) Place and Time are used according to Munn’s categories. Cause 
(noted in italics in (11e)), however, does not constitute a separate category, although Munn 




these categories is the existence of respective (wh/th) pro-forms: there indicates Place14, while 
then or when indicate Time. This means that they should be able to replace the arguments of the 
second conjunct in coordination constructions as in: 
(12) John turned from this corner and Bill turned from there too.  [Place] 
(13) A lot of good music came from the 90s but a lot of bad music came from then too.  
         [Time] 
Munn does not offer a pro-form designated for questioning Causes and concomitantly also does 
not suggest a Cause category. Cause, however, does have a pro-form in nonlexical verbal 
environments (see (14a)) which are also compatible with so (see (14b)): 
(14) a.  The fever is from the cold and the chills are from that too. 
b.  The fever is from the flu shot and so is the headache. 
The fact that (14a) uses that in contrast to (12&13) will be of great value as it will be telling of 
the syntactic identity of the PP’s argument. This will be studied in detail thoughout chapter 4.  
The reason so is also significant is because according to Munn, so is the relevant pro-form for 
Predicates based on the example: John is intelligent and so is Bill. If this is correct, then in (14b) 
so is replacing a PP predicate15.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 With the exception of the ‘non-locative’ there pointed out to me by Tom Leu and discussed in 
Kayne (2005b) as in He spoke thereof. Note, however, that even though it does not denote place, 
it is still licensed by a PLOC as also argued for the locative there. Ultimately both types of there 
have the same licensing requirement and are topped off by a locative P. The relation with PP 
structure and Place interpretation will become more relevant in chapters 4 and 5. 
15	  So does not substitute only predicates, but as we will see in 3.2.5, the whole PredP. In 
examples like Mary puked from the wine and so did Bill, so will have to target the whole PredP, 




This supports a predicational analysis for causative ‘from’-phrases (unlike their Place and Time 
counterparts), but let us consider whether there is syntactic evidence for a predicational analysis 
in the literature. 
2.4 THE PROPOSED TREATMENT  
It is an interesting fact that a ‘from’-PP may convey cause as easily in (anti)causative 
configurations as in non(anti)causative or even nonverbal constructions. So in the sentences 
below (which are both unambiguous), there is nothing that clearly or necessarily conveys 
causativity, nevertheless, the argument of each from-PP is straightforwardly interpreted as the 
main cause of the preceding situation, namely her fever or of the fact that she is tired. 
(14) a.  Her fever is from the flu shot.        
 b. She is tired from the day’s activities. 
The fact that ‘from’-PPs can convey causativity independently of the structure they appear in, 
more specifically beyond (anti)causative structures, strongly suggests that they are able to 
establish a causal relation on their own between the ‘from’-argument and the preceding caused 
event/state.  
Solstad (2007) reaches the same conclusion based on his study of the German durch (‘by, 
through’). He observes that “durch has a similar effect in combination with both stative and 
inchoative16 predicates and that durch can be made responsible for the interpretation of a causal 
relation” (p.486). Solstad’s treatment endows the semantics of durch with a CAUSE predicate. If 
the semantic analyses mentioned in the previous section are on the right track regarding the 
eventive status of causative ‘from’-PPs, then this should be expected to carry over to Solstad’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




durch-phrases. In the example below, he presents a causative durch-phrase which is assumed to 
introduce CAUSE on its own since there is no other source of causation. Given that causative 
PPs should be eventive, the durch-argument in this case will have to be reinterpreted as eventive: 
(15) Das Spracherkennungssystem  wird  durch eine  Taste aktiviert.    GERMAN 
 The speech-recognition-system  is  through a  key  activated 
 ‘The speech recognition system is activated by pushing a key.’ 
This is indeed the case: Although the durch-phrase expresses an entity (“a key”), the 
interpretation of durch eine Taste is eventive. This is more explicitly shown in the English prose 
translation “by pushing a key”. Solstad derives the eventive reinterpretation via a semantic 
“sortal shift” and considers it as evidence for the presence of a CAUSE predicate since causative 
predicates require eventive causes and not entities. Solstad’s analysis is important because: (a) it 
reinforces the fact that causes are eventive, as predicted in the previous section and (b) it 
suggests that causative durch-phrases (similar to ‘from’-phrases) are predicative and able to 
introduce a CAUSE element independently of the structure they participate in. 
Along the same line, Rákosi (2010) studies anticausative constructions that license three types of 
“non-canonical” (partly in the sense that they are non-agentive) types of causers (what I refer to 
as Cause here): those found in ‘from’-PPs, those licensed by by-itself phrases, and finally 
unintentional dative causers. The reason these causers are considered “non-canonical” is because 
they manage to get licensed by anticausatives, which lack an external argument. The plot 
becomes more interesting when he challenges the extant theories regarding the underlying 
structure of anticausatives, which all merge in one assumption, namely that anticausatives 
syntactically involve some causative structure (e.g., a CAUS head or CAUS features) responsible 




Based on the distribution and properties of ablative causers in Hungarian—treated on a par with 
causers introduced in English by from, in Greek by apo, and in German by durch—Rákosi 
provides evidence that anticausatives do not have an underlying causative syntax or semantics 
(for details of his analysis see Rákosi (2010)). If anticausatives are not syntactically causatives, 
then these non-canonical causers cannot inherit their causative interpretation from the structure 
they adjoin to and, thus, causation must have some other source (at least in these cases). This is 
reinforced by the fact that non-canonical causes are attributed a causative interpretation even 
beyond the realm of (anti)causative structures—ablative causers are licensed in anticausatives as 
well as in transitives, and stative predicates). Rákosi arguess for a predicational nature of these 
ablative arguments (causes), hence considering non-canonical causes (with the ‘from’ cases 
being most pertinent in this work) as predicates of the caused events. This property of 
introducing a causal relation by themselves is then inferred at a post-syntactic interface. A 
desirable consequence of assuming that causation is inferred through a predicational 
configuration is that we do not need an explicit underlying causal syntax any more. Ultimately, 
this accounts for the interpretation of ‘from’-PPs (among other non-canonical causes) as Cause 
in stative contexts like.  
Finally, Roy&Svenonius (2009) offer an analysis of complex causal prepositions which will be 
responsible for introducing Cause in much the same way other Ps introduce Space. 
Roy&Svenonius map the decomposition of complex causal Ps  (i.e. à cause de ‘because of’, afin 
de ‘in order to’, and de façon à ‘in order to’) onto the well know analysis of complex spatial Ps 





(15) FIGURE [Place in [AxPart front  [K  of  [DP GROUND]]]]  [Spatial] 
    
(16) RESULT [Place  à [AxPart  cause [K de [DP CAUSE]]]]17  [Causative] 
 a. [Paul a annulé son voyage]Figure  à cause de [Marie]Ground 
  ‘Paul cancelled his trip because of Mary.’ 
 b. Les sans-papiers doivent s’unir] Figure  afin de [défender leurs droits]Ground 
  ‘Illegal workers must unite in order to defend their rights.’ 
The suggested mappings are based on a re-interpretation of each head for the complex Ps that 
denote cause in (16a,b). In the re-analysis in (16) the GROUND represents the CAUSE (based on 
Talmy (2000)). In the same way the FIGURE is ‘translated’ as the Effect of that CAUSE. 
Importantly, the causal relation in (16) is expressed by the prepositional linking of GROUND 
(CAUSE) and FIGURE (EFFECT, CONSEQUENCE) as abstracted in (16) and illustrated in examples 
(16a&b): In (16a) the Place à expresses a relation between the CAUSE ‘Marie’, which is 
identified by the AxPart as a “consequence” type of relation lexicalized as cause, and the 
resulting event ‘Paul cancelled his trip’. 
 
Two points should be highlighted in the Roy&Svenonius account with regard to the proposed 
treatment of Cause in this thesis. Firstly, causative interpretations can be rendered by a P alone (a 
complex preposition in this case), which is close to my suggestion for ‘from’. I do not, however, 
consider the lexical properties of ‘from’ responsible for interpeting its complement as Cause. In 
other words, there is no “causal P” (unlike S&R 2009), but the causal meaning is distilled from 
the syntactic environment ‘from’ participates in. Secondly, the causal link between CAUSE and 
RESULT is based on the truth conditions of the whole structure. For example in (16), the truth 
conditions dictate that the RESULT argument has to be “among the ‘consequence’ subset 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




[denoted by the AxPart] of the set of all events which are causally downstream” of the CAUSE 
(R&S 2009:8). In other words, (16) describes a causative relation (i) because there is a semantic 
subset relation between Figure and Ground arguments and (ii) due to the lexical properties of P. 
For the non-lexical verbal configurations, however, I suggest that their causative interpretation is 
the outcome of the internal structure of the ‘from’-PP (which is nonetheless underspecified, 
unlike à cause de which is suggested to mark its complement as Cause), and the syntactic 
environment this PP is found in. 
Based on these observations and arguments, I will pursue a closer investigation of the structure, 
derivations, and distribution of causative ‘from’-phrases to argue for their predicative nature. The 
main inspiration for arguing for their predicational nature, as abstractly depicted in (17), is 
attributed to Marcel den Dikken and his seminal work on predication. I will be referring back to 





CHAPTER 3  IDIOSYNCRASIES OF ‘FROM’ IN CAUSATION 
In this chapter I will review why make/cause are interwoven with the notion with causation, 
investigating their uses across languages. Then I will show how only causatively interpreted 
‘from’-PPs manage to alternate with make/cause and argue for the syntactic nature of these 
alternations. This will be important because it will establish a link between causation and the 
particular set of ‘from’-PPs. Additionally, these sybtactic alternations will help shed some light 
on the distinction between Agents and Causes.   
3.1 THE COMPOSITION OF MAKE 
The fact that many different languages convey causation by using the verb that corresponds to 
the translation of the English make suggests that the semantics of causation in language is 
encapsulated in the meaning of the verb make. This will be useful if we manage to ‘transfer’ the 
semantic properties of ‘make’ to those of ‘from’-PP. Moreno (1993) observes the verb make has 
three main uses: (i) Lexical; where it participates in transitive constructions that denote the 
creation of a new entity/object (implying a causative meaning), also referred to as the “effected 
object”, i.e. he made a cake; (ii) Phrasal; where make combines with a verb (transitive or 
intransitive), noun or adjective to form a complex phrase that describes an activity or a process 
without necessarily producing a new entity/change. Compare for example: darvaazsaa band 
karnaa [door closed make] ‘close the door’ in Hindi with lo egin n-u-en [sleep make 1SG-have-
PAST] ‘I slept’ in Basque. In the former there is a change of state expressed by the combination 
of “close-make” but in the latter there is no effect produced, hence such an example is 
straightforwardly not causative. (iii) Syntactic, where make has no lexical content but rather 




make that will be center stage in this thesis, since it is this sort of examples that not only convey 
a causative meaning (akin to the lexical use of make as a creation verb) but also participate in 
“causative constructions”. Notice that these three uses are derived from a “progressive 
abstractive generalization” starting from the creation of physical objects (a cake) to more 
abstract entities (an agreement) and finally extending to events (Mary talk), with the last being 
considered a “causative use” or a typical “causative construction”.  
The fact that the verb make can participate in causative constructions (with its syntactic use) 
across a wide array of languages, implies that its semantic composition is in crucial respects 
identical to the properties and features of causation per se. These features have been discussed 
and revisited frequently in the literature (see also DeLancey 1984; Talmy 1985; Song 1990; 
Jackendoff 1990; a.o.). Below is a selective and brief description of these features.  
The first feature is Force (Talmy 1985): it refers to the energy exerted by the cause in order to 
bring about an event or a change in the state of the affected object. The second feature is Purpose 
(Song 1990): it describes the intention or volition of the causer. Since there are cases where the 
caused event takes place inadvertently by an unintentional causer as in John accidentally broke 
the vase (by tripping over the table) (Schäfer 2007), Purpose is not a sine qua non condition for 
causation but only participates optionally. The third feature is Transition (Moreno 1993): It is the 
actual change of state of the causee, the shift from the original form or state or property to an 
acquired one once the cause is present. The causative constructions that will be analyzed here 
involve a cause as a starting point of a process (the main source) responsible for bringing about a 
change of state or event with regard to the causee. In sum, causation is the exertion of force (F) 




The fact that only ‘make’ verbs are found across most languages of the world, they convey a 
causative meaning in all their uses (lexical, phrasal, syntactic) and denote transition and force is 
suggestive of their close relation to causation. For languages in which ‘make’ lacks F (i.e. 
Basque, Japanese), special causative affixes are used to compensate for the absence of that 
feature or else the construction cannot be rendered causative. For instance, in the Basque 
example presented earlier (lo egin n-u-en [sleep make 1SG-have-PAST] ‘I slept’), the phrasal 
use of egin ‘make’ in the sentence ‘I slept’ did not convey any causative meaning because egin 
has P and TR, but crucially lacks F. Lack of F preempts it from participating in causative 
constructions. To remedy that, Basque uses the causative infix -ra- which carries F. Thus, 
although egin cannot participate in a causative construction (lo egin ‘sleep’), eragin can (lo 
eragin ‘make sleep’).  
The fact that all equivalent translations of ‘make’ in so many different languages denote “a 
purposive transitional process brought about by force”—which is the semantic composition of 
causation per se—is responsible for its closely woven relation with causation. On a more 
practical level, this analysis can offer theoretical and empirical support to a make-or-break test of 
‘from’-PPs with regard to their causative interpretation in different constructions, for as long, of 
course, as ‘make’ and ‘from’-PPs are proven to be interrelated. 
3.2  IDIOSYNCRASIES OF ‘FROM’ IN AND OUT OF CAUSATION 
3.2.1 ALTERNATIONS: A GOLD STANDARD TEST? 
Levin (2007) offers an interesting diagnostic for testing the causative nature of ‘from’-PPs linked 
them directly to ‘make’. She shifts the attention away from the preposition itself (in 
contradistinction to the approach of Alexiadou 2009 et al.) and focuses on the idiosyncratic 




responsible for interpreting the whole PP as causative. The diagnostic is based on the observation 
that it is only the DP arguments of causative from-PPs that can become the subjects of a 
periphrastic causative with the verbs make/cause18.  
Having presented a short account on the causative nature of make, let us investigate the merits of 
a make/be from alternation scenario. In order to make sure that such alternations can be a ‘gold 
standard test’ for causative ‘from’-PPs, it will not be enough to show that ‘from’-PPs with a 
causative interpretation alternate with a periphrastic make/cause, but, as den Dikken points out, it 
must also and unexceptionally be the case that such alternations systematically fail when the 
‘from’-PP has any other interpretation (i.e., spatial, temporal). Verbal and non-verbal alterations 
in (1–3) are equally acceptable, with the b-counterparts conveying the same meaning as their a-
counterparts. The alternations of intransitive verbs (primarily unaccusatives, rather than 
unergatives) that take either locative or temporal from-PPs in (4–6) are not acceptable 
paraphrases of their a-counterparts: 
CAUSATIVES: 
(1) a. The unemployment is from the crisis. 
b. The crisis caused the unemployment. 
(2) a. The pollution of the gulf comes from the oil spill19. 
b. The oil spill caused the pollution of the gulf. 
(3) a. The door opened from the wind. 
b. The wind made the door to open.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Alternations of make and (cause) to be are described in Heine&Kuteva (2002) as part of a 
more general evolution of the verb make, which participates in the process: “MAKE X > (cause) 
to be X”, observed in denominal verbs in Tamil (among other languages). In the examples they 
submit, make X is semantically equivalent to cause to be X. Given that from conveys cause, these 
make/be from alternations are also expected to be equivalent from a typological point of view as 
well. 
19 The oil spill is the only possibly ambiguous DP in examples (1−3) in a scenario where the oil 
(which is understood as pollution) has been transferred from location A (out of the gulf) to 





(4) a. John telephoned from a distance.   [Locative] 
b. *A distance made John telephone. 
(5) a. John arrived from Rome.    [Directional] 
b. *Rome made John arrive. 
(6) a. Babies smile from an early age.   [Temporal] 
b. *An early age makes babies smile. 
The examples in (1–3) show that all cases of causatively interpreted from-PPs, alternate with a 
make/cause construction unlike the non-causative one in (4–6). However, it is necessary to test 
whether this alternation works in both directions, that is, whether every and only make/cause-
causatives can also alternate with a ‘from’-PP.  
In (7–11) below, it is the case that all make/cause constructions can alternate with a ‘from’-PP. 
Here it is also useful to consider verbs other than make/cause that convey causativity, like bring 
or give in examples (10&11), which pattern like make/cause, providing additional support to the 
VCAUS-to-from alternation direction (and by extension possibly grounds to consider a scenario in 
which verbal causation is underlyingly prepositional):  	  
(7) The cold made John leave early. 
John left early from the cold20. 
(8) Strain made the pipes break. 
The pipes broke from strain. 
(9) The recent earthquakes caused a great damage. 
A great damage came from the recent earthquakes. 
(10) A last minute inspiration brought the idea. 
The idea was from a last minute inspiration. 
(11) Genetic transfusion gives new breeds. 
New breeds come from genetic transfusion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The fact that only causative-PPs allow their argument DPs to undergo this alternation suggests 
that: (i) the make/be from alternation is possible only for causative constructions and (ii) it is a 
sound diagnostic for distinguishing causative ‘from’-PPs from other types of ‘from’-PPs.	  
While a causative construction always supports a make/be from alternation, lexical uses of 
make—in the sense of creation—do not support alternations. This is an additional argument for 
the validity of the VCAUS-to-from diagnostic. The examples in (12a,b) show that a lexical use of 
make can only support from-alternations when the P-argument denotes origin, but not cause. So 
the only available reading for the cake is from Bill is the non-Agentive one, which is not 
semantically equivalent to Bill made the cake.	  
(12) a. Bill made the cake.     
The cake is from Bill.    [Bill brought the cake] 
The cake is from Bill    [Bill baked the cake] 
b. Bill made this painting. 
 This painting is from Bill.   [Bill gave/brought the painting] 
This painting is from Bill.   [Bill painted it]21 
Interestingly, when the theme of lexical make is a non-agentive entity as in (13), the ambiguity 
observed in the from-alternant example disappears and the two alternants are semantically 
equivalent:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Native speakers of English intuitively interpret examples like (12) as source, where Bill has 
brought the cake or the painting but not made either of them. Interpreting Bill as the baker or the 
painter, however, is not entirely impossible. In fact, there are a few examples available online: 
(i) The first painting is from Pat Marvenko Smith and was done in 1992. 
[http://www.sermonsfromseattle.com/books_of_the_bible_the_lamb.htm] 
What is interesting though, is that the frequency of such examples is significantly smaller in 
comparison to all other interpretations (spatial, temporal, source). Example (i) was the first 
relevant interpretation of the from-argument after 110 Google returns (roughly speaking, 1% of 
all the Google returns for “the painting is from__”). But more importantly, native speakers of 
English report that such from-PP interpretations sound non-native and are actually dispreferred 





(13)  My own head made the argument.   
The argument is from my own head.  [only causative reading available] 
[http://lyfaber.blogspot.com/2010/02/scotistic-argument.html] 
Alexiadou et al. (2007, 2009) bring up another class of verbs that resists causative alternations, 
namely unergatives. The claim that unergative verbs resist Causes is based on the fact that 
unergative verbs already have a subject (agent) which, in turn, has control over the event. 
Therefore, the addition of an external cause is impossible since it would compete for the same 
position. In addition they argue that unergatives do not have a causative analysis (which seems to 
be true) thus they should not be able to combine with cause-PPs. Remember here that they also 
argue that co-occurrence with a Cause-PP can be used as a causativity diagnostic,22 which then 
cyclically proves again that unergatives are not causative. However, there are some important 
empirically challenges. In the rest of this section I will discuss how unergatives invite cause-PPs 
and why this is not problematic. 
Alexiadou et al. (2009) discuss some cases of unergatives that seem to exceptionally accept 
causative ‘from’-PPs (which are also unambiguous) like:  
(14) She jumped from happiness.  
Their conclusion nevertheless is that unergatives do not have a causative interpretation and that 
examples like (14) do not constitute counterevidence because:  
(A) They resist alternations as in: 
(14ʹ)  ??Happiness made her jump.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 As discussed in 2.1, I will not consider this as a valid diagnostic, since mere co-occurrence 




In other words, they cannot become subjects in periphrastic causatives. The examples provided 
below, on the other hand, constitute direct counter-evidence to this argument and more 
specifically for that from-PP: 
(15) A sudden loud explosion made her jump back in surprise. 
[http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119151526/PDFSTART] 
(16) The touch on her shoulder made her jump and brought her back to reality. 
[http://www.fanfiction.net/s/2883112/1/Dark_Flight_Down] 
(B) They do not convey Cause but Source.  
Arguing that happiness in (14) is not the Cause, but has instead some Source is semantically 
tautologous since I have extensively argued that Cause is a kind of Source. In absence of a 
formal distinction between the categories Source and Cause, it is not possible to argue for their 
different interpretations. Additionally, it does not shed any light on why or whether these 
unergatives resist alternations. 
To extend the discussion beyond (14), I provide below additional examples from both English 
and Greek with unergative verbs taking ‘from’-PPs with a causative interpretation. In (17), the 
cause-NP can become the subject of a periphrastic causative sentence headed by make rendering 
an equally causative meaning as the prepositional counterpart: 
(17) UNERGATIVE  ALTERNATIONS: 
a. i gineka fliarouse astamatita apo amixania   GREEK 
 D woman babblingPAST endlessly from awkwardness    
I amixania  ekane ti gineka na fliari astamatita. 
D awkwardness made D woman to babble endlessly 
‘The woman was babbling endlessly from awkwardness →  








b23. Etrexe  stin Αthina apo fovo min tοn prolavi kanenas alos.  
 running to-the  Athens  from  fear  not  CL catch up no one else           
Ο fovos na min tοn prolavi kanenas alos ton ekane na trexi stin Αthina. 
D fear to not CL catch up noone else CL made to run to-the Athens  
‘He was running to Athens out of fear that someone would catch him → 
The fear that someone would catch him made him run to Athens.’ 
[http://www.koureio.net/]  
 We have been running from fear since 9/11.   
Since 9/11 fear has made us run. 
 [http://spiritualpopcorn.blogspot.com/2005_07_01_archive.html] 
c. Ο aetos petaxe psila apo ton dinato aera. 
 D kite flew high from D strong  air  
 Ο dinatos aeras ekane ton aeto na petaksi psila. 
 D strong  air   made  D  kite to fly high  
‘The kite flew high from the strong wind → 
The strong wind made the kite fly high.’ 
 Your spirit flies high from the joy of doing what you did.     
 The joy of doing what you did makes your spirit fly high.    
 [http://www.datehookup.com/Thread-258833.htm] 
d. The warmth made her yawn.  
 She yawned from the warmth. 
 [http://www.mycandylove.com/forum/t9406,3-immortal-academy.htm] 
e. Carbonation made him burp. 
 He burped from the carbonation. 
  [This Vacant Paradise by Victoria Patterson, p.221] 
If the periphrastic causative criterion is valid across-the-board, then these ‘from’-PPs are 
causative in nature and contrary to Alexiadou’s et al. suggestion they do combine with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Let me point out that (17b) constitutes direct counter-evidence to Alexiadou’s et al. (2009:10, 
example (35)) repeated below as (17b′): 
(17b′) */#i stratiotes perpatisan apo fovo.  vs.  (17b) etrexe [..] apo fovo. 
 ‘The soldiers walked/marched from fear.’      ‘he was running from fear.’ 
Although (17b′) is not as readily acceptable (no combinations of “walk from” could be mined 
online either) as (17b), it is not the case that it is ungrammatical (hence the two judgments in 
(17b′)). After all, the fact that (17b′) is somehow degraded does not necessarily mean that this is 
due to the ‘from’-PP that cannot combine with unergatives and certainly not that this PP cannot 
convey causation⎯which is straightforwardly the case in (17b).  
The reasons responsible for the unfavorable judgment of (17b′) are most probably pragmatic, 
rather than grammatical. It is usually the case for “fear” to trigger more intense or extreme 
reactions, such as “running”, rather than simply “walking” or “marching”. Consequently (17b′) is 
not ungrammatical (especially in the light of equivalent constructions like (17b)), but simply 




unergative verbs. Additionally, it is also claimed that unergative verbs cannot take natural force 
causing event NPs, however, (17c) features “strong wind” as a cause is acceptable.  
What the examples in (17) show overall is that: (a) causative ‘from’-PPs are not banned from 
unergative constructions.  
This section has investigated and confirmed the validity of make/be from alternations as a 
diagnostic for causativity by testing different possible alternations taking into consideration some 
exceptions and restrictions. In sum, these alternations apply bidirectionally and across-the-board. 
In other words, only causative make examples alternate with ‘from’-PPs, while at the same time, 
only causative ‘from’-PPs alternate with make, unlike other interpretations of ‘from’ like 
locative, directional or temporal. Notably, these alternations apply equally to non-verbal as well 
as verbal environments, while in the latter, they extend both to transitive and intransitive cases. 
Finally some unergative examples were discussed due to their non-causative nature and it was 
empirically shown that they are not allergic to causative ‘from’-PPs and that they support 
periphrastic alternations, modulo pragmatic considerations. 	  
Overall, two are the most important conclusions up to now: (i) the make/be from alternation is a 
valid causative diagnostic and (ii) causation is conveyed by the preposition per se because we 
have seen at least two environments—non-verbal configurations and unergatives—which by 
common concensus, lack a causative analysis (independently of what that analysis might be), but 
nevertheless successfully combine with causatively interpreted ‘from’-PPs. In the following 
section, I will submit some additional observations regarding the availability of Agents or 
Causers, along with some discussion on their interference with the nature of the verb they appear 




3.2.2 AGENT/CAUSER INHIBITIONS 
It was shown that VCAUS-to-from in (1–3) work well across all examples, but ‘the fly in the 
ointment’ is that the nature of the cause can interfere with the availability of such causative 
alternations. More specifically, the generalization is that VCAUS-to-from alternations seem to 
work well for as long as P’s complement is not animate, and consequently ‘from’ is always 
associated with Cause, but not with Agent/Causer. We can see this in the alternations in 
(18b&19b) which do not yield the same judgments as their inanimate counterparts (18′&19′): 
(18) a. Mary made John leave early. (19) a. Jack made him sneeze. 
b. *John left early from Mary.  b. *He sneezed from Jack.	  
(18′) John left early from Mary’s nagging.    (19′)   He sneezed from Jack’s pepper tricks. 
The difference in acceptability becomes immediately apparent if we replace the animate ‘from’-
argument with an inanimate nominal phrase, a Cause as in Mary’s nagging or Jack’s pepper 
tricks 24. Although the generalization that the complement of ‘from’ must be inanimate seems to 
be unexceptionally true, I will have to reserve a more in-depth analysis for future work. In what 
follows, I will lay out certain considerations in accounting for the ban of animates in the 
complement of ‘from’ with regrd to the current literature.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Although animates are banned in the complement of from, it was pointed out by some native 
speakers that within an appropriate scenario, an Agent could be licensed in this position: 
(i) Mary left from John. 
The intended reading for (i) is a causative one where John is the cause of Mary’s departure. 
However, John is always understood as a phrase with some null constituents rather than a single 
proper noun, along the lines of: “John’s behavior” or “John’s remarks”, with the silent parts 
(behavior, remarks) being retrievable from the context. Ultimately, (i) can be considered 
acceptable for as long as the P-complement is understood as a causing event very much in the 




Restrictions on animacy of an argument have been related to the semantics of the verbs they 
combine with. The literature is mostly concerned about internal (wilt, blossom, decay) and 
external change of state (COS) verbs (destroy, kill, write) and the kind of subjects they combine 
with25. It seems that the subjects of internally COS verbs are rarely agentive and, by extension, 
animate (Wright 2001). Exceptions, however, have been noted by McKoon&McFarland (2000) 
where animate Causers or Agents do combine with internally COS verbs as in: 
(20) The gardener allowed/?caused the prize rose to wither/wilt. 
(21) The boy left his bicycle out in the rain and let/?made it rust. 
Notice that periphrastic causative constructions with animate causers are more easily deemed 
acceptable when they employ verbs like allow or let rather than make or cause. Levin (2009) 
argues that one of the reasons for this lies in the nature of processes that internally COS verbs 
describe. Since such verbs describe inherent biological processes, they “will happen inexorably 
in the natural order of things”, thus any direct (agentive) causation is preempted and only indirect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The notion of “change of state” encapsulates a sense of causation since these verbs “describe 
changes in the physical shape or appearance of an entity” (Levin and Rappaport 1995). A COS 
predicate denotes some transition from one state to another, also attested in Dowty’s BECOME 
operator which conveys the notion of change. Interestingly, COS verbs participate in causative 
alternations: John opened the window/the window opened.  
A closer look, however, immediately reveals many exceptions in terms of the 
transitive/intransitive and causative/non-causative uses of these verbs that need to be accounted 
for. Levin and Rappaport (1995:89) introduce the distinction between internally and externally 
COS verbs to predict whether a COS verb would participate in a causative alternation and, by 
extension, have a causative underlying structure or not. Their suggestion was that intransitive 
verbs with transitive causative alternants (the vase broke/he broke the vase) are externally COS 
verbs. On the other hand intransitives without causative alternants are internally caused (he 
laughed). This distinction then roughly corresponds to the unaccusative/unergative distinction 
and is also proposed as an unaccusativity diagnostic by L&R (1995).  
The distinction should not be treated axiomatically though since there are some exceptions cross-
linguistically. Alexiadou (2010) correctly points out, based on a cross-linguistic study, that “the 
distinction might be the correct generalization concerning the morphological pattern of 
anticausative formation in certain languages (unmarked vs. marked), but not concerning the 




causation can be deemed possible, which is preferably expressed by natural environmental 
forces, circumstances or attributes (non-agentive, in general).  
The inherent properties of internally COS verbs, however, do not necessarily presuppose that a 
third party cannot interfere. If the caused event is contingent on the active participation of an 
external causer/agent, while at the same time, its absence prevents the initiation and progression 
of the event, then we can safely assume that we are dealing with a causative relation between 
external direct causer/agent and causee. For instance, although one may suggest that roses will 
eventually bloom due to their inherent property to blossom, it is also the case that they might not 
unless someone interferes. Consider the example David can bloom roses in the middle of winter 
(also repeated as (22j) below), where had it not been for David, the roses would not have 
naturally bloomed in the middle of winter. Notice that in such examples the choice of let/allow 
over make is critical since it can give out different readings: let/allow presupposes that David did 
not interfere (i.e., by killing or pulling up the flowers), but on the contrary it was the absence of 
his interference as an agent that helped the roses bloom. Make on the other hand, strongly 
suggests a direct and volitional interference (i.e., David gave the roses some synthetic plant 
steroid) that brought about the blooming, contrary to the roses’ inherent property of blooming in 
the summer and not in the middle of winter26.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Although (22j) is a verbatim example from a conversation, one may also find similar sentences 
abiding by the same provision of interference:  
(i) The Palestinians made the desert bloom  
[http://lawrenceofcyberia.blogs.com/news/2010/03/palestinians-made-the-desert-bloom.html]  
This example clearly presupposes the interference of Palestinians as the causers of the desert’s 




Another reason for internal COS verbs being recalcitrant to external causes, according to Levin 
(2009:22), is the following: “As many of these changes are viewed as undesirable (e.g., rotting, 
wilting, etc.), it is unlikely that they will be indirectly caused by a third party; hence, the paucity 
of make and cause examples.” In other words, our knowledge of the world builds the assumption 
that agents would not act to bring about “undesirable” effects. This, of course, is easily disproven 
given the right circumstances. After all, the “undesirability” of internal changes, such as rotting, 
wilting or decaying, is only based on the mistaken assumption that they are always bad or 
undesirable27. Although examples that feature animate causers/agents of internally COS verbs 
are indeed rare, they are certainly not absent. Most of the following mined examples cover a 
wide range of causative versions of internally COS verbs as well as their periphrastic 
counterparts with make: 
GREEK: 
(22) a. ihe perasi “aeriko” apo pano tou ke ton emarane.  
had passed    pixie   from above him and CL wilted 
‘a pixie had passed over him and wilted him.’ 
[http://www.sarantakos.com/kibwtos/mazi/ppd_aeriko.html] 
b. epitides to skourjase οlokliro. 
 purposely CL rusted all 
 ‘he rusted it [the car] on purpose’  
 [http://www.alfisti.gr/forum/archive/index.php/t-11296.html]    
c. tha valo to kranos mou, tha paro to glob kai tha se sapiso.     
 FUT put D helmet my  FUT take D bat  and FUT CL rot 
 ‘I will put my helmet on, I will take my bat and I will rot you.’  
[http://ziou-kitsou.blogspot.com/] 
d. i  thea tis anixis ekane ta louloudia na anthizoun  
 D goddess D spring made D flowers to bloom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Here are some examples of desirable uses of such verbs:  
(i) Instantly, you cannot create alcohol. It has to rot, rot, rot, and the more it rots, the more 
good it is, they say.           [http://kalkichrist.wordpress.com/2010/01/01/it-is-wise-to-avoid-insulting-christ-shri-kalki/]  
(ii) Duracoat does plenty good for firearms. You have to rust your surface first. Then it 
bonds to the rust and becomes part of the metal. 
[http://www.marlinowners.com/forums/index.php?action=printpage;topic=53088.0]  
(iii) To make spinach salad really great, you have to wilt it in the dressing just a little so that 




 kai tous agrous na karpoforoun. 
 kai  D  fields to bear fruits 
 ‘the godess of spring made the flowers bloom and the fields bear fruits.’ 
[http://resistance-hellas.blogspot.com/2010/05/blog-post_6776.html] 
ENGLISH: 
e. There is a woman who played that banjo so badly and sang so poorly that I think 
  she made the flowers wilt.  
[http://wyaryan.blogspot.com/2007/10/accentuating-negative.html] 
f. They made him rot so he would be eaten more quickly in the river. 
[http://psychicteamwork.com/MISSING/publicr/adjidesircase648page2.htm] 
 g. He made the millet and barley rot in the fields.  
[“Nart Sagas from the Caucasus”] 
h. He caused the towns to decay 	  
[http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a727190284&db=all] 
i. Wherever she found a bloodied scuff, she rusted the vehicle's bodywork. 
[http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2008/sep/27/jeanettewinterson.alismith] 
 j. David can bloom roses in the middle of winter.  
  
The examples in (22) not only show that external causers may, in some cases, be agentive, but 
they also challenge L&R’s (1995) conclusion that internally caused COS verbs do not have 
causative transitive uses28. Although such examples may not be widely used, their presence is 
nevertheless unequivocal. Levin (2009) refers to these cases as “occasional causative transitive 
uses” of some unergative verbs and argues against a causative analysis for their underlying 
structure. In other words, although all examples in (22) have a causative interpretation, they 
should not be assigned a causative underlying structure. 
3.2.3 CORRELATION NOT CAUSATION 
Alexiadou et al. (2009) claim that internally caused verbs do have a causative structure involving 
a vCAUS head responsible for the licensing of the cause-PP and they note another distinction: 
with verbs of internal COS, apo ‘from’ is dispreferred, while me ‘with’ is more preferable. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 In fact, Levin&Rappaport do admit that although internally caused change of state verbs due to 
their inherent properties do not need an external cause, nevertheless they may occasionally have 




distributional pattern is attributed to the fact that internal COS verbs do not have external direct 
causes but can only license indirect causes29. In other words, blossom should be able to combine 
with a cause but only if it is indirect and consequently introduced in a with-PP. The relevant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Alexiadou et al. (2009 and earlier) attribute the distinction between apo ‘from’ and me ‘with’ 
on the nature of the causal relation, namely direct or indirect following Bittner (1999) who 
introduces the notion of direct causation. Given that causation is a configuration of events e and 
e′, where one chronologically precedes the other, then e an e′ are in a direct causal relation iff 
there is no other intermediate cause in the pragmatically determined causal order. The notions of 
direct/indirect causation are reinterpreted by Levin&Rappaport (1999) with event related 
terminology: direct causation constitutes one event with two co-identified subevents, while 
indirect causation involves two (or more) temporarily distinct events.  
Although me ‘with’ does seem to describe two independent events, the suggestion that apo 
‘from’ is reserved for direct causation, however, is not borne out empirically. I submit here two 
unambiguous examples of indirect causation (where intermediate causes occur between cause 
and causee) that are perfectly compatible with an apo-PP denoting an external and independent 
cause:  
(i) i perikopi tha erthi apo tin allagi stis siskevasies ton farmakon.  GREEK 
 D  cuts  FUT come  from  D change to-the packaging D drugs 
‘The budget cuts will be due to a change in the drugs’s packaging’ 
 [http://www.iatronet.gr/endoscope.asp] 
(ii) 2,5 ekat. Euro imerisios «xani» i Θessaloniki apo tis kathisterisis  
 2.5 mil. Euro daily  loses D Thessaloniki from D delays     
 sto  ergο  tou metro. 
 to-the  construction D  metro  




Example (i) describes a cause-and-effect situation where the cause does not itself (directly) bring 
about the caused event, but there are at least 3 distinct intervening events/stages: It is suggested 
that a change in the packaging (cause) will affect the amount of the dosage per package, which 
will eliminate surpluses of dosages, which will, in turn, lower the cost incurred by these 
prescriptions, which will eventually lead to major budget cuts for the state insurance. In example 
(ii), the intermediate stages between cause-and-effect are even more obscure. As the Technical 
Chamber of Greece suggests in its report, the delays with the construction of the subway system 
cause the citizens to use private vehicles for their commutes. The use of cars, in turn, incurs costs 
of transportation, maintenance, etc., which ultimately accounts for the cost of 2.5mil. euros/day. 
Both (i&ii) describe cause-and-effect cases where the cause/source has a secondary or tertiary 
effect, which is introduced as the theme in each example. These examples indicate that apo 




example that confirms this hypothesis is the judgment given by Alexiadou et al. (2009: (30)), 
and repeated below: 
(23) To fito  anthise  ??apo/me  ti  zesti30.   GREEK   
‘The  plant  blossomed  from/with the  heat.’ 
If (23) is the “strongest argument that in Greek in contexts where the relation between the cause 
and the change of state is semantically indirect me is favored and apo is dis-preferred” (p.12), 
then such an interpretation of the data must be revisited in the light of two major considerations: 
(a) the notions of direct and indirect causation, as well as their boundaries, are not clearly 
defined in syntactic terms in order to give grammaticality judgments. Thus, such distinctions of 
causation cannot be held responsible for sanctioning ‘with’-PPs and banning ‘from’-PPs. And (b) 
there are contrary judgments deeming causative ‘from’-PPs with verbs of internal COS 
acceptable, but most pertinently for (23). According to several native speakers (23) is matter-of-
factly more preferable with apo ‘from’ rather than with me ‘with’ when conveying cause.31 So 
not only can apo-PPs combine with verbs of internal COS, but they can also successfully 
introduce an external cause—although not an agent.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Note that the ‘with’ version is ambiguous between a causative and a temporal interpretation (in 
the sense that ‘the heat’ is interpreted as ‘the warmer weather’). This conforms well with the 
suggestion that ‘with’ primarily conveys simultaneity rather than causation. On the other hand, 
this ambiguity is not available for the ‘from’ version, which is unambiguously causative. 
31 Additional examples in support of the ability of causative from-PPs to combine with internal 
COS verbs comes from the following examples: 
(i)     ...ta anakatevoume me kουtali jia na marathoun apo ti domata.  GREEK 
  ‘we stir them with a spoon so as to wilt from the tomato.’ 
[http://katiascouzina.blogspot.com/2009_09_01_archive.html] 
(ii)      Skourjase apo ton aera ke tin amo. 





The discussion over apo vs. me is peripheral to the topic of this thesis, but given the salient 
divergence between judgments for (23), as well as the controversy it has stirred, I will discuss the 
main reasons why me ‘with’ should not be analyzed on a par with apo ‘from’, although on the 
surface it appears that they can both participate in causative constructions introducing the cause.  
Firstly, me ‘with’ cannot convey causation on its own in the absence of other causative elements 
in a sentence. Thus, (24a) is straightforwardly ungrammatical while (24b) is always acceptable, 
as expected given the preceding discussion: 
(24) a. * i gripi einai me ton kainourjio io.       GREEK 
    D flu  is with D  new  virus   
  ‘The fever is with the new virus.’   
b.  i gripi einai apo ton kainourjio io. 
  D flu is from D new virus  
  ‘the fever is from the new virus.’  
    [http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/news/local/232185] 
Secondly, me-PPs do not systematically undergo causative alternations like apo-PPs do, a 
diagnostic used in section 3.1.1: 
 c.  to afheniko prokalei ponokefalous.    GREEK 
    ‘The cervical syndrome causes headaches.’  
   i ponokefali einai  ✓apo/*me to afheniko. 
   ‘the headaches are   from/with the cervical syndrome.’ 
Thirdly, in contrastive examples, even those speakers that find the apo counterpart of (20) 
awkward, they judged (24d) as considerably better: 
   d. To fito anthise       ✓	 apo  ti zesti  … oxi to kalo kladema. 
  ‘The plant  blossomed  from  the heat   …  not the good pruning.’  
 e. To fito anthise      ✓	 me ti zesti  … oxi to kalo kladema. 
  ‘The plant blossomed with the heat …  not the good pruning.’ 
The contrastive structure is used to juxtapose the two PPs, syntactically and semantically. The 
contrastive phrase contains such a DP which pragmatically forces a causative meaning. This 




were indeed as questionable as indicated in (24), the contrast in (24d) would not have managed 
to invoke this judgment.  
Another interesting observation is that while apo can be replaced by or understood as ex aitias or 
logo ‘because of, due to’, me is only replaced by parallila, mazi, or eno ‘alongside, together, 
while’. This intuitively makes apo a more ‘fit’ candidate for purely causative readings. On the 
other hand, me-PPs motivate a temporal interpretation conveying simultaneity. So although in 
(24e) one could argue that the heat is either a simultaneously occurring event (in this case it 
could allude to the season) or a cause, the same is never true for (24d), where the heat is 
necessarily interpreted as the cause. 
Finally, when me and apo-PPs appear together in a causatively interpreted sentence (given that 
both PPs are equally pragmatically possible to be interpreted as causes), it is the apo-PP that is 
always understood as the “main cause”, while the me-PP is understood as the temporal frame of 
the causative relation. This effect is true independently of the ordering of the PPs:  
(25) a To fito    marathike  apo tis vroxes me to krio    GREEK 
  ‘the plant wilted     from the rains with the cold.’ 
 b.   To fito    marathike  me to krio apo tis vroxes     
 ‘the plant wilted     with the cold from the rains.’ 
Linear order is not really important, as was also revealed by the judgments32. In both cases, it is 
the argument of ‘from’ that is always understood as the main cause of the ‘wilting’, while the 
‘with’ argument is interpreted as the temporal framework of the cause. If the proposal in (2.17) 
that the causative interpretation of a ‘from’-PP is contingent on the predicational relation of that 
PP and the theme argument, then we can assume that the ‘with’-PP is not a small clause 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Native speakers’ judgments did not make a distinction between (25a&b), but there was a 




predicate, but an adjunct. This is supported by (24a), where ‘with’-PPs are never compatible with 
the copula, unlike (24b). If this is correct, then the ordering effects are indeed not important in 
(25) as adjuncts can attach either to the PredP or the vP. In the former case (25a), the ‘with’-PP 
provides a temporal frame for the entire structure ‘the plant wilted from the rain’. In the latter 
case (25b), the ‘with’ PP refers only to the temporal frame of the ‘wilting’.  
The four facts briefly presented above were: (i) me-PPs cannot convey causation in copular 
examples, (ii) me-PPs do not systematically participate in causative alternations, (iii) apo-PPs 
become readily available in contrastive environments, surprisingly even for those that find them 
awkward in non-contrastive constructions and (iv) apo-PPs are always understood as the main 
cause when co-occurring with me-PPs. These points suggest that me-PPs might be causatively 
interpreted only in the absence of apo-PPs. This causative interpretation, however, is attributed 
to the effect of temporal correlation (the simultaneity) of the two arguments i.e., the ‘cold’ and 
the ‘wilting of the flowers’. In reality, the two might not be causatively related at all, after all 
there are flowers that blossom only in the winter; in this case the ‘cold’ is not the Cause but the 
temporal frame of the ‘wilting’. Crucially, this is never the case with the argument of apo, which 
is always interpreted as the Cause in such examples.	  
In this subsection different kinds of inhibitions were visited: firstly with regard to Agents, which 
resist being introduced in a ‘from’-PP, and secondly with regard to Causes, which contrary to 
considerations in the literature, do manage to appear with internal change of state verbs. 
Importantly, all these “exceptional” examples undergo causative alternations, a fact that indicates 
that their underlying structures should ideally be similar to other causative ones. Since this thesis 
will not go into a detailed analysis of internally COS verbs and their causative transitive uses, it 




linguistically and respond well to the causative alternation diagnostic, it would be desirable to 
extend any causation theory to these examples as well.  
There are still two important issues, however, to be addressed: (i) the nature of the alternations 
between make/cause and causative ‘from’-PPs, which I will turn to in the next section, and (ii) 
the distinction between Agents and Causes, which I will discuss further in 3.3.  
3.2.4 CONNECTIVITY SIDEEFFECTS  
Since a strong semantic relationship has been established from the examples above between 
alternations of causatives from-PP with make/cause sentences, Tortora observes that it is 
important to also ascertain whether or not these alternations are in fact syntactically derived. In 
other words, we need to test whether these alternations underlyingly share the same structure and 
whether there is syntactic evidence for that. One syntactic tool we can use is to look into possible 
connectivity effects and binding principles.    
Connectivity effects arise when an argument is pronounced in a position different than the 
position it is actually interpreted, the ‘displaced’ position, according to Chomsky (1995). 
Displacement suggests that some kind of movement has taken place, therefore, we consider 
connectivity effects to be the result of movement. Such connectivity effects lead to interesting 
predictions and give insights regarding the moved constituents and their original position in a 
sentence when they participate in binding relations with each other. In this section, I will show 
how connectivity effects between an anaphor and its antecedent can prove vital in pointing to the 
origin of an argument, and more importantly for this work, the position of the Cause argument. 
It has been shown in Burzio (1986), Belletti&Rizzi (1988), Pesetsky (1995), and Fujita (1996), 




Belletti&Rizzi (1988) first observed that Experiencer psych verbs display backward binding as 
in (26) where each other’s is bound by Bill and Mary. Similar effects were noted for dative 
constructions in (27) (but not for their double object counterparts as observed by Zubizarreta 
(1992) and Pesetsky (1995)) where the second object binds an anaphor contained in the first 
object. (28) is also interesting as it shows that such backward binding phenomena are preserved 
even when (27) is passivized. And finally, in (29), the reciprocal in the subject position is bound 
by an antecedent inside the raising verb’s argument. What is most germane to this thesis, 
however, is that connectivity effects also extend to causative predicates (see (30–31)) as 
observed by Pesetsky (1995): 
(26) [Each other’s]i pictures annoy Bill and Maryi. [Experiencer predicate] 
(27) John showed [each other’s]i friends to Bill and Maryi. [Dative construction] 
(28) [Each other’s]i friends were shown to Bill and Maryi. [Passivized] 
(29) Friends of [each other]i seem to Bill and Maryi to be very nice. [Raising V] 
(30) [Each other’s]i remarks make Bill and Maryi laugh. [Causative predicate] 
(31) [Each other’s]i remarks gave Bill and Maryi a book. [Causative use of give] 
In each of the examples above, the anaphor each other is successfully bound by its antecedent 
that is crucially found further down the sentence. According to principle A of the Binding theory, 
reflexives and reciprocals must be generated within their antecedent's governing category in 
order to be properly bound by the antecedent.33 This then predicts that the base structure of (30) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 As pointed out by den Dikken, there are some cases of successful binding which crucially do 
not and/or cannot abide by the c-command requirement of the Binding theory, and importantly 
for some of these cases, there is no available reconstruction site for the bindee. The most well-
known case is the specificational copular connectivity effects, discussed in Higgins (1973), 
Jacobson (1994), and Sharvit (1999), a.o.:  
(i) The person Johni likes most __ is himselfi.  
(ii) The woman who every Englishmani admires __  is hisi mother. 
(iii) What no studenti enjoys __ is hisi finals. 




should look like (32), where movement of the anaphor creates two copies,34 one in the base 
position and one in the top-most position of the movement chain:  
(32) <each other’s remarksi> make Bill and Maryi laugh <each other’s remarksi>. 
Although it is quite apparent that only the top-most copy is phonetically realized, it is not as 
straightforward that this is also the one involved in interpretation. In fact, for the interpretation of 
this sentence we rely on the lower copy, which is properly bound by its antecedent Bill and 
Mary. Thus, we assume that (30) and its likes are derived from (32), otherwise the reciprocal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(v) Hisi car is every mani’s joy and pride. 
In (i–iii) the post-copular constituent behaves as if it were in the gap in the pre-copular 
constituent. Examples (iv&v), however, have no gap in the pre-copular constituent. So even if 
we contemplated some backward reconstruction scenario or silent copies on either sides of the 
copula to account for the connectivity effects in (i–iii), we would still fail to account for (iv) and 
(v). This radical absence of possible reconstruction sites ensues that binding relationships are not 
always and necessarily established via structural c-command (or even some scope-cum-linear-
order constraints, as suggested by Jäger 2005 or Shan and Barker 2006). The facts in (i–v) 
indicate that some specificational copular sentences may allow binding without c-
command⎯both Jacobson 1994 and Sharvit 1999 offer a formal semantic account that explains 
their successful binding as a result of the equal denotation by both constituents of the copular 
sentence.  
Barker (2008) offers an interesting series of examples, displaying similar to specificational 
copular effects, where quantificational expressions bind pronouns from non c-commanding 
positions. But is the abandonment of c-command possible? It seems that the repercussions of 
such a radical move would outnumber its gains—the most important being of course the fact that 
it feeds the Binding Principles, which, in turn, account for a wide range of correct grammatical 
predictions. So let us examine the exceptional cases for which c-command appears to be 
superfluous. Barker’s data cover only quantificational binding (each, every, no) but no other type 
of anaphora. None of the cases provided as counterevidence to the necessity of c-command in 
binding relations involves reciprocals, unlike examples (21–26). Also the semantics of 
specificational copular sentences seem to exhibit idiosyncratic properties unlike all other 
examples that feature binding relations.  
34 This prediction is in accordance with the copy theory. Other accounts are also available, for 
instance the reconstruction account where the anaphor moves downward into its original 
position, which is now occupied by a trace. In that case, the evaluation of the anaphor takes place 
at its trace, which is lower than its binder. The bottom-line is that for as long as the evaluation of 




would fail to be licensed in its surface position and the sentence would have to be deemed 
ungrammatical as a direct consequence of Principle A. If we take (30) to be derived via 
movement, it would ultimately mean that (30) and (32) share the same underlying structure. But 
before we extend this claim to all causative predicates, let us test whether this is equally true for 
causative constructions (i.e., copular and verbal) with the same or different reciprocals (i.e., each 
other and one another), and importantly whether they all support ‘from’-alternations.  
The following sentences involve both verbal and copular (unambiguous) causatives, while they 
do support both reciprocals. Importantly, they all alternate with a make/cause sentence35:  
(33) a. Bill and Mary'si divorce was from each other'si jealousy.      [copular] 
b. Each other'si jealousy caused Bill and Mary'si divorce.  
(34) a. The team’s membersi won the game from each othersi’ moral support.  [TRAN] 
b. Each other’si moral support made the team’s membersi win the game. 
(35) a. Bill and Maryi will only heal from one another’si love.      [INTR-anticaus] 
b. Only one another'si love will {heal Bill&Maryi/make Bill&Maryi heal}. 
As per the copular example, it is always the case that they alternate with cause. It should also be 
noted with regard to (34) that causative constructions are different from other transitives, which 
do not support similar configurations or from-alternations, thus (34′) is not acceptable.  
(34′) a. * Each other’si friends thanked John and Maryi 
We have seen that examples (33–35) offer support for the assumption drawn earlier from 
(30&31), namely that they are derivationally related. Employing different reciprocals (each other 
& one another), (33–35) manage to give out acceptable VCAUS-to-be from alternations across-
the-board, while, such alternations were blocked with non-causative verbs (see (34′)). Given the 
discussion and observations in this section, I will tentatively conclude that VCAUS-to-from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Although these examples have not been mined from online sources, they have all been judged 




alternations are of syntactic nature. This is important because it links causative ‘from’ with 
‘cause/make’ strengthening the alternations diagnostic and opening up the door to future research 
of the possibility of deriving VCAUS from causative ‘from’-PPs.  
3.2.5   EVALUATION OF EARLIER TREATMENTS  
In what follows I will summarize Pesetsky’s approach, which is congruent in some respects with 
the proposed predicative analysis in this work ((17) in section 2). Although there are some 
configurational differences, both accounts operate on two pivotal hypotheses: (i) the Cause is 
generated in a low position in the underlying structure (also shown in 3.2.3) and (ii) the Source 
of Cause can also be prepositional in nature instantiated either by a CAUS head or a P. The bone 
of contention, however, will be the structural nature of this prepositional phrase introducing 
causation; to wit, an adjunct vs. a predicate.  
In his (1995) work, Pesetsky presents an interesting account of the underlying configuration of 
causatives, where CAUS is realized as a “clause-internal preposition” that can be lexicalized by 
prepositions like out of, of, or for 36 and which takes as its argument the Cause: 
(36) Sue yelled (out of frustration). 
(37) John died (of consumption). 
(38) Mary jumped (for joy). 
This P head that realizes CAUS, and which then internally selects a Cause-DP, is not selected by 
the verb’s theta grid and consequently lies lower than the rest of the selected arguments (i.e., 
Goal, Theme). Due to the fact that the CAUS-phrase in these examples is optional, Pesetsky 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The proposal for a prepositional affix with causative interpretation originally stems from 
Walinska de Hackbeil (1986) who developed such an analysis for the causative en- (i.e., enlarge) 




assigns it “the status of because or the wh-phrase why” and treats CAUS in an “adjunct-
preposition” (1995:196ff.). In his proposed structure in (34) he uses the term “Causer”:  
(39) [VP  [V′ V  [PP1 Goal/Exper  [P′  P1[+Affix]  [PP2  Theme/Target  [P′  [P2 CAUS ]  Causer  ]]]]]] 
Structurally, the Cause is not part of the main predicate, but an “adjunct-P” contingent on the 
arguments of the verb, Theme/Target and Goal/Experiencer. One of the crucial points of this 
proposal is that CAUS is generated in a low position, meaning lower than the Theme. The main 
support for this position comes from the binding effects presented in the previous section. The 
structure in (34) jibes well with the proposed structure in (2.17) where the Cause is also 
generated low, as repeated below from chapter 2: 
(2.17) [ CAUSEE  [PredP  [PP  ‘from’ CAUSE ]]]   
Notice that both (39) and (2.17) generate the cause in a position inside the predicate as an 
argument of the CAUS/P head, lower than the Causee, unlike other causative accounts in the 
literature (Fujita 1996; Pylkkänen 2000; Alexiadou 2006), where the Cause is associated with 
some subject left peripheral position. This saves us from having to wiggle a causative-PP in an 
adjoined position to some projection of the verb—or some other functional head. Notice also that 
the CAUS head in (39) and the P head in (2.17) are incarnated by a preposition introducing the 
Cause (and causation per se for the non-verbal cases) and is not some independent functional 
CAUS-head (or CAUS-feature), unlike the CAUS head proposed in the literature (a.o. Dowty 
1979; Pylkkänen 2002; Alexiadou 2006). 
Things get complicated when we take a closer look at the exact position of the PP in (39) and 
(2.17). In the former it is considered an adjunct, while in the latter a predicate. The arguments 




considerations37 and important repercussions, which I will briefly discuss and evaluate against 
(2.17). 
Some crucial observations to be made with regard to (39) and the status of this P head that 
introduces the Causer stem from the following empirical evidence: (A) The status of because, 
which Pesetsky assigns to the P that brings CAUS into the configuration, is not always that of an 
“adjunct” and in fact it is not always optional either and (B) optionality is not always indicative 
of adjuncthood. Consider the following examples: 
(40) The reason ice floats is *(because of hydrogen bonding).  
 [http://www.visionlearning.com/library/module_viewer.php?mid=57] 
(41) The second largest source of the Planet’s heating is *(from the greenhouse gases). 
[http://www.america2inc.com/electric_cars.htm] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 One point to keep in mind is that a low generation site of the Causer, when introduced by a 
causative PP, could lead to a double-entry problem in verbal causation. In other words, if 
causation stems from the Causer-PP, then what about the causation conveyed by the lexical verb 
itself in that sentence? This is also discussed as the Variant Problem by Solstad (2007), who 
offers a semantically flavored account. Pesetsky on the other hand provides a syntactic maneuver 
as a remedy. He assumes that each instance of CAUS (one generated with the verbal root and one 
in lower position harbored by the P head) θ-selects a Causer. This configuration licenses two θ-
selected Causer positions, one in SpecVP and one in the argument of CAUSP. Notice that this 
latter θ-selection is not part of the main predicate, but is a consequence of the verb’s CAUS affix, 
thus the cause-PP remains an optional adjunct and not a main argument of the sentence.  
(i) [VP Causer  [V′ √V+CAUSaff   [PP  Causee [P′  [P CAUSP [DP Causer ]]]]]] 
Once these positions are in place, the Causer-DP has to move from the lower to the higher 
position. Pesetsky claims that this movement is not illicit because these positions practically 
incarnate the same θ-role and, as such, movement from one to the other is not banned. Assigning 
the same thematic roles to two different configurational positions and landing into θ-positions 
clearly pose serious theoretical problems, namely a violation, for instance, of the Main Thematic 
Condition or the θ-Criterion. But even if we were to accept Pesetsky’s maneuvres, we would still 
need to account for the movement of the Causer from a low generation site to a higher one. Bear 
in mind that the low position according to Pesetsky is considered an adjunct position, hence this 
movement would not only be movement of an argument out of an adjunct, but also movement 




With regard to observation (A), in (40–41) the part in the parentheses is unquestionably 
obligatory. Unlike examples (36–38), which Pesetsky uses in order to account for the 
classification “adjunct-P”, in (40–41) the prepositional phrase that introduces the Cause in the 
configuration cannot be omitted, and this is always the case for copular causative examples as 
noted already in chapter 2. The ungrammaticality incurred by the omittance of the ‘from’-PP in 
the copular example in (41), straightforwardly indicates the predicative nature of that causative 
from-phrase (and its because of kin) in (40). Notably, this is not simply an idiosyncrasy of 
‘from’, but of other prepositions conveying causation as well. Consider the following examples 
based on (36–37)38: 
(36′) The minute’s silence is *(out of fear). 
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_of_silence] 
(37′) The only danger is *(of dehydration). 
 [http://www.medicalmasterclass.com/PL_Gastro.htm] 
The causative prepositional phrases in (40–41&36′–37′) are clearly neither optional nor adjuncts, 
as Pesetsky suggests for causative Ps. Consequently, it would be desirable to establish an 
analysis that could account both for the obligatoriness of the Cause-introducing PPs in these 
examples and for their apparent optionality in (36–37). With this in mind, let us re-examine the 
arguments for adjuncthood and how that was established in the first place and then offer an 
alternative solution that covers both conditions.  
Pesetsky’s main argument for the adjuncthood of these causative PPs was that CAUS is not 
thematically selected by the main predicate, hence its optionality. Additionally, these PPs answer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 I have not included a counter-example to (38) jumped for joy, since there is no causative 
meaning for for. Example (38) is an idiomatic use of this preposition in the specific phrase, 




to why, which is traditionally considered an adjunct pro-form. These two arguments used as 
evidence are not infallible tests for adjuncthood.  
As per the first point, that adjuncthood is attributed to non theta-selection, there are some 
adjuncts that are not optional, just like there are arguments that are not obligatory. Lexically 
selected adjuncts, as pointed out to me by den Dikken, are not optional: he worded the letter 
*(carefully), the job paid us *(handsomely). These manner adverbs are being lexically encoded 
in the respective verb that selects them. Cruse (1986) further confirms that some adverbs are 
lexically selected by showing that the acceptability of the sentence is affected if we replace that 
adverb with its antonym: 
(42) ?Arthur was shouting softly. 
He claims that the adverbs in these cases further specify/intensify the manner which is lexically 
entailed by the verb in the first place and draws a parallel both with: (a) Resultative phrases, 
where the AP specifies in a similar manner the result state described by the verb i.e., The lake 
froze (solid) and (b) Path-PPs, which delineate the inherent to the verb path, i.e., He entered the 
room (through the door). In all these examples adjuncts are used to specify a lexically encoded 
meaning and are selected by the verb.   
At the same time, there are arguments that are optional without being considered adjuncts as in 
(43) below: 
(43) a. I drink (my coffee).     
b. He helped (us). 
In none of the cases in (43) is the material in the parentheses considered an adjunct, even though 
its absence does not yield ungrammaticality, similarly to (36–38). Instead they are found in the 




optional, nonetheless, they are not adjuncts. So optionality alone is not a diagnostic for 
adjuncthood, thus it does not make optional causative ‘from’-PPs adjuncts.  
Let us turn now to the second argument for adjuncthood of the cause-PPs in (36–38), namely the 
fact that they answer to why. Considering this argument, I will have to borrow another similarly 
typical adjunct pro-form, namely how. Its use is similarly not restricted to adjuncts alone, but 
primary predicates as well like:  
(44) a. How is the new car?    
b. The new car is bigger and black.    
This line of thinking intents to show that a wh-word cannot always predict the kind of constituent 
it is linked to as argument or adjunct. If how is on a par with why39, the immediate expectation 
would be for why-questions to be equally able to question predicates as well, a fact that would 
ultimately undermine Pesetsky’s assumption about the adjuncthood of cause-PPs.  
Admittedly, both for and against adjuncthood arguments regarding why are neither empirically 
nor theoretically deeply rooted. The former relies on inductive reasoning, where adjuncthood is 
postulated due to absence of contrary evidence. As for the latter, it seems to rely on a more 
deductive reasoning which puts why and how in the same category, thus extending the evidence 
we have for how to why40. Since no resolution can be reached at this point, I will tentatively take 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Of course treating why and how equally without any proper discussion is, at best, an educated 
guess.   
40 An argument that could possibly tip the scale targets directly the initial assumption that why 
questions adjuncts. So if a causative from-PP does not successfully answer why, then that could 
constitute grounds for questioning its adjuncthood. This path, however, does not seem to take us 
far since there is no consensus among native speakers, with most considering the following pair 
acceptable and some awkward: 
A: Why do you have a headache? 




sides with the latter reasoning acknowledging, however, that there is more discussion to be had 
here if we were to use this point as a strong argument. 
To synopsize, empirical evidence suggest that: (i) optionality does not entail adjuncthood, and 
(ii) wh-pro-forms cannot always be used as a configurational prognostic. These facts resonate 
well with the predicative approach for causative ‘from’-PPs proposed in (2.17), unlike Pesetsky’s 
adjunct CAUS PPs. The copular examples in (40–41&36′–37′), being primary predicates, 
obligatorily take a cause-PP, a fact that could not have been accounted for had we adopted the 
adjunct proposal.  
Following Christina Tortora’s suggestion, I extended the same analysis for the optional cause-PP 
cases in (36–38) that can have a predicative structure, just like the cases in (43). In (45) the 
causatively from-PP is predicated of the whole VP she puking as per den Dikken’s suggestion:  
(45) [SpecTP  Shej  [T  was  [PredP [vP tj  [VP puking]] [Predʹ  Ø  [PP  from [DP the wine ]]]]]] 
More specifically, the verb and the PP enter into the configuration together as a constituent with 
the vP being the subject of a PredP small clause headed by “from”. The derivation proceeds with 
merging the TP to the PredP, followed by subsequent movement of the subject “she” which 
raises to SpecTP to satisfy T’s EPP property. The predicational relation vP and PP under PredP, 
and their semantic interpretation as Causee and the Cause, is the outcome of them forming a 
constituent. But the PredP should syntactically act as a constituent as well. This is indeed true 
since this predicate can be topicalized as in puking from the wine, she was.  
According to (45), what is topicalized in puking from the wine, she was is the PredP small clause 
rather than just the VP. This means that the fronted predicate includes the trace of the subject that 




argued that such cases can be found in English and are responsible for the unambiguous anaphor 
binding by the trace of the subject in its base position. That the anaphor in the fronted predicate 
in (46) is bound only by the trace of Bill and not by the matrix subject is a consequence of 
Principle A. Parallel effects are observed for pronouns, which are attributed to Principle B. In 
(47a) the pronoun her cannot be bound by the local antecedent, whereas in (47b) the pronoun is 
successfully bound by the matrix subject yielding the sentence grammatical: 
(46) [ tj criticize himself*i/j ]p, Johni thought Billj would not tp.  [Principle A] 
(47) a.  * [ti criticize heri ]p, Johnj thought Maryi would not tp.  [Principle B] 
b.  [tj criticize heri ]p, Maryi thought Johnj would not tp. 
With these examples, Huang shows how predicate topicalization is possible in English and yields 
binding relations insided the fronted predicate, between the trace of the subject and the anaphor 
or the pronoun as predicted by Principles A and B respectively. So a predication fronting 
analysis for puking from the wine, she was finds theoretical support. 
Although examples (46&47) offer support to predicate topicalization, example (48a) shows that 
(45) can undergo VP-ellipsis, which is problematic as it targets only VP constituents and not the 
whole predication (see fn.15 in ch.2). A general predicate ellipsis process cannot be allowed in 
English as it would have to extend to other predicates, for example AP predicates which, 
however, resist ellipsis, see (48b,c): 
(48) a. John puked from the wine, and Mary did too. 
b.   *John considers Mary smart and Bill considers Jane too. 
c.   *Mary looks cheerful and Jane sounds.  (Rothstein 2001:5.2.3) 




As a sidenote, I would like to bring up a possible remedy discussed in Rothstein (2001), which 
accounts for (48b,c) without necessarily banning a general predication ellipsis process in 
English. She claims that it “embedded absorbed predicates” (as in (48b,c)) cannot be elided 
since, according to Stowell (1991), the predicate of a complement small clause is reanalyzed by 
raising up to its selecting verb, a process he refers to as “small clause restructuring”. In other 
words, the ungrammaticality of (48b,c) is not due to a general ban on predicate ellipsis, but 
because the specific predicates are not available for ellipsis since they need to incorporate with 
their selecting verb. But here also lies the weakness of this proposal. If it is indeed the absorption 
of the embedded predicate that is responsible for the ungrammaticality of (48d), this would take 
place at LF as “small clause restructuring” is an LF process, as den Dikken points out. Ellipsis, 
on the other hand, is a PF process, so it unclear how it could be affected by predicate absorption. 
In conclusion, what we have seen in this section was that adjuncthood cannot be claimed merely 
on optionality grounds, so an analysis of ‘from’-PPs as adjuncts is not well-founded. On the 
other hand a predicative analysis can derive the thematic link between a causatively interpreted 
PP and its subject understood as the Causee. Although the focus of the thesis is on non-verbal 
configurations, it was important at this point to show that the proposed structure in (2.17) can 
extend to (at least) lexical intransitive verbs, discussing a possible underlying structure and 
considerations that arise from cases like she is puking from the wine.  
3.2.5.1 AGENTIVITY REVISITED 
Pesetsky will also attempt to provide an account for an older question left unanswered in the 
Agent Inhibition section 3.2.2, namely the difference between Causes and Agents. In short, the 




Belletti&Rizzi’s (1988) observation about backward binding to causative predicates, Pesetsky 
notices that the subject-Cause can only have a non-volitional Causer and not a volitional Agent. 
This is attested in the examples below which are acceptable only with a non-agentive reading: 
(49) Each other’s friends (*intentionally) make Bill and Mary laugh.  [non-agentive] 
(50) Each other’s friends (*successfully) caused John and Mary’s divorce. [non-agentive] 
Low generation analyses of the Cause argument comes with an additional perk, namely they 
indicate a cleavage between Causes and Agents with regard to their distribution. If Agents are 
always generated in a position external to the verb (usually in SpecvP) then this could explain the 
unacceptability of structures like (18b): *John left early from Mary, since it would be a feat for 
the Agent to move to the complement position of from. So separating Causes from Agents in 
terms of their birthplace in a structure immediately accounts for certain ungrammaticalities.  
Of course, one could also claim here that there is nothing to preclude the possibility of the Agent 
having been introduced in the underlying structure as the complement of the cause-PP, just like a 
Cause. After all, there are sentences that do allow their Agents be introduced by a P. The 
structures that introduce Agents (volitional and animate) in PPs are no other than passives. This 
then raises the logical question: Since there is a possibility of introducing Agents in a PP, why 
does it not freely apply to causative constructions such as (18b) as well, but instead they only 
accept Causes (non-volitional or non-animate41)? At this point we need to carefully consider the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 In chapter 1, I distinguished Agents from Causes with regard to their animacy feature. This 
distinction, however, is rather coarse and remains a much debated theme. For example, Agents 
are traditionally attributed the main characteristics of animacy and volition. However, it is not 
always the case that Agents display both these features. Surprisingly, sometimes they may even 
lack both. Some counterexamples are provided by Tom Roeper (in Bhatt&Pancheva 2006, see 
(i)), who proposes that agency does not always preclude animacy (along the lines of Nishimura 
(1993) who also argues for inanimate agents), and Maria Polinsky (p.c.), who points out a lack of 




details that differentiate causatives—or, in fact, intransitives in this case—and passives, a topic 
that has occupied many authors before. I will only sketch the differences with wide strokes, 
focusing mostly on what is important for the current discussion, namely why Agents cannot be 
introduced in the underlying structure as arguments of a ‘from’-phrase, unlike Causes.  
According to Embick (2004), unaccusatives and passives share an intransitive structure and they 
lack an external argument—among other similarities, like morphological syncretism in many 
languages. It is only passives, however, that can have an agentive PP. The key difference 
according to Embick lies in the featural composition of v and encyclopedic meaning of V, rather 
than the structural configuration itself, which is represented for both as: [vP  v  [VP V… DP ]]]. 
Building on this structure, Harves (2002) proposes that an agentive by-phrase would merge as an 
adjunct to the vP, licensed by a defective (in the sense of being incapable of merging with an 
external argument) v head—whether and how v licenses the by-phrase is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. If we accept that by-phrases are structurally adjuncts, then this could explain part of the 
asymmetry between Agents and Causes, since in the previous discussion, the status of a ‘from’-
phrase was claimed to be predicative rather than an adjunct phrase.   
Importantly, passives have traditionally been argued to involve (semantically and possibly 
syntactically as well) an implicit agent, in contrast to unaccusatives. Implicit agruments are non-
overt or conceptual material which are, nevertheless, syntactically active. The well-known 
example of the ‘sunk boat’ below (see Roeper 1987; Manzini 1983) suggests that unaccusatives 
lack an implicit argument, in contradistinction to passives. With regard to the latter, 
Bhatt&Pancheva (2006) argue that the implicit argument is responsible for: (a) the licensing of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(i) The part was automatically rotated to insert four screws.  [–animacy] 




the by-phrase, (b) the ability to control the PRO subject in the rational clause and (c) the 
compatibility with agent-oriented adverbs: 
(51) a.  The boat was sunk {by the company/PRO to collect the insurance/deliberately}. 
b. The boat sank {#by the company/#PRO to collect the insurance/#deliberately}. 
The acceptability of all possibilities in (51a) vs. (51b) suggests that there is an implicit argument 
in passives unlike in unaccusatives which is syntactically and semantically active. Given the 
length and importance of the above subsections, it would be useful before weighing anchors to 
further analysis to compile a list of the key points discussed up to now. 
3.3 INTERIM SYNOPSIS  
1. In section 3.1, a variety of empirical evidence was presented suggesting that alternations of 
“X comes/is ‘from’ Y” with “Y makes/causes X” are underlyingly related.  
2. Importantly the Source of Causation was suggested to be the P itself based on the fact that in 
the absence of all other possible sources of causation (e.g., lexical verbs, functional heads), a 
‘from’-PP still manages to give out a causative reading. And to seal the deal, in the absence 
of these ‘from’-PPs, no causative meaning is obtained. 
3. In order to argue for a derivational relation of causative alternations, syntactic arguments had 
to be found. A syntactic indication was drawn from Connectivity Effects. More specifically 
reciprocals yield connectivity effects when they occur structurally higher than their proper 
antecedents in causative constructions. Since these anaphors are successfully bound—and 
they must be in order to be licensed in the first place—by something lying lower, this 
suggests that they probably started life lower themselves and are subsequently raised to their 




4. On a separate observation, Causes were argued to be distinct entities from Agents. The 
inability of Agents to appear in causative ‘from’-PPs indicates that they do not follow the 
same derivational path as Causes and, as a result, they are not generated in the same position. 
This conclusion is buttressed by Agents’ and Causes’ distribution and licensing conditions. 
5. While Causes were argued to be base generated lower than the theme-Causee, Agents are 
generated in an external subject position higher than the theme-causee. Agents may 
optionally show up in a passive configuration, which is syntactically derived from an active 
one. Crucially, the P-head of these adjunct by-phrases does not assign a thematic role to the 
Agent-complement. On the other hand, the causative ‘from’ was held responsible for 
introducing causation by itself and is thus responsible for the interpretation of its 
complement-DP as the Cause when found in the configurations discussed.  
6. The licensing and interpretation of an Agent in a by-phrase is contingent on some implicit 
argument (it is not important here whether it is syntactically projected or not). In 
unaccusative configurations, however, there are no implicit arguments, hence no such linking 
obtains for Causes: 
(52)   a.  (AGENT)    [v … [ by   [ AGENT  ]]]] 
b.          ∅     [v … [CAUSEE [Pred  ‘from’ [ CAUSE ]]]] 
The fact that unaccusatives lack implicit arguments suggests that by-phrases in passives and 
cause-PPs are probably syntactically (and conceptually) different. If this is true, then the question 
is how do cause-PPs get licensed? In other words, how do they enter the configuration both 
conceptually and syntactically. The proposed answer in this work is that causes enter the 




semantic contribution of the preposition ‘from’ is responsible for the causative reading. Note that 
this is in full accord with a low generation account for causes.  
These facts are important because they provide empirical and theoretical indications regarding 
the Source of Cause. To close the circle of diagnostics and observations, I will submit one last 
theoretical consideration in support of the low generation analysis for Causes, in 
contradistinction to Agents, before moving on to a more micro-syntactically motivated 
discussion of the internal structure and interpretation of ‘from’-PPs. 
3.4 A THEORETICAL DIAGNOSIS 
The causative alternations—presented in section 3.2.1—beg the question of whether and how the 
interchangeable positions of the arguments, namely the subject of cause and the complement of 
‘from’, relate to the Linking Problem. Are there any regularities between the roles of the 
participants in the causative events and their surface position? This section provides a brief 
theoretical discussion on alternations and thematic linking (without necessarily committing to it).  
An attempt to grammaticalize the configuration of different initial conceptual/grammatical 
representations onto syntactic configurations was proposed by Baker (1988), known as the 
Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH). According to the UTAH, identical 
thematic relationships between items are represented by identical structural relations between 
those items at the level of D-structure. This predicts a direct mapping of thematic information 
onto underlying syntactic structure. For example, Agents are underlyingly subjects and Sources 
are found in object positions—arguments surfacing in these structural positions, however, do not 
always have to be marked as Agents or Sources respectively, since only subcategorization entails 




Considering the cause/be from alternations we face a puzzling distribution of the Cause 
argument that puts the UTAH to the question. Although Causes appear both high and low as in 
(53a&b), Agents do not, see (53c&d)).  
An additional level of complexity is added to the above puzzle when we compare (53a&c): Both 
a ship and the president are DPs, nevertheless only the former is acceptable. 
(53) a. This oil slick is from a ship.              PATTERN 
[http://www.ahmedabadmirror.com/index.aspx?Page=article&sectname=News%20-
%20World&sectid=5&contentid=200906062009060603453354062d2b4a8]     THEME>CAUSE 
b. A ship caused a [huge] oil slick.      CAUSE>THEME   
[http://www.theolivepress.es/PDF/28W.pdf]                    BUT 
c. * The earthquake is from the president.      *THEME>AGENT  
d. The president caused the earthquake.       AGENT>THEME     
[http://thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/we-dont-cause-the-earthquakes-but-we-are-responsible-for-disasters/336363] 
The distribution facts in (53c&d) indicate that Agents respect UTAH’s predictions: they typically 
surface in a subject/external position. Indeed, in (53d) vs. (53c) the Agent has prominence (it is 
in a c-commanding position that is) over the Theme/Patient argument, thus yielding the order: 
AGENT>THEME. Although UTAH’s assumptions correctly predict the acceptability of (53d) 
only, the same is not true for (53a,b), where one would expect for Causes to surface only in 
oblique positions.  
But the observations in (53) also raise an important question: Why and how can Causes appear in 
two different positions and can this be reconciled with the UTAH? The answer will eventually 
depend on whether the two different structures Causes participate in are derivationally related or 
not, as suggested by den Dikken. I will evaluate both possibilities based on the structural X-ray 
of (54&55) below:  
(54) Z  is from  Cause 




Scenario 1: (54) and (55) are derivationally related. Then automatically the Cause that appears 
in each of them is one and the same thematic role. The fact that be from/cause alternations are 
available only for causative readings of ‘from’—in comparison to non-causative ones which 
systematically fail—is probably a good first indicator for the presence of a close relationship.  
The question then is which of the two acts as the underlying structure that gives rise to the other. 
The previous sections act as a rudder for steering towards (54) as the underlying configuration. 
The backward binding effects discussed in 3.2.4 can only be accounted for if we assume that the 
anaphor started in a lower position, where it was bound by its proper antecedent, and then raised 
to a higher position. The low generation account for Causes, that is, lower than the Theme is 
reflected in the configuration in (54).  
Backward binding effects aside, additional support for a derivational direction from (54) to (55) 
comes from independent principles of argument structure. Since Fiengo (1977), the notion of 
proper binding is expressed as “a relation that holds between a node and its trace if the node 
precedes its trace”. One important corollary of the Proper Binding principle is that it blocks 
rightward movement. In more recent literature such representational binding principles are 
superseded by Economy of Derivation (Chomsky 1991; Collins 1994) or derivational approaches 
to structure building. According to the latter ones “the complement of Ho is by hypothesis in a 
selectional relation with Ho” (Epstein et al. 1998:104). This means that P and Cause-DP always 
merge together in a mutual c-command configuration (Derivational Sisterhood), thus precluding 
movement of any other XP into the complement position of the feature checking head Ho (i.e., 
the P). This ensures that the preposition ‘from’ is in a local relation (a mutual dependency) with 
the DP-Cause and only movement out of that PP is licit. Independently of the theoretical 




to the P’s complement) by forcing every movement to target c-commanding positions. This then 
explicitly dictates the direction of the derivation from (54) to (55) since the Cause can only move 
leftwards.  
An additional perk to this scenario then is that we can keep the UTAH, which can then make the 
right predictions for the puzzle in (53): Causes always appear low (53a), unless moved out of 
their initial position (53b), while Agents only appear high (53d) and cannot move low (53c) due 
to the ban on rightward movement. 
Scenario 2: (54) and (55) are not derivationally related. This entails that each instance of Cause 
enters the configuration independently and there are no restrictions in terms of where a Cause 
may appear (high vs. low), for as long as it is properly licensed, either by the verb or the 
preposition. Under this assumption, we also do not have to perform gymnastics to prove a 
relation between be from and cause since they are treated as independent structures; the first 
conveying causation due to the configuration “from” is found in and the second due to the lexical 
properties of the verb “cause”. 
In this scenario, the UTAH is single-handedly annulled, ridding syntactic theory of the Linking 
Problem by radically severing all connections between roles of participants and their underlying 
structural position. This is not an inconceivable scenario, after all the UTAH is not a principle of 
grammar and it is based on operative constructs that are not clearly defined i.e., thematic roles.  
Ultimately the UTAH alone cannot be held responsible for distribution facts although it makes 
some accurate descriptions cross-linguistically (for example Agents appear in the subject 
position). However, it is more challenging to explicitly define what thematic roles are rather than 




Baker (1997) calls “highest positions” (VP external) or in “lower positions” (object or some 
other position instantiated by an oblique NP introduced by an adposition or Case marker) is, at 
the end of the day, a question of whether (54&55) are derivationally related or not. The 
arguments offered and the discussion in the previous sections support a derivational account (that 
is, Scenario 1), which also happens to be in keeping with the UTAH, providing a plausible 




CHAPTER 4    COMPLEMENT-TESTING ‘FROM’ 
In this chapter I will argue that the interpretation of a ‘from’-PP as causative or non-causative is 
dependent on the underlying syntactic configuration of its complement. In support of this 
proposal, I will submit relevant observations, syntactic diagnostics, distribution patterns, and 
morphological indications that suggest that the syntactic category of the complement of ‘from’ is 
indeed related to the interpretation this ‘from’ will end up having.  
According to Emonds (1972), Jackendoff (1973), Wunderlich (1991), Saint-Dizier (2006), den 
Dikken (2010), among other, prepositions constitute a lexical category exhibiting categorial and 
semantic selection. Importantly, they have semantic content and type restrictions on their 
arguments. In a V-PP configuration, for example, the V imposes selectional restrictions on the 
type of its complement. In other words, the P must be compatible in terms of its type with its 
nominal complement. This ‘agreement of types’ is shown through the following example; in run 
to school, the verb run requires a path with an underspecified area in which it occurs. This is 
satisfied by to. But also to itself satisfies its own selection restrictions incarnated in the NP, 
which has to be a delimited, closed, and large space, like school. Other prepositions like around, 
out, away, are used with “empty objects” (Saint-Dizier 2006) or, as are more widely accepted, 
“intransitive prepositions” (Emonds 1972; Jackendoff 1973; Ramchand&Svenonius 2004; 
Emonds 2007), for instance go {away/out/around}. Some prepositions, like into, before, down, 
around, subcategorize for an optional complement and finally some subcategorize for no 
complement i.e., beforehand, away (Emonds 1972; Jackendoff 1973). When it comes to ‘from’, 
Saint-Dizier (2006) notes that prepositions like from (and out) can select either an NP or another 
PP. Although Saint-Dizier’s analysis is mostly descriptive, delegating the more fine-grained 




preposition, to “non-trivial world knowledge”, his suggested subcategorization frame of ‘from’ 
will open up an intriguing structural bifurcation directly responsible for delivering semantic 
interpretations.  
A bidirectional interaction of the PP structure and its semantics has been argued for in Helmantel 
(2002), where she shows semantic properties are assigned to an element depending on its 
structural position. DPs, for example, that occupy a specifier in the functional domain of a PP 
acquire 1-dimensionality characteristics and are consequently interpreted as paths. Other possible 
semantic restrictions are directionality or restricted vector. Tortora (2008) argues that a P’s 
functional domain reflects the semanctic properties of that P’s internal argument. The 
lexicalization of an aspectual projection in the functional domain of a locative P, for instance, is 
tied to the boundedness of the P’s NP argument.  
In the following sections, I will try to offer additional evidence pointing to the interaction of 
argument structure and semantic interpretation based on the internal structure of a ‘from’-PP. 
More specifically, category selection of the complement of P goes hand in hand with the PP’s 
interpretation, and in the case of ‘from’, causal vs. non-causal. I will investigate the internal 
structure of ‘from’-PPs with an eye to finding dependable syntactic or morphological differences 
which will covary with each interepretation ascribed to that ‘from’-PP. In doing so, I will assume 
that there are no individual entries for each interpretation of ‘from’ and that we are not dealing 
with either homonymy or polysemy. This would be against the grain of conceptual economy and, 






4.1  WH-EXTRACTION 
The main observation regarding the complement of ‘from’ is related to wh-extraction facts. 
Kracht (2002:182) distinguishes the wh-words where and what/which with regard to their 
denotations. He claims that the former only asks for locations, while the latter questions a group 
of sets or individuals. Additionally, he states that there always denotes a region (something that 
will have to be explicitly defined in the following subsections). Based on these two observations 
about where vs. what and there, he sketches the distribution of relative clauses in German (in 
parallel with their English counterparts) headed by wo ‘where’ and worin ‘wherein’, relativized 
either of the locative dort ‘there’ or a DP. The acceptability judgements of those sentences 
reinforce his assumptions that where and there denote location and are thus compatible vs. what 
that denotes objects and is consequently incapable of relativizing there:    
Dort, wo das Gras noch grün ist,… 
‘there, where the grass is still green,…’ 
✔LOCATIVE-LOCATIVE 
*Dort, worin das Gras noch grün ist,… 
‘*there, wherein grass is still green,…’ 
*LOCATIVE-NOMINAL 
*Das Buch, wo wir gelesen haben,… 
‘*the book, where we have read,…’ 
*NOMINAL-LOCATIVE 
Das Buch, worin wir gelesen haben,… 
‘the book, wherein we have read,…’ 
✔NOMINAL-NOMINAL 
Table 4.1: wh-relativizers of locatives vs. nominals in German.   
Table 6.1 offers a good first indication of compatible and non-compatible relative clauses with 
elements traditionally considered locative and nominal respectively. Their compatibility with 
relativizers is attributed to their denotation only. It remains, however, to further discuss whether 
and why there is locative and what this means syntactically compared to a DP or its pronominal 
counterpart that. Additionally, the categorial assumptions about there must be extended to where 




same category, namely locative and nominal. Once the status of where vs. what has been 
explored, I will return to the discussion of relative clauses with a better understanding of the 
nature of the relativized DPs.  
A parallel test which seems to have a categorical perception effect between causatively and 
spatially interpreted ‘from’-PPs is the type of wh-word used for extraction, which reveals the 
category of the phrase extracted. In table 4.2 we notice that the complement of only causatively 
interpreted ‘from’-PPs can be extracted by what. Importantly, in all spatial PPs, the wh-word 
employed is where (for spatial interpretations)42:  
 
Table 4.2: wh-extraction out of differently interpreted ‘from’-PPs in English (a), Greek (b), 
German (c), and Dutch (d). Notice that only English allows P-stranding in the wh-
extraction column. All other three languages resist P-stranding ‘from’, which, in turn, ends 
up being fronted. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 I will leave the temporal interpretations aside. In section 1.1, according to Luraghi (2003), it 
was suggested that time has an independent life from cause or space, which is also evident in the 
wh-extraction facts. Notice that temporal ‘from’-PPs have a different wh-word assigned for them, 
namely when. 
MEANING ‘from’-PPS WH-EXTRACTION 
 
CAUSATIVE 
(1a) Her headache was from the wine. 
(1b) o ponokefalos tis itan apo to krasi. 
(1c) die Kopfschmerzen kommen von dem Wein.  
(1d) de hoofdpijn kwam van de wijn. 
What was her headache from? 
apo ti itan o ponokefalos tis? 
Von was kamen diese Kopfschmerzen? 
Van wat kwam de hoofdpijn? 
 
SPATIAL 
(2a) Elisabeth is from London. 
(2b) i Elissavet einai apo to Londino. 
(2c) Elisabeth kommt von London. 
(2d) Elisabeth komt van Londen. 
Where is Elisabeth from? 
apo pou einai i Elissavet? 
Von wo kommt Elizabeth? 




(3a) These problems are from the internet. 
(3b) auta ta provlimata einai apo to diadiktio. 
(3c) diese Probleme kommen von dem Internet. 
(3d) deze problemen kwamen van het internet. 
What/Where are these problems from? 
apo ti/pou einai auta ta provlimata? 
Von wo/was kommen diese Probleme?   





This discrepancy in wh-extraction can be better observed in ambiguous sentences like the last set 
in (3), where the internet can either be the cause of a network crash due to viruses, for instance, 
or the place whence the set of problems was copied. Provided that such ambiguities do arise, a 
secondary observation here is that the lexical properties of the P’s nominal complement alone 
cannot always ascertain the type of interpretation that PP will have.  
As a preliminary conclusion, I will submit the following generalization: The complement of 
spatially interpreted ‘from’-PPs is always associated with the locative where, while the 
complement of causatively interpreted ‘from’-PPs is systematically associated with the nominal 
phrase compatible only with what.  
4.2 TH-WORDS 
I will use the term “th-word” following Bernstein’s (2008) suggestion that the th- of there and 
that (along with they, then, the) are in fact the same morpheme and can thus be grouped in the 
same natural class. Th-words can be used to disambiguate different ‘from’-PPs in examples like 
(4). For the leak is from the crack in the roof, there are two th-words that can be selected by 
‘from’, namely that and there. 
Similarly to wh-words in Table 4.2, th-words also exhibit selectional effects dependent on the 
interpretation of each ‘from’. More specifically, the th-word used will turn out to be a 
dependable categorial indicator for causative and non-causative readings. Causative ‘from’-PPs 
always combine with the pro-form that, while spatial ‘from’-PPs always combine with the pro-
form there. 
(4) a. The headache was from THAT/*THERE.   (causative) 




c. The leak is from THAT/THERE.    (causative/spatial) 
If that and there are dependable cues for a causative vs. non-causative interpretation, and if they 
each project a different syntactic phrase⎯I will claim a DP and a PP respectively⎯then we can 
conclude that the interpretation of ‘from’ is contingent on the syntactic category of its 
complement. Of course the crux in this line of argumentation is to show that that and there 
indeed project two different syntactic phrases.  
The pro-form preferences in (1–4) hold cross-linguistically, which is a promising start for a 
unified syntactic account. In order to interprete these observations, however, we must first 
establish the syntactic identity of those pro-forms. This then will link the PP-interpretation to the 
categorial selection of P itself. 
4.3 THAT AND THERE/WHERE 
Contra Williams (1984), who considers there to unarguably be an NP, it will be shown that the 
pronominal nature of there/where does not necessarily make them NPs. Postal (1966), for 
example, argues that personal pronouns are in fact determiners that can themselves take an NP 
complement. Such accounts essentially differentiate grammatical status from syntactic structure. 
In other words, a pronoun does not always stand for a noun nor does it always have to be 
represented under an NP.   
4.3.1 THE VAN RIEMSDIJK METHOD 
Van Riemsdijk’s (1978) account places there and where in a special r-pronoun43 category (along 
with er ‘there’, daar ‘there’, waar ‘where’, among other pronouns). These are pronominal 
elements that have a typical element in common, namely the phoneme /r/ which is responsible 
for their name, r-pronouns, but has no morphological bearings. Van Riemsdijk’s analysis is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




mostly based on construction specific observations, on which he builds rules and filters, in order 
to account for the distribution and behavior of R-words.  
He proposes that R-words originate as NPs on the right complement position of the P and via 
consecutive application of filters they raise up to an r-position deriving the surface order 
[[+R]−P] from the underlying [P−NP]. The derivation is reproduced in the following examples: 
(5) [+human] NP complements of P heads are admissible, thus (4a) is acceptable 
a. 	 ✓Jan heeft op Marie gerekend.      DUTCH 
   ‘John has on Mary counted.’   
[−human] pronouns, however, are not allowed in P-complement position, hence (4b) is 
ungrammatical according to the *P-[−H] filter:  
b.  *Jan heeft op het gerekend.   
‘John has on it counted.’ 
To remedy that, an R-suppletion rule then applies which turns a [+PRO,−H] element into 
a [+R] element. In other words, het becomes er in (5c). 
c.  *Jan heeft op er gerekend. 
  ‘John has on there counted.’ 
A final rule prohibits the occurrence of R-words on the right of P (*P−[+PRO,+R]). This 
forces R-word movement to the left of P, deriving (5d) ([PP er [Pʹ′ P  t ]). 
d. 	 ✓Jan heeft er op gerekend. 
  ‘John has there on counted.’ 
Van Riemsdijk’s filters and rules account for the empirical data as well as for the complementary 
distribution of r-pronouns and NPs. His filters, however, have been criticized mostly by Bennis 
(2005) and Helmantel (2002) as non-explanatory. Indeed there is no apparent motivation for 
substitution of a [−Human] pronoun (especially since it is sometimes acceptable, as we will see 




So although van Riemsdijk links R-words to prepositional phrases by structurally assigning them 
a position on the left of the P head, we have little information about the nature of the R-words 
themselves other than they are substitutes of NPs—a fact that has little syntactic value and, as I 
show later on, is not always true either. 
4.3.2  THE BENNIS METHOD 
Bennis (2005) follows a line of argumentation close to van Riemsdijk’s in terms of establishing a 
relation between r-pronouns and PPs, but crucially different in terms of the assumptions on the 
grammatical nature of the r-pronoun. Bennis claims that r-pronouns should not be considered 
NPs due to Case-assignment, distribution, and their internal properties. Nonetheless, they may 
have thematic roles assigned by a P just like NP arguments or appear in complementary 
distribution with full DPs.  
Before I present his main arguments for an underlying PP analysis of r-pronouns, I will briefly 
summarize the arguments used against an NP analysis, which was considered to be the main 
assumption in van Riemsdijk’s proposal as well as Williams (1984).  
Against NP. Although van Riemsdijk (1978) had proposed a special treatment of here/there as r-
pronouns, his analysis does not make any categorial distinction between them and NPs. Bennis is 
opposed to a categorial merging of NPs and r-pronouns pointing out the discrepancies in Van 
Riemsdijk’s derivation process of r-pronouns using a set of filters that account for the 
distribution and behavior of r-pronouns. By disputing the validity of these filters, the analysis of 
r-pronouns as NPs is consequently challenged, since it will be proven that they do not behave 
similarly. Below I summarize some of the issues raised regarding van Riemsdijk’s analysis and 




(i) The r-suppletion rule turns a [+PRO,–human] element in the complement of a P into a 
[+R] word. This filter was probably the easiest to dispute by bringing up empirical 
evidence. Although this filter can account for the ungrammaticality of *op dat/het/wat 
‘on that/it/what’, it fails to apply to other [+PRO,–human] P-arguments like ‘everything’ 
or ‘nothing’: 
(6) a. ✓met  alles                          DUTCH 
 with  everything   (acknowledged in van Riemsdijk 1978) 
b. ✓Zonder  dat kan ik niet leven.         (Helmantel 2002) 
 without that  can  I  not  live 
c. ✓Het  ontbreekt mij aan niets. 
 it  fails me on nothing 
(ii) If [–human] NPs were never licensed in the P-complement position, then we should 
expect the same for r-pronouns if we accept that they are also NPs and [–human]. This is 
borne out by examples like *op daar ‘on there’. To overcome this, van Riemsdijk 
introduces another filter that bans the occurrence of r-words in the complement of P. 
Again this is empirically put to the question by the examples in (7) that show that r-
pronouns can appear in such positions. Ultimately it seems that we reach contradictory 
observations with regard to the distribution of r-pronouns since they seem to resist some 
Ps, but they are perfectly acceptable with others, like van ‘from’, tot ‘on’, or naar ‘to’: 
(7) a.          ✓	 Deze weg loopt van hier (naar/tot daar).  DUTCH 
 this   road runs from here  to  there   
  b.	 	 	 	 	 ✓ de bus rijdt {tot daar/*daar tot}.    
   the bus drives {till there/ there till}   
  c.	 	 	 	 	 ✓Tot waar rijdt de bus? 
   till where drives the bus 
  d.      * De bus vertrekt van (n)ergens. 






The contradictory behavior observed in example (7), where the R-pronouns follow the P 
instead of preceding it (as it was the distributional norm up to now), although possible, it 
is not a general pattern. The cases where we find R-pronouns emerging post-
prepositionally are restricted in terms of the prepositions and R-pronouns used as well as 
to their semantics. According to Helmantel (2002), it is only the prepositions: van, tot and 
naar that can combine with the r-words: daar, hier, waar, and overal, but not er (*naar 
er) or (n)ergens (*van (n)ergens). The exceptional ability of certain r-pronouns to appear 
post-prepositionally is ascribed to specificity by Helmantel, who formulates the following 
generalization (ibid.:150) “Specific R-words appear to the right of van, tot, voor, and 
naar”. 
The assumption is that deixis is one way of making an element specific, thus, only those 
R-words that are deictic are eligible for appearing to the right of the P. This is true for 
hier, daar, and waar in (7a–c) that only denote a specific location with regard to the 
speaker. On the other hand, elements that fail to denote a specific location, like er or 
(n)ergens are not able to appear on the right of the P. Helmantel argues that er is the 
weak form of daar in the sense that it cannot be stressed and must be linked to the 
discourse. These properties render it non-specific and, consequently, incapable of 
remaining in the complement of P (7d). Similarly, (n)ergens is equally non-specific 
which accounts for the unacceptability of (7d). To prove that it is indeed specificity that 
is responsible for this, Helmantel contrasts (7d) with the pair in (7e&f). (7e) has an 
attribute, assigning a more specific meaning to (n)ergens, while (7f) has focus (stress), 
which seems to ‘override’ so to speak any specificity requirement on the r-pronoun: 
  e.          ✓	 De bus vertrekt van ergens *(in Spanje).   DUTCH 




  f.	 	 	 	 	 	 ✓ Die bus moet toch van ERGENS  vertrekken. 
   the bus must PRT from somewhere leave 
In sum, r-pronouns can appear to the right of some prepositions under lexical (only some 
of the r-pronouns) and semantic (only specific ones) restrictions, which do not force the 
R-word to move above P, as is generally the case, thus yielding the P>R-word surface 
order.   
(iii) Provided that r-pronouns and NPs were argued to be categorially alike and originate in 
the same position, it is surprising that only r-pronouns are able to move out of the head P 
domain and not NPs. So (8a) is not acceptable but (8b) is: 
(8) a.       * dat op        DUTCH 
 that on    
  b.    ✓daar op    
 there on    
Bennis ascribes the contrast in acceptability in (8) to the Head Movement Constraint, 
according to which a head cannot move over a governing head position, but can only 
move up to the first governing head (Travis 1984). With dat sitting in the complement of 
P, it cannot move past its governor. R-pronouns, however, seem to follow a general 
prohibition in surfacing to the right of P (exceptional cases were given in (7)), while they 
can appear on the left. This suggests that r-pronouns and NPs do not share the same 
underlying structure and, consequently, the same constraints do not apply. Arguably, this 
does not necessarily imply any categorial distinction between r-pronouns and NPs, but 
does invite exploration of the structure, which I will immediately turn to in the following 





4.3.2.1 CASE ASSIGNMENT AND Θ-ROLES 
The categorial correlation of r-pronouns with NPs is theoretically challenged on the basis of their 
structural position with regard to Case-assignment and government. Given that NPs are in need 
of Case and a theta role by their selecting P head, then under the assumption that r-pronouns are 
also NPs/DPs, we would expect the same requirements to hold for r-pronouns. This, however, 
does not hold, consequently suggesting that r-pronouns are similar to NPs/DPs. I will first 
present some theta-role assignment considerations on r-pronouns and then move on to Case 
assignment. 
Helmantel (2002) points out that the theta theory could, in fact, come in handy as it explains why 
r-pronouns and NPs are in complementary distribution. If the P head assigns one theta role, this 
means that it can only theta-mark one argument at a time. If both NPs and r-pronouns are theta-
marked arguments by the same P head, then they can only appear in complementary distribution. 
Bennis, on the other hand, will not find the theta theory particularly useful in structurally 
distinguishing NPs and r-pronouns due to the fact that it does not entail any requirements in 
terms of the nature of the phrase or its structural position. The only precondition for theta 
assignment is that it takes place under government. Both r-pronouns and NPs can receive a theta-
role on either side of the governor-head as theta assignment is non-directional44. On the one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Leu has drawn my attention to Travis’ (1989) work, who argues that head-directionality along 
with the direction of theta-role assignment and the direction of Case assignment can determine 
word order. However, only one of the three parameters can be specified in a language (unless 
none is specified and then Head Paramenter can vary deriving the ‘inconsistencies’ in German 
for example). Ultimately, this suggests that theta-assignment can be parametrized. In response, 
den Dikken points out that the direction of theta-role assignment is not parametrizeable, based on 
the Borer-Chomsky conjecture (discussed in Baker 2008), which attributes parametric variation 
only to functional heads. As for the direction of Case-assignment and head-directionality, they 
are both unavailable in the minimalist theory since Case is checked by functional heads under 




hand, non-directionality of theta-assignment cannot explain the distributional idiosyncrasies, for 
NPs (cf. (9a–b)). On the other hand, it can accommodate the distribution of r-pronouns, which 
may occur on either side of the P head (cf. (10a–b)).  
(9) a.     op   dat  [P−NP]      DUTCH 
   on  that 
  b.       *dat op     *[NP−P] 
    that on  
(10) a.        daar op [R−P] 
    there on 
  b.  van  hier  [P−R] 
    from  here 
The unavailability of (9b), and by extension the whole paradigm in (9–10), is better captured by 
Case assignment considerations. Unlike theta-assignment, Case-assignment is directional, 
assigned by the governing head to its right. Given that that is an NP, it is in need of Case, but it 
can only get it when it is found on the right of the P head45. The same does not hold for (10) 
where the r-pronoun that appears on either side of the P head is not under Case constraints. This 
then can then account for the unavailability of (9b) compared to (10a) on the basis of Case-
assignment failure46. If we adopted an NP analysis for r-pronouns, the distribution in (9–10) 
would be problematic. Bennis notes that r-pronouns inherently resist Case-marking, thus, their 
distribution with regard to the P head is not as restrictive as that of NPs ultimately concluding 
that r-pronouns and NPs are two distinct elements.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 This can be overtly observed in Greek, where auto ‘that’ inflects for all φ-features, but eki 
‘there’ does not. 
46 Nevertheless, Case–assignment considerations seem to fail for de berg op ‘the mountain onto’, 
which is grammatical. For this example neither Case-assignments nor the Head Movement 
Constraint seem to be in effect although the DP is licensed above op without any movement 




As an interim summary of the above subsections, let me summarize the main points raised about 
the distinction of r-pronouns and NPs:  
(i) NPs and r-pronouns do not have a similar distribution regarding a P-head or syntactic 
behavior in terms of their movement and extraction availability. 
(ii) Case assignment being directional, it can only account for the distribution of NPs but 
not r-pronouns suggesting that they do need Case.  
4.3.3 NULL-HEADED PPS TRIGGER AGREEMENT 
In the previous section some considerations were discussed regarding the status of r-pronouns as 
substitutes of DPs and we concluded that r-pronouns have all the characteristics of an 
independent phrase. In this section I would like to present evidence that indicates that sometimes 
a phrasal category may appear in the position of and share a function with another category (in 
this case, a DP), nonetheless their categorial status is not the same. Although this does not 
directly provide evidence for the underlying structure of there/here, it does, however, show once 
again that distribution alone is not dependable. More importantly it shows that PPs or CPs can 
sometimes ‘masquerade’ as DPs, opening the floor for further discussion regarding the 
underlying category of there/here, which I will claim not to be a nominal one but rather a 
prepositional.  
We know that subjects have to be nominal elements since (a) they need to check nominative case 
features with T, (b) they enter into an agreement relation with the verb, and (c) they must satisfy 




has ([uD*])47. Nonetheless, case-resistant phrases like PPs or CPs (Stowell 1981), which cannot 
agree with the verb or check EPP’s [uD*] feature, can be found in subject position: 
(11) [CP That he is a doctor] surprised everyone.          (Han 2005) 
(12) [PP Under the bed] is not a good place to save snowballs for summer.   (see Stowell 1981) 
[http://www.notso.com/kidhumr.htm] 
So how can we reconcile the theoretical requirements on the nature of subjects, namely that they 
have to be nominal (vs. non-nominal possibilities) on the one hand, and the empirical 
observations like (11&12) that have PPs and CPs appearing in subject position on the other 
hand? 
The proposed solution was an NP-over-CP analysis (see Groos and van Riemsdijk 1981). In its 
more recent revamp by Davies and Dubinsky (1998), these case-resistant categories are 
structurally represented in a DP-shell, which features a null-D head taking a non-NP phrase, 
which is understood as the subject of the sentence. The main advantages in this configuration is 
that with a DP in the subject position, EPP’s [uD*] feature on T can be checked and a theta role 
can be assigned. But more importantly, agreement is established with the verb, a problem raised 
by McCloskey (1991), who observes that coordinate subject clauses trigger plural verb 
agreement as in: 
(13) [That he’ll resign] and [that he’ll stay in office] seem at this point equally possible.   
McCloskey (1991: 564) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 It should be noted that it is not always obvious that the EPP can be checked only by nominal 
elements. For example Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou (1998) argue that although every 
language has a strong EPP feature that needs to be checked, not every language satisfies it in the 
same way. So for null subject languages that allow VSO word orders and have no overt 
expletives, they propose that the EPP can be checked by verb movement and not by Move (of a 
phrase) or Merge (of an expletive).  
In addition to this, locative inversion has been extensively argued (see for example 
Hoekstra&Mulder 1990; Jang 1996; Kim 2005; den Dikken 2006) to involve movement of PP to 




I will follow the DP-shell structure proposed in Davies and Dubinsky (1998) for CP subjects 
(11′) and for examples that have PPs in subject position (12′):  
 (11′) DP-shell of CP subjects   (12′) DP-shell of PP subjects 
    
A null-headed DP-shell is able not only to account for PPs appearing in subject position (12′), 
but also capture plural agreement when the subject has coordinated clauses, as McCloskey 
observed and is reproduced in (14) for PP clauses. McCloskey (1991) also notes that plural 
agreement is only possible when the conjoined clauses are “contradictory or incompatible”, in 
other words, when they denote two distinct state of affairs. If the conjuncts denote one state of 
affairs or one place or one situation, then only singular agreement is possible.  
A case of singular agreement is attested in (16) where here and there since they jointly specify 
one location and not two distinct places as in (15). So unlike (14′), (16′) does not trigger plural 
agreement since here and there are not used deictically to specify one distinct location each. 
(14) [PP1 Under the bed] and [PP2 in the wardrobe] are good places to hide it.  
[http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=5451867]   [Definite location] 
(15) [Here and here] are a couple of recent photos  [Deictic/Definite] 
 [http://www.schleygrange.org/] 








 (14′)  Plural subject–verb agreement   (16′) Singular subject–verb agreement 
        
In (14′), we had to postulate two null headed-DPs each one carrying a PP as the only way to 
account for the plural agreement, unlike (16′) that behaves more like (12′) and exhibits singular 
agreement.  
What is most important in these structures is that they can accommodate non-typical 
grammatical categories in subject position. I have tentatively chosen to abstract away from 
specifying the category under which here and there appear, but it has become clear that the fact 
that they may distribute like DPs or appear in subject position does not necessarily make them 
DPs.  
4.3.4 DISTRIBUTION 
The first empirical observations point to the fact that r-pronouns distribute more like PPs rather 
than DPs or any other phrasal category. The fact that there48 never distributes like a DP can be 
seen in the examples under (17), which clearly involve a DP. We observe that in none of them is 
it possible to replace the DP with there.  
(17) a. They occupied {DP  Wall Street/*there}  there does not  
  b. He finally bought {DP  the place/*there}   distribute like 
  c. He always liked {DP  cakes/*there}   a DP 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 And of course it is not surprising that the same paradigm holds for here since they are usually 




Additionally, there/here also cannot stand for other types of phrases, like CP and APs, as (18) 
shows:    
(18) a.  She knows {that people lie/*there}.  there resists  
b. She smells {funny/*there}.   CPs and APs 
On the other hand, there/here can promptly stand for prepositional phrases or their complements. 
There can, in general, stand for many locative and directional PPs in English, see (19b–d), but 
not for all i.e., (19e–g). Notice also that certain restrictions apply on the semantic properties of 
the DP complement. So He lives in the Bronx is acceptable, he lives in there is not, although 
(19b) is fine. In such cases in can only stand for a specific location like house, car, building.  
(19) a. John was going  {to the party /there/*to there}  
  b. Many people live  {in this house/ (in) there}  
  c. The cat ran {under the bed / (under) there} 
  d. The airplane flew {above the lake / (above) there} 
  e. Jane is standing  {by the exit / *by there }   
  f. The car arrived  {at the station/*at there}       
  g. The plane came  {from London/*(from) there}  
What is striking is that unlike all of these PP-examples, from-PPs are never substituted in their 
entirety by there49. So in (22g) from can never go missing50. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Other locative prepositions unavailable for there-replacement are through and out of. So in 
(i&ii) there cannot replace the entire spatial PP: 
(i) The kids sneaked {out of the house / *there} 
(ii) He crawled {through the pipe / ?there} 
Notice that both these Ps can also be used causatively but they are not analyzed on a par with 
‘from’. For example, they cannot convey causation on their own as ‘from’ does in non-verbal 
environments, although are are fine with anticausatives. 
(iii) ??The headache is out of the wine. 
(iv) The pipe broke out of pressure. 




The examples in (17–19) all point to the fact that there is prepositional in its syntactic category. 
In Dutch, however, den Dikken notices that we find examples where ‘there’ can stand for a DP, 
parallel to the English thereof discussed in Kayne, see fn.14: 
(20) Hij keek er naar.      DUTCH 
  He looked there at  
  ‘He looked at it/??her/them.’ 
We know that er in these cases is in the place of a DP based on distribution. The phrase ‘looked 
at’ cannot take a PP complement but must select a DP. Importantly, this DP does not have to 
convey space, but as we see in the prose translation, er can be pronominal.  
Based on distribution alone, let us try to find a case similar to Dutch (23), where the phrase 
spelled out as there has to necessarily be a DP. One good candidate in English would be a 
sentence like (21): 
(21) He slept under {the bridge / there}. 
We know that under is a locative preposition, thus it is expected to select a DP and not yet 
another PP layer. Additionally, under is one of those prepositions that does not easily select for 
another overt preposition, although English is rather flexible in terms of P-stacking. Such 
considerations point towards the conclusion that (21) could have been equivalent to Dutch (20), 
showing that English there stands for DPs, had it not been for one important semantic distinction. 
Although the there-version of (21) can be argued to be equivalent to its overt DP-version, in 
(21a) this is not possible any more: 
(21a) He slept under {the moon / *there / ✓it}. 
(21a) is important because it highlights that semantic (and possibly syntactic) properties the DP 
there stands for can affect the grammaticality of the sentence. What can be drawn from the 




longer able to stand for that DP. Instead it is only a pronominal element that is able to surface in 
this position, like it. So the licensing of there seems to be contingent, not only on the 
subcategorization frame of the selecting head (as was the case in (17&18)), but also on the 
internal properties of the denoted entity.  
What this means syntactically is that the structure of the bridge in (21a) must involve some 
compatible elements with the structure of there, which at the same time are incompatible with 
the structure of the moon. Arguably the two DPs (the bridge and the moon) differ in their place-
denoting interpretation in the specific example. So although the bridge marks a specific location 
in space, the moon does not because the area under it is non-specific and ultimately incompatible 
with the deictic there. I will discuss the nature of the difference in more detail in chapter 5, 
where I will show how and why the two DPs differ. For now it suffices to say that there is good 
indication that not all DPs behave the same with regard to their distribution and their 
compatibility with there. 
Distributional patterns are probably the first tool used in ascertaining the grammatical category 
of a phrase. The distribution of the pronouns here/there indicates that they behave more like PPs 
rather than NPs, although they are caterogized as pronouns. I have shown, however, that 
distribution alone is not sufficient evidence for caterogial classification due to the considerations 
presented in this section. At the same time, it can offer useful insights regarding the underlying 
syntactic structure of the sentences that here/there participate in, based on the different readings 






4.3.5 “ARTIFICIAL” SUBSTITUTES 
In studying distributional patterns we looked at examples where there could stand in for some 
other phrase, namely a PP or a DP. The substitution method can indicate the category of the 
substituted phrase based on the substitute, for example when a VP is substituted by do so, both 
project up to a verbal phrase. However, there are cases where the substitute is not always of the 
same syntactical category. Practically this means that when an r-pronoun performs a similar 
semantic function as a DP, it is not necessarily the case that the r-pronoun has to be a DP itself. I 
refer to such substitutes as “artificial substitutes” since their semantic function is the same as the 
substituted phrase, but their syntactic nature is not necessarily alike.  
Although an r-pronoun appears to ‘stand in for’ a DP, it will be shown that its projection is not 
nominal but prepositional. Important considerations with regard to the: (i) category of the 
substituted phrase, (ii) stress, and (iii) the need for an antecedent, ultimately suggest that r-
pronouns should be treated syntactically independently and not simply as DP equivalents. 
Firstly, pronouns do not always stand for nominal phrases, so the link between pronouns (and by 
extension r-pronouns) and DPs is compromised. Sometimes we find pronouns or demonstratives 
that stand for entire predicates:  
(22) a. Hans ist schlau, und Maria ist    *( es)  auch.  GERMAN 
John is   smart   and  Mary  is it, too 
 b. Hans  ist dumm.  Nein, das ist er nicht. 
John is  dumb No,  that  is  he  not 
‘John is dumb. No, he’s not.’ 
 c. John washed his car and Bill did it, too. 
Note also Postal’s (1966) proposal, where he claims that pronouns are not nouns at all, but in fact 
determiners which allow their nominal complements to go unpronounced. In support of this, 




the French le, la, les). Ultimately we can conclude that (r-)pronouns do not uniformly substitute 
nounal phrases. In fact, (23a) shows that r-pronouns can also stand for entire PPs: 
(23) a.        Bill was {on this table/HERE} not {behind that closet/THERE}! 
b. * John washed his car and Bill did IT too 
Secondly, we know that here/there cannot be treated on a par with DP substitutes because they 
can carry stress in a sentence. For example, in (23b) the stressed it stands for a VP and gives out 
an unfavorable judgment, while the stressed here in (23a) is perfectly acceptable. 
Thirdly, substitutes have to be d-linked, thus they need to be related to an antecedent in the 
previous context. This is the case with pronominal elements like it. So in (24) the pronoun it is 
not recoverable, unless there is a preceding context to be linked to.  
(24) Bill did it. 
On the other hand, here/there can be used deictically and consequently do not always require an 
antecedent, as in Come here! 
In conclusion, there are indications pointing to the fact that r-pronouns are “artificial” substitutes 
in the sense that they do not seem to always agree with the category of their substitute and should 
thusly be treated as independent phrases whose categorial status is to be determined based not 
only on distribution but further syntactic evidence. 
4.3.6 P-MODIFIERS 
One way of testing the presence of PP structure is to look for prepositional specifiers, that is, 
elements that usually appear in the projections of a P head and, therefore, presuppose the 
existence of PP structure (Emonds 1972). These are optional phrases and, according to van 
Riemsdijk (1978), they may belong to a variety of phrase types: an NP, two miles; an AdjP, 




straight, two modifiers that frequently combine with ‘from’-PPs and test their behavior with 
THERE/THAT.  
This section will be divided in two parts. First I will discuss the availability of specifiers P-
externally, that is, above ‘from’. This will provide support to the conclusion that causative ‘from’ 
lacks spatial components reflected in its functional domain. Then I will test the availability of 
specifiers P-internally, that is, above the complement of ‘from’. The distribution facts will be 
accounted for by appealing to the presence of a null P head for the spatial cases versus the 
causative ones, indicating a structural distinction between the two interpretation of ‘from. 
4.3.6.1  ABOVE ‘FROM’ 
Spatial ‘from’ examples freely combine with specifiers like straight, while the same is not 
always true for the causative ‘from’. Compare (25a) with (25b):  
(25) a.  That virus was/came [straight [from  [Africa]]]. 
 b. My headache was/came [*/✓straight [from  [drinking that cheap wine]]]. 
The judgments for (25b) vary considerably among native speakers. So in discussing (25), I will 
try to offer a possible account for this variation after showing what underlies the contrast in  
acceptability between (25a&b).  
The examples in (25) focus on the functional domain of each ‘from’, which can pinpoint a 
difference between the spatially and the causatively interpreted ‘from’-PPs as suggested by 
Tortora. To understand why (25b) is not acceptable, let us start by examining the type of these 
specifiers, their position, and the kind of Ps they modify. An important ingredient of this 
discussion will be Jackendoff’s (1983) analysis of the properties of Path Ps. The first one he 




Boundedness assigns Ps a specific endpoint, or in the case of Sources, a specific point of origin 
as in John ran from the house. 
Tortora (2008) extends the property of boundedness to Place PPs and examines in detail their 
functional layers and their interrelation with the semantic interpretation of the P. More 
speficically, based on evidence from Italian and Spanish, it is shown that the Aspectual phrase 
above a PPPLACE encodes the feature [bounded] and is responsible for the interpretation of the 
space denoted by the PP either as bounded/contained or unbounded/non-specific. When the Asp 
head is marked as [−bounded], the space denoted is “wider” and is not limited or location-
specific. On the other hand, a positively marked [bounded] feature yields a “punctual” or limited 
space51. With these conclusions in place, Tortora (2008) offers an analysis for the English 
specifiers right/straight. She observes, based on distribution facts, that a lexical preposition 
comes equipped with its own aspectual domain contingent on its lexical properties. So there are 
Ps that are compatible with right and others that are not; compare the house is right around the 
corner vs. *there were bees right around the house. Those Ps that invite modification by 
right/straight render a specific or bounded location, unlike those that do not. The conclusion is 
that the aspectual projection of a P has semantic effects, in terms of boundedness, on the Space 
denoted in that PP. This will be the key to explaining the judgments in (25). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51   I repeat here the Italian examples reported in Tortora (2008) that illustrate how the 
lexicalization of the Asp head (a is meged in the functional domain of the lexical P dentro) 
results in marking the Space denoted by the locative PP as bounded/punctual: 
(i) Mettilo dentro la scattola.   Bounded space: put it in a specific spot  
 Put it inside the box     inside the box 
(ii) Guarda  bene dentro alla scattola.  Unbounded space: look everywhere in  





Tortora (p.c.) suggests that the semantic property of boundedness can be re-interpreted (from 
Jackendoff 1983 and Tortora 2008) to also define the “linear space” denoted by the Path vs. the 
space denoted by PlacePs, which is 2- or 3-dimensional. So Path is a kind of SPACE, although 
not of a Place-type. According to this line of argumentation, a bounded Path can be understood 
as a “rigid” Path that does not permit deviations from the linear trajectory. An unbounded Path 
on the other hand, is not as ‘restrictive’, allowing the Figure to possibly oscillate from that linear 
trajectory. The distinction boils down to whether there is a ‘straight and inescapable route’ or not 
between the beginning and end points of the Path. This is better illustrated below: 
(26) This shop’s pastries are (straight) from the bakery across the street. 
Bounded Path (straight): the pastries are prepared in the bakery and are served in the 
shop exactly as they got delivered. Modification by “straight” is possible. 
Unbounded Path (*straight): the pastries are prepared at the bakery, but there could be 
intermediate steps before serving i.e., they are processed in the shop’s kitchen where they 
bake them or prepare them in some way before serving. Modification by “straight” is not 
possible. 
So the conclusion that P specifiers are licensed only when the denoted space is bounded can be 
replicated for Paths. In (26), straight is licensed only when the Path is bounded in the sense that 
there are no intermediate stops or deviations from the main course.  
The conclusions drawn from the above observations can now give an insight into the 
unacceptability of (25b) vs. (25a): If the licensing of straight/right is contingent on the properties 
of the P head and its ability to render a bounded Path, then a causatively interpreted from 
(meaning one that selects a DP), which does not convey any kind of Space, will not be able to 
have aspectual projections related to boundedness. In sum, the ungrammaticality of (25b) can be 
attributed to lack of spatial structure, that is, an internal PP argument and concomitantly an 




At this point I would like to bring up the fact that there is a stark contrast in the judgments of 
some native speakers, who do not consider (25b) ungrammatical as a causative sentence. Below I 
provide additional sentences that illustrate better the use of specifiers with causatively interpreted 
‘from’: 
(27) I’m in the hospital with mild emphysema and a collapsed lung […], the emphysema is 
straight from smoking and the collapsed lung is from me being tall and skinny. 
[http://www.totse2.com/archive/index.php?t-9904.html] 
Such examples are not as easy to find as spatial ones, yet their causative interpretation is 
unequivocal. Logically there should be an explanation that accounts for the speaker variation on 
the acceptability of straight in causative sentences without undermining its licensing conditions 
based on the boundedness of the P’s argument that derives the contrast in (25a) vs. (25b). 
Consider the difference in acceptability between (27b) and (27c) as reported by speakers who 
find (25b) acceptable: 
(27)   b.  The emphysema was straight from smoking. 
 c.  * The emphysema was right from smoking. 
This contrast on the one hand reinforces the analysis for incompatibility of aspectual modifiers 
due to lack of spatial structure ((27c) is still rejected by everyone), but on the other hand, points 
out that the type of specifier used can influence the acceptability of the sentence52. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52  Consider also the specifier “directly”, which seems to be particularly compatible with a 
causative meanings as Causes are usually considered either direct or indirect: 
(i)  It’s impossible to say it comes directly from smoking, because there are so many other 
elements that play into it. 
[http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20090727114629AAMWSMm] 





Focusing on straight vs. right, we notice that their distributional difference extends also to verbs. 
We can observe that while right is mostly restricted to Space meanings, straight participates in 
non-spatial contexts more freely. In examples like my application was denied straight53, there is 
no space denotation, nevertheless straight can be licensed in light of the fact that we have a 
resultative structure and the event denoted by the verb is telic/bounded54. The same does not hold 
for right, so *my application was denied right is out. These judgments form a symmetrical pair 
with those in (27b–27c), where straight was preferred over right.  
Examples (25–27), taken together, show that straight can modify spatial as well as non-spatial 
entities, while right is mostly reserved for spatial ones. This does not necessarily infringe on the 
boundedness restriction, but rather points out that not all P-modifiers require a space-denoting 
argument. So we going back to (25), we can suggest that for those speakers that find (25b) 
ungrammatical, straight seems to strictly abide by the boundedness condition. For those speakers 
that find (25b) and (27a−b) acceptable, we could appeal to the fact that straight can be used as a 
modifier in non-spatial environments and by extension applied to causative uses as well. 
Additionally, the distribution of right across the board makes more categorical distinctions, 
which seem to depend on whether the P’s argument has a spatial denotation or not. This is 
important as it confirms that the distinction between directional (25a) and causative (25b) can be 
attributed to the presence or absence of spatial structure in the complement of ‘from’.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 An example brought up by den Dikken. 
54 It is modified for example by in ten minutes: 




4.3.6.2  BELOW ‘FROM’  
I will now shift the attention from the functional domain of ‘from’ to its internal structure. 
Unlike (25), we notice that in (28) the same modifiers are never compatible with nominals, 
which is responsible for the unfavorable judgments:	  
(28) a.       * That virus was/came  [from  [right/straight [DP Africa]]. 
 b.       *My headache was/came [from  [right/straight [DP the wine]].  
The data become more interesting when we replace the complement of those ‘from’-PPs with its 
respective th pro-form. The specifier test will be in accordance with the main line of 
argumentation in this chapter, namely that THERE is prepositional in its syntactic category 
versus THAT, which is always nominal. It turns out that only THERE can co-exist with straight 
and right, but not THAT, which is distinctively degraded as seen in (28&29b).  
(29) a.	 	 	 	 	 	 ✓The noise came [from  right/straight  [PP  THERE]. 
b.       *The fever was    [from  right/straight  [DP  THAT]. 
If the hypothesis that THERE projects a prepositional phrase is on the right track, then the 
favorable judgment for (29a) is predictable. In the same way, since THAT is uncontroversially a 
DP, it is not surprising that it is incompatible with prepositional specifiers, giving out an 
unfavorable judgment for (29b). So the judgments in (29) indicate that there and that project up 
to a different syntactic phrase, a PP and a DP respectively. 
But an additional observation should be added here. If we accept that the directional from is 
comprised of two PP layers, namely Path and Place/Location, then in (28a) there should be a null 
PP layer in the complement of the overt P. Theoretically, a prepositional specifier could have 
been hosted by the embedded PLOC and not the DP projections any more. This structure would 




(28) a′.      * That fever came [PDIR  from [ right/straight [PLOC  ∅  [DP Africa]]. 
(28a′) however is not acceptable. It would be desirable not to change the underlying structure of 
directional PPs. Getting rid of the Pø would seriously undermine the congruent literature on the 
internal structure of directional PPs. Also changing the syntactic category of THERE as a PP vs. 
THAT would go against the argumentation of this chapter and indications provided. With these 
considerations in mind, it is worth exploring other possible scenarios for the source of the 
ungrammaticality of (28a′).  
One such possible scenario attributes the judgment of (28a′) to the properties of the intervening 
Pø. The structure in (28a′) involves modification of a null head by right/straight. Such 
modifications, however, fail in general because the null head is not rich enough in features to 
allow modification, a phenomenon that extends to heads of other categories.  
For example, Nerbonne and Mullen (2000) discuss that English determiners can only take 
phonologically realized complements, other than the case of possessives, which strictly select 
null heads, so your place or mine is acceptable. Additionally, English does not allow adjectival 
modification of null nouns, which accounts for the unacceptability of *your place or mine 
beautiful. In modification of null nouns, one is forced, giving out the contrast in acceptability of 
*the beautiful vs. the beautiful one. Only some exceptional cases are noted for comparatives and 
superlatives as well as for positive adjectives like favorite, first, last, which Nerbonne and 
Mullen refer to as empty N-licensers (for English and German). Example (30) exhibits their 
effect in the acceptability of null-head modification: 
(30) Paul read 20 abstracts the best/more interesting ∅   were on Creoles. 




Such exceptional cases aside, the modification of nouns requires the presence of a 
phonologically overt N head. This is parallel to what had been proposed above for the inability 
of phonologically unrealized P in (28a′) to host specifiers, which in turn may account for the 
unacceptability of (28a′). 
Another observation that supports the fact that the ungrammaticality of (28a′) is due to the 
unrealized PLOC, is that as soon as we lexicalize this intermediate Pø (see (31a–c)), the outcome 
becomes acceptable for the directional readings only (31a,b). On the other hand, it was 
impossible to find any examples where any preposition could emerge between a causatively 
understood ‘from’ and its Cause-DP (31c), and of course any P-specifier is also unavailable.  
(31) a. ... he could have easily taken to banking [from straight [out of [school]]] 
[http://businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/the-executive/34873-the-lecturer-bankers-first-results] 
b. ..a column of light emerged [from right [over [the peak of the mountain]]] 
[http://www.aurorahunter.com/peak-moment.php]     (spatial) 
c. The constant back pain is [from [ *P [a bad sitting posture]]]. (causative) 
So the prediction that causatively interpreted ‘from’-PPs take only DP complements and hence 
no prepositional specifiers could emerge is borne out empirically since no examples of [fromCAUS 
[PP specifier [P [ DP ]]]] have be found, contrary to spatial contexts, where we do find [fromDIR  
[PP specifier [P [ DP ]]]]. 
We conclude that the distribution of prepositional specifiers seems to be congruent with a 
categorial difference between THAT and THERE as a DP and PP respectively. Specifiers like 
right and straight are compatible only with prepositions, which has lead us to assume that 
THERE projects a PP, but not with the nominal THAT. Additionally, it was shown that only 
spatial from can select a specified PP layer, but not causative from, which supports the main 




complement. An additional conclusion is that since P-modifiers require an overt P, and since 
specifiers are compatible with there in (29a), there should not only project to a PP but also 
contain a lexicalized P-head. This last conclusion deserves further analysis. So in the following 
section I will dissect ‘there’ confirming the presence of a P-head. 
4.3.7 A MOLECULAR ANALYSIS OF THERE 
Kayne (2005a) analyzes there and where as polymorphemic pronouns and identifies three 
distinct morphemes: th/wh, e, and r, which are more closely studied in the following subsections 
in order to offer further support for an underlyingly prepositional structure for ‘there’: 
4.3.7.1 TH/WH/D 
The th/wh is the definite and indefinite respectively part of there and where which are also found 
in other pronouns and wh-words. Kayne (2005a) links this th morpheme to their determiner 
status, which is considered a widely accepted fact in English. In his argumentation, Kayne 
follows Postal’s (1966) proposal that pronouns are determiners that always select a nominal 
phrase even if that noun is deleted or unpronounced (a line of thought also defended in 
Jackendoff (1977), Panagiotidis (2002), a.o.). Assuming obligatory selection of an NP, Kayne 
(2005b) proposes that there always selects an unpronounced PLACE, THING, or REASON. In 
sum, there must project a DP layer since th sits under D. 
4.3.7.2 R 
According to Kayne (2005a), the r in there also surfaces independently. The morphemic nature 
of r is based on Noonan’s (2005) observations and analysis of Dutch and German locative r-
pronouns. I will reserve a more detailed discussion on the monomorphemic and syntactic status r 





If th and r are individual morphemes, by deduction, the vowel e between them will also be one. 
The vowels {o, a, e, ie} are referred to as the locative vowels. Kayne (2005a) capitalizes on the 
English e in here observing that it is differently pronounced than the e in there/where and draws 
a parallel of the [i]−[ε] contrast with the person distinction in Italian and Spanish pronominal 
possessives. The contrast in those pronouns is between first person marked with −i (mi) and 
second and third persons marked with −u (tu, su).  
If the here−there contrast is indeed parallel to that of mi−tu/su and if it is also the case that here 
“has something in common” with mi-, then this could offer support to the morphemic status of e 
in here. Indeed Kayne (2005a) proposes that here and mi converge on an interpretive level in 
meaning something like “the odd man out”; in other words, they define/mark a particular space 
or individual in contrast to the rest. So here contrasts with everything over there, while first 
person contrasts with everyone else in the same context (2/3.SG).  
The proposal that phonetic convergence can be claimed to mark proximity to the speaker is 
further supported by empirical facts relating ‘here’ and ‘1.SG.’. For example in Dutch: hier and 
mijn, ik. In German: hier and ich. And in Greek: ɛðo and ɛɣo. The case of Greek is slightly 
different in that the vowel is not [i] but [ɛ], nonetheless they seem to converge. In fact, the 
paradigm in (32) below exhibits an exceptional uniformity among the locative pronouns ‘here’ 
and ‘there’, and the 1.SG–2.SG personal pronouns:  
(32) ɛðo ‘here’ ɛɣo ‘I’      GREEK 




Similar mappings between locative and personal pronouns are not as overt in Romance 
languages, for example the French pair ici–lá ‘here−there’, does not exhibit any connection with 
je–tu/il ‘1.SG−2/3.SG’.  
4.3.8 THE RECEPTOR OF R  (RP) 
Noonan (2007) provides a unifying account for the syntactic structure of r-pronouns ‘there’ and 
‘where’ in German (da, wo) and Dutch (daar, waar), which then she also extends to English 
there55. She bases her analysis on the distribution of r- and non-r-pronouns with regard to DPs 
(+/−HUMAN) and the locative preposition, as well as on the pronunciation (or non) of the r at PF 
and the ability to be pied-piped and strand adpositions. In the following subsections, I will 
briefly present her analysis and show how it leads to the conclusion that ‘there’ is a PLOC, as also 
also suggested in Jackendoff (1983) who categorizes t/here as “intransitive prepositions”. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 A reference to Greek cannot be made here, as Greek lacks r-words. I would like, however, to 
submit a morphological indication of the prepositional composition of ‘there’ from Ancient 
Greek (AG), where we find a transparent combination of a preposition and a locative suffix for 
the word ‘there’. Although the case of AG does not constitute evidence for a prepositional 
analysis of there (or er in Dutch and da/dort in German), it can provide individual morphological 
support for the prepositional nature of the grammatical adverb ‘there’.  
So for ‘there, thither’ we find the word: ἔνθα (entha) (GWST, Τriantafyllidi). What is interesting 
about this word is that it is composed of two morphemes, namely ἔν and -θα. The first 
morpheme, which is most germane to our analysis here, is the preposition ‘in, within’ denoting a 
fixed position in place, time or state (GWST). The suffix -θα, according to Smyth (1956), 
belongs to the category of adverbs which were originally case forms—like prepositions—and 
which survive as affixes attached to a nominal stem or a case form. Smyth submits six different 
cases with their respective adverbial suffixes. The suffix -θα is associated to Locative case, and 
claims that when it attaches to a stem, it denotes Place/Location.  
In sum, there are two important observations here: (i) ἔνθα ‘there’ is not monomorphemic, and 
(ii) it is comprised of an overt preposition and a locative suffix. I will reserve any etymological 
claims that would link the Greek entha to its Germanic counterparts (Ge. da, OHG dar, Du. 
daar, O.S. thar, Goth. þar, from PIE *tar-) as this pertains to a different field altogether and 
focus only on the fact that AG gives overt evidence for a prepositional (de)composition of 




4.3.8.1 R-GENERATION: HIGHER THAN DP, LOWER THAN PPLOC 
Although non-pronominal DPs (+HUMAN) and non-r-pronouns can appear in the complement of 
a preposition, obtaining the word order: P>DP; pronominal DPs and r-pronouns prefer a 
postposition, both in German and Dutch. So in (33a&34a) the DP appears after the P, while a 
postpositional distribution, as in (33b&34b), is blocked. Pronominal [−HUMAN] objects of 
prepositions (i.e. r-pronouns), however, can only appear before the preposition as can be seen in 
the c-counterparts of each example set: 
(33) a. Sie  sitzt  auf dem  Stuhl.  GERMAN  (Noonan 2007) 
   she  sits  on  the chair 
b.   * Sie sitzt dem Stuhl auf.   
   she  sits  the  chair  on 
 c.       *auf  da/wo  →  c′.      ✓ darauf/worauf 
   on  there/where    thereon/where on 
(34) a.  Hij ligt  op de bank.    DUTCH  (den Dikken 2010) 
he  lies on the couch 
 b.      * hij ligt de bank op. 
  he lies  the couch on  
c.       * op er  cf.(7b)  → c′.      ✓ daar   op   
   on there    there  on 
(33&34) show that the distribution of r-pronouns differs from that of DPs with regard to the 
locative adposition: P>DP vs. r>P. Consequently, Noonan assumes that r-pronouns occupy a 
different structural position than DPs. More specifically, r-pronouns are generated higher than 
the locative adposition, which obtains the postpositional order, and DPs are generated lower than 
the adposition (inside the PP), which obtains the word order: P>DP. 
Koopman (1997) reaches the same conclusion regarding the structural position of r-pronouns. 




to DPs, due to their distribution and the fact that they can pied-pipe P. Let’s see the empirical 
facts first.  
One thing Koopman wants to establish first is that independently of their relative position, r-
pronouns still end up in some left projection of that locative PP. She offers the examples below 
to support this structural relation by showing that the r-pronoun can not only appear with the PP 
(which does not offer any structural insights on its own), but it can also pied-pipe the PP as in 
(33b):  
(35) a. Ik  heb  dat boek daarop gelegd.         DUTCH     (Koopman 1997:8) 
  I  have that book there-op put 
‘I have put that book on there.’ 
 b. de tafel, waarop ik het boek heb gelegd. 
the table, whereon I  the book  have put 
  ‘the table, on which I put the book.’ 
The second argument she wants to make is that although r-pronouns are part of the locative PP, 
they are attracted higher than the P. For that, Koopman will use movement as a diagnostic of 
relative position within the PP vicinity. Examples (36a&b) below show that only r-pronouns can 
move away from the vicinity of the adposition (36b), while DPs fail to be extracted (36a): 
(36) a.       * Welke tafeli heb je dat boekje op ti gelegd? DUTCH 
  which  table  have  you  that  book  on   put      (Koopman 1997:9) 
  ‘Which table did you put the book on?’ 
 b.      ✓	 Waari heb jij dat boek  ti op gelegd? 
where  have   you this book   on put 
Assuming that postpositional word order is correctly attributed to stranding (van Riemsdijk 
1978), Koopman concludes that DPs fail to strand the adposition in the same way r-pronouns do, 
hence they have to start from different syntactic positions. If movement out of a phrase requires 
landing in the Spec of that phrase first, then it is only those elements that can reach this position 




ability of r-pronouns, in contrast to DPs, to strand the preposition to locality effects. The DP, 
being in the complement of P, cannot raise to SpecPP and consequently cannot escape out of the 
PP phrase. An r-pronoun, however, manages to reach that escape hatch position (Spec), 
according to Koopman (1997). This derives the asymmetry in (34) above advocating for the 
different syntactic positions of r-pronouns and lexical DPs with respect to the locative P. 
4.3.8.2  R  HAS ITS OWN HEAD 
Taking it a step further, Noonan (2005&2007) puts forward the hypothesis that the r of r-
pronouns is a separate morpheme generated under its own syntactic head, RPLACE. The 
preliminary support to this hypothesis comes from the phonological constraints on the spell-out 
of r in German r-pronouns. Müller (2002) had already identified the independence of r and 
describes German r-words as having an adverbial base ([–WH] da and [+WH] wo) and an 
epenthetic r inserted when the following preposition is missing an onset, that is, when it starts 
with a vowel:  
(37) da-r-an ‘there-r-of’        vs.   da-*r-mit ‘there-*r-with’ 
da-r-über, ‘there-r-under’    da-*r-hinter ‘there-*r-behind’ 
In Dutch, a greater variety of r-containing words is reported which do not appear to be 
phonologically constrained i.e., daar ‘there’ and waar ‘where’, but also er ‘there’, hier ‘here’, 
nergens ‘nowhere’, etc. 
By isolating the r under a separate head, Noonan attempts to correlate its spell-out with: (a) the 
presence of an overt P and (b) the phonological constraint in German that forces adpositions 
have an onset. In (38&39) below the r projects an RPLACE head with two important 





(38)  [RPLACEP  da/daa  [RPLACE′  r  [PP  Ø  [DP  e] ]]] 
   Du            Ge 
(39)  [RPLACEP  da/daa  [RPLACE′  r  [PP  [−onset]P  [DP  e] ]]] 
The r being an independent morpheme, it can morphologically attach either leftward to the 
locative adverbial base in Dutch daa/waa (solid line indicating movement) or rightward to the 
locative P for German. So the spell out of the r head in German is contingent on what follows it. 
If the following P is overt and vowel initial, then the r is pronounced (39). In the absence of an 
overt locative P, RPLACE remains silent (dashed line). In Dutch, the spell out of that RPLACE head is 
contingent on the pronunciation of its specifier (solid line), which is occupied by daa/waa.  
Consequently, we always get r-pronouns with the r pronounced in Dutch: daar or waar. On the 
other hand, in German, their counterparts have a silent r: da and wo, unless there is a P following 
and it is vowel initial. In this case we get: darauf and worauf with the r spelled out. 
A more syntactically flavored evidence for the morphemic independence of r comes from 
another interesting asymmetry between German and Dutch. Although in Dutch the r can be pied-
piped along with waa (40b), in the German counterpart this is not possible (40a), suggesting that 
r has its own separate projection, thus it is morphemically independent (Pantcheva 2008). 
(40) a.        Wo(*r) ist er rüber gesprungen?   GERMAN     (Noonan 2007) 
which is  he  r-over  jumped 
b.    Waar heb je  dat boekje op gelegd? DUTCH 
where have  you this book on put 
4.3.8.3  THE MOLECULAR STRUCTURE OF RP  
Taking into consideration the conclusions drawn from the above observations regarding the 




2006), Noonan decomposes r-pronouns into the following parts: PlaceP, RPLACEP, , DPLACEP, and 
PLOC. Let us see what the assumptions about and function of each one of these are: 
The r heads its own projection (as has been argued for in the previous section) which Noonan 
calls RPLACEP. The fact that the head has a PLACE flavor is attributed to its inherent deictic 
function (also argued for in Kayne 2005b). As a spatial deictic head, it has to select something 
that denotes Location, which accounts for its PlaceP complement.  
PlaceP is a categorial incarnation of Kayne’s (2005b) unpronounced PLACE in the complement 
of there, where, and here. It will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5, how space-denoting 
arguments have to be selected by a Prepositional or Locative head due to the fact that an NP 
alone fails to denote location. The PlaceP, in turn, takes a pro as a complement, which represents 
the referent of that r-pronoun: [RPLACEP  r  [PlaceP PLACE [NP pro ]]]. 
Up to now we have seen the internal structure of the RPLACEP. There are, however, some 
functional projections as well which are most crucial for the distribution and meaning of r-
words. The first projection is used for the definite part of r-pronouns: DPLACEP. Notice that the 
PLACE index of that D is not an indicator of a Locative DP, but it is used as a co-indexation 
notation. The DPLACEP is realized as d for da and w for wo in German or w for waar in Dutch. It 
is precisely at this point that Kayne’s (2005a) linking of the English th with the German d, and 
Dutch w becomes most relevant. Noonan’s analysis will step on this link and extend her analysis 
on the German and Dutch r-pronouns to the English th-words, thus, neatly putting them under 
the same umbrella. Finally, the function of DPLACE is to license the pro complement of the silent 




The r-pronoun is not complete though until we include the locative vowel {a, o, e}. With Kayne 
(2005a) having already argued for the morphemic individuality of this vowel, Noonan assignes it 
in a separate head, lexicalizing a Locative Prepositional head (PLOC) and ultimately the RPLACE 
head as well, depending on language-specific restrictions as described in (38&39).  
The fact that where and when ultimately project up to a PP is not a new proposal. We also find it 
in Bresnan&Grimshaw (1978: 347), who consider where and when to start out as locative NP-
complements of a P[Loc]/[Temp], both carrying the same categorial features, either [Loc] or [Temp]:  
(41) a. [PP[Loc/Temp]  [P[Loc/Temp]  φ  ]   [NP[Loc/Temp]  where/when ]]     => 
b. [PP[Loc/Temp]  [NP  [ where(ever)/where(ever) ]]] 
The derived structure in (41b) is the outcome of a P-deletion rule, following Emonds (1976), 
which deletes locative and temporal Ps when they are followed by a locative or temporal NP: 
 c.  P    → φ / ___ NP  
  [F]              [F]          (F = [Loc/Temp]) 
Although this analysis is not followed here, it is important to notice that where, which is 
considered ‘inherently locational’, is structurally represented in a locative prepositional structure, 
which accounts for the distribution and behavior of where and when.  
The tree in (42) is the structural decomposition of Dutch daar, waar, hier; and German da, wo, 
















There are, however, three important points I would like to emphasize regarding this structure: (i) 
the internal morphological complexity of r-pronouns, suggested partially in Katz&Postal (1964) 
and Kayne (2005a), must be syntactically represented; (ii) the r-pronoun projects up to a PLOC 
phrase and not a nominal one, in other words, there enters the configuration as a PP; and (iii) this 
structural (de)composition of there/where explains why they are closely linked to place/location, 
unlike nouns or other pronouns. 	  
Noonan extends this structure to English there and 
here—based mostly on Kayne’s analysis (2005a, 
2006)—as well as to thereon and therein, but I 
have also left that part of structure out as it is not 




CHAPTER 5 A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO ‘FROM’-PPS 
The wh-extraction and th-word facts in the preceding sections were particularly revealing in 
terms of the categorial nature of the complement of ‘from’ because these tests offered a clear 
dichotomy between causatively and spatially interpreted ‘from’’s. There it was shown that 
‘where/there’ are underlyingly prepositional (linking syntactically locations with PPs), while 
‘what/that’ are nominal as commonly accepted so in the literature. This proposal can provide a 
syntactic explanation to why we ask for locations using ‘where’, but not for objects or 
individuals, something that has often been taken for granted. ‘Where’ and ‘what’ are never 
interchangeable, hence they are able to provide an explicit distinction between PPs and DPs. The 
‘where/there’ and ‘what/that’ distinction was most useful because it gave a way to arguing for a 
different interpretation of ‘from’ contingent on phrasal selection.  
But for the sake of completeness, we need to discuss those cases where a DP surfaces in the 
complement of ‘from’ and there is no wh-extraction or th-words. How are these DPs understood 
either as cause or location? Is there something different in their semantic or syntactic 
composition? Can a DP be interpreted as location on its own? The answers to these questions 
will offer a consistent analysis of the denotation of DPs across-the-board, placing the burden of 
interpretation onto the structural environment they are found in and ultimately reinforce the 
proposal that the disambiguation of ‘from’ is indeed dictated by the structural environment. 
5.1    AN X-RAY OF CAUSATIVE ‘FROM’-PPS 
I will start with an interesting observation regarding the internal structure of causatively 
interpreted ‘from’-PPs: the P’s complement seems to always be nominal. This will become 




argument, which is based on existing research on prepositional structure, is that a causative 
‘from’ always selects for a DP structure even when its complement appears to be clausal. In light 
of this generalization, I would like to propose two possible internal configurations for every 
cause-denoting ‘from’ complement: (i) the (Eventive) Nominal56 and (ii) the Clausal State of 
Affairs (SoA). Below are the two possible structural configurations for causative PPs illustrated 
in a coordinated sentence that includes both possible types:  
(1)   (EVENTIVE) NOMINAL        CLAUSAL STATE OF AFFAIRS     
     
(2) Back pain is from [a bad chair & sitting with bad posture]. 
 http://www.sitbetter.com/sorted/search/chairs_for_back_pain/] 
The (eventive) nominals cover those cases where the P-head directly selects for a DP that it also 
Case-marks as in:  
(3) [My headache] was from [the wine/a bad wine].  
Another possible complement is a clausal SoA. We find gerunds serving as the causing event 
that brings about the Causee found in the subject position, for example: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 The type of argument selected by the causative ‘from’ can optionally be eventive. For 
example, gerunds like smoking or working hard can be analyzed as eventive. The nominal 
Causes, however, are not always eventive. So although the frequent tasting of the wine or the 
leaking of the pipe are considered “complex event nominals” (Grimshaw 1990), DPs like the 
wine or his negligence are not eventive in the sense that they do not pass certain tests for 
eventivity. Example (i) tests for compatibility with adverbial modifiers. Provided that events can 
be divided in subevents (Parsons 1990), they can also be associated with incremental changes 
and thus measured by modifiers. Example (ii) tests for durative adverbials which are licensed by 
the property of events to culminate (Pustejovsky 1991): 
(i) The gradual [leaking of the pipe/*wine]. 




(4) [His heavy breathing] is from [smoking cigars].  
Although the nominal cases are quite straightforward under a DP, I will briefly discuss the status 
of gerundival SoA and why they end up under a null DP in the complement of causative ‘from’.  
The representation of gerundival SoA as clauses is based on Chomsky (1981) who shows that 
gerunds exhibit structural properties similar to those of verbs phrases, predominantly because 
they require the presence of a subject. Horn (1975) and Reuland (1983) offer additional 
arguments for the full clausal nature of NP-ing. Reuland (1983) notices that many sentential 
diagnostics provided in Willams (1975) apply to NP-ing constructions, for instance, their ability 
to combine with sentential adverbs (5), their ability to take non-motivational because-clauses (6), 
or that there is no restriction on the type of their subject, just like any tensed clause (the most 
important observation being that they require a subject in the first place).    
(5) John probably being a spy Bill thought it wise to avoid him. 
(6) Grass being green because it contains chlorophyll, it is one of the most common types of 
vegetation employing photosynthesis. 
More synchronically, Pires (2010) follows the same path of argumentation regarding the clausal 
nature of gerunds and provides an extensive discussion on their syntactic properties concluding 
that they are in fact ‘bare TPs’, meaning that they lack a CP projection. Investigating the syntax 
of gerunds is not relevant here; what is of importance though is that we have different sources 
that concur with the conclusion that gerunds are clausal, which means that they are found under a 
TP or a CP57.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The conclusion that gerunds are TPs or CPs is not compatible with the generally accepted 
subcategorization frame of prepositions. We know that verbal or tensed clauses are generally 
dispreferred as prepositional complements (for further supporting discussion see 
Dubinsky&Williams 1995; Cornilescu 2004). So Ps in general are not expected to select either 




Additionally, we also find evidence for a nominal distribution of gerunds, although they might 
not be nominal themselves, in Emonds (1976). He shows that ing gerunds have an external 
distribution of NPs based on their position in the deep structure and behavior under movement in 
passives and clefts and submits the following “quasi-lexical” entry for gerunds: 
(7) ing, [+N], +V__, N: V+[ing] selects like V inside its maximal projection,but its 
maximal projection is syntactically an NP. 
Conclusively, the fact that gerunds distribute like nominals is reflected on their top-most 
syntactic head, which I have posted as a DP in (1). This is perfectly compatible with two facts:	  
(A) Gerunds exhibit plural agreement in coordination.	  
Since TPs cannot be subjects and thus cannot trigger sort agreement in any configuration, I will 
consider the gerunds to be under a CP due to their clausal status. But if this is true, then we have 
to deal with the McCloskey problem: How do coordinate CP subject clauses trigger plural verb 
agreement?  
(8) [John dancing with his ex AND the new shoes being too tight] were Mary's major 
concerns the entire night.  
Remember from 2.3.3 that Davies and Dubinsky (1998) show that case-resistant categories (i.e., 
CPs) in subject positions are structurally represented in a DP-shell. This is because with a DP in 
the subject position, EPP’s [uD*] feature on T can be checked and a theta role can be assigned, 
thus satisfying subject requirements. Postulating null-DPs then also takes care of the agreement 
under coordination, since what is coordinated now are the DPs and not the CPs any more. So in 
the end, independently of whether these clauses are TPs or CPs, they are represented in a DP-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Wth regard to this, Reuland (1983:108) notes that “unlike other clausal complements […], 
Clausal Gerund constructions do occur headed by a preposition in a position subcategorized for 
by a verb”. Pires (2010) submits the following example: 





shell as suggested in (1).	  
(B) Gerunds are compatible with nominal pro-forms. 
Gerunds are compatible with the pro-form THAT, which is associated to nominal phrases as 
discussed in the previous chapter. So although THAT clearly cannot stand-in for the embedded 
regular clause in (9), it can do so for the clausal gerund in from’s complement in (10), which is 
unambiguously interepted as Cause: 
(9) He knew that {he had too many drinks /*THAT}. 
(10) His accidents were from {him drinking before driving/THAT}. 
So once again the gerund seems to distribute like a DP rather than a TP/CP as suggested in (1). 
In this section I have claimed that causative ‘from’-PPs always subcategorize for a DP. I also 
included a brief discussion on gerundival causes because these are not usually analyzed as 
nominals. Four facts were important in this discussion: (i) gerunds appear as complements of 
causative ‘from’ (ii) they are clausal (iii) they have a nominal distribution and (iv) prepositions 
do not subcategorize for clauses. These facts logically lead to the conclusion that clausal SoA are 
topped off by a DP layer representing the nominal distribution of those gerundival clauses. This 
conclusion was additionally supported by coordinate gerund subject clauses triggering plural 
agreement and their compatibility with the nominal pro-form THAT. Ultimately a causatively 
interpreted ‘from’ always selects for a nominal argument, either a lexicalized or a null DP, 
expressing the causing event. 
5.2 AN X-RAY OF SPATIAL ‘FROM’-PPS 
Van Riemsdijk & Huybregts (2002) examine the relations between objects and events as realized 
by prepositions and identify two main relational dimensions: Location and Path. They start off 




syntactically and morphologically specified positions in a spatial structure. The evidence 
provided concurs on a hierarchical ordering of Path over Place configuration projected above the 
noun phrase:  
(11) [V′ V [PP DIR [P′ LOC [N′ N ]]]] 
But more importantly, they also prove, based on locality considerations that only adjacent heads 
in this hierarchical sequence are able to appear together in (morpho)syntactic configurations 
while non-adjacent ones are blocked. In other words, we can have sequences like:  
(12) a. V–PDIR, PDIR–PLOC, PLOC–N, N–PLOC, PLOC–PDIR, PDIR–V  
but the orderings below are predicted to be impossible—and indeed they are not found:  
b. V–PLOC, PDIR or V–N, N–PDIR, PLOC–V 
The morphological evidence provided in van Riemsdijk&Huybregts (2002) comes from the overt 
sequence of morphemes in spatial expressions in Lezgian (spoken in Dagestan and northern 
Azerbaijan). The order detected is abstractly equivalent to N−PLOC−PPATH. Notice that Lezgian 
employs only postpositions that follow the noun they attach onto (Dryer 2007), nonetheless, the 
relative ordering is preserved in accordance to (11) with the locative morpheme attaching before 
the directional one, hence closer to the stem:  
(13) sew - re  - qh   -  aj      LEZGIAN 
 Bear  augm. behind from 
‘from behind the bear’ 
Pantcheva (2009) provides additional morphological evidence in support of this relative order 
underlying prepositional constituents, building the Path on top of Place. For example, in Yanesha 
(an Arawakan language spoken in Peru) Goal and Source phrases in (14b&c) are always built on 
top of a locative layer, which when alone it gives out a purely locative meaning (14a). In this 




paths, and Ablative case expresses Source oriented paths. (Examples are originally from Duff-
Tripp 1997). 
(14) (a) nonyty-o (b) nonyty-o-net  (c) nonyty-o-ty           YANESHA 
  canoe-LOC  canoe-LOC-ALL  canoe-LOC-ABL 
  ‘in the canoe’  ‘towards the canoe’  ‘from in the canoe’ 
 [Place [DP]  [Path [Place [DP]]]  [Path [Place [DP]]] 
More source-related data comes from the family of Pama–Nyungan languages (spoken in the 
region of Pilbara in Western Australia). These languages are interesting because of their complex 
overt morphology and productive use of the ablative case. Dixon (1980) points out that most 
Australian languages use ablative case suffixes to mark both locative and causal source. Dench 
(1995, 1997) studies the use of ablative suffixes and their different interpretations identifying 
five major interpretations (very much along the lines of Luraghi’s (2003)): 
(15) Ablative morphemes in Pama–Nyungan languages: 
(a) source of motion:    X moves from place Y 
(b) temporal precedence:   X dates from Y/is after Y 
(c) source of origin/habitual dwelling:  X is from Y 
(d) direct cause:     X results from Y 
(e) indirect cause:    situation X is because of Y 
But most importantly he submits overt morphological evidence showing that the a difference 
between spatial and non-spatial uses of ablatives comes from the additional locative morpheme 
(annotated as “L” in the table 5.3). And as predicted in van Riemsdijk & Huybregts (2002), the 














Nyamal L+kulyara kulyara kapu X 
Ngarluma  L+nguru nguru kapu X 
Panyjima  L+nguru nguru mari ngarala 
Yindjibarndi L+ngu ngu X ngaala 
Kurrama L+ngu(u) ngu(u) X ngaala 
Martuthunira  L+nguru nguru wura ngalyarnta 
Warriyangka parnti X parnti X 
 Table 5.3: Ablative/Causal suffix forms in Pama–Nyungan languages (adjusted  
from Dench 1997). “X” indicates that no morpheme has been reported for those combinations. 
 
The singled out case of Warriyangka (in bold) uses one morpheme, parnti, which explicitly links 
spatial and causal source. This morpheme seems to be able to perform spatial, temporal 
(although data is not available for Warriyangka, temporal uses of parnti have been reported for 
Thalanyji and Payungu, where is it also used for spatial meanings) and causal duties without any 
morphological alternation. So the use of an ablative morpheme in Warriyangka is close to the use 
of ‘from’ in Greek and Germanic with little overt morphological distinction.  
For all other languages in table 5.3 we observe that the morpheme for the direct cause is 
morphologically unrelated to all other interpretations (kapu, mari, wura). What is of importance, 
however, is that the direct cause is not the only way to express causation. There is an indirect 
cause morpheme, which does not seem to be as morphologically independent as its direct cause 
counterpart. Compare the indirect cause morpheme in the forth column with the locative source 
denoting morphemes in the first column (shaded cells).  
Although it would be extremely valuable to extend this close morphological identification across 




altered. What is striking is that the suffixes across Panyjima, Yindjibarndi, and Kurrama follow 
very similar patterns of variation in their interpretations. Dench (1997) notes that ngalyarnta in 
Martuthunira should be treated differently, so it is not surprising that we do not get ngarala 
there. An etymological relationship has not been formally established for the suffixes of the first 
three languages. Nevertheless Dench (p.c.) does not rule out the possibility of analyzing the 
morphemes: *-nguru and *-ngara(la) as reconstructable to a common origin. A reason this 
relation should be approached with caution is the fact that there are only three vowels (+length) 
in the phonological inventory of these languages and a sporadic vowel alternation like this is not 
always warranted for an etymological derivation. 
So table 5.3 gives strong evidence for a complex morphological make-up of spatial source as 
location+source. It also shows that this composition is productive, since in the absence of 
location we derive a different meaning. And finally we also noticed a morphemic resemblance 
underlying space, time and cause. 
To more densely populated languages now, overt morphological evidence is presented from 
Japanese and French in Emonds (2007), where we find PathPs stacked on top of PlaceP. 
Examples (16a–d) all have the same translation ‘take the kittens outside the house’:  
(16) a.  Japanese     b.  French    




His analysis expands to arguing not only for a Path-Place sequence but, crucially, for the 
necessary presence of a null Path head, at least in certain English ditransitive contexts. The 
proposal for an obligatory Ppath head on top of PlaceP in structures analyzed as secondary 
predications is based on the Revised Theta Criterion (Emonds 2007:111). I will briefly explain 
its rationale below because it makes important assumptions about the theory of grammar that 
favors the presence of null P heads in certain syntactic configurations, like (16c), over what 
might have been a more economical representation, as in (16d), something that will be in the 
heart of this chapter’s proposal.  
c. ✓Transitive V with a Path complement   d. * Antitransitivity violation 
       assigning two theta-roles 
   
e. ✓Secondary predication assigning 1 theta role f. ✓Secondary predicate AP 
              introduced by to (qua copula) 




Emonds notes that the structure in (16c) in comparison to (16e) has to be different, because the 
latter is an instance of secondary predication with the verb assigning only 1 theta role internally, 
while (16c) is a transitive verb that takes a PATH complement and assigns 2 theta roles. The 
problem that arises is which head the second theta-role is assigned to i.e., the Pplace (16d) or 




introduces and does not correspond to the secondary PP predicate as is the case with the Pplace 
of want. Emonds equates the role of this null Ppath with that of the Ppath in (16f), see circled 
PPs. The role of to under Ppath in (16f) is analogous to a higher verbal infection head I (also in 
Emonds 1987) incarnated as a P58. This to/Ø acts as a predicate head with a function similar to 
that of the copula or an inchoative verb conveying a change of state—in the case of (16c) the 
kittens are/got outside the house)—so the AP happy and the PPplace outside the house are 
secondarily predicated of the direct object, indicated by the dotted lines from Pplace/AP to DP in 
(16c&f). Emonds concludes that predications are expressed only by PPs of Place and not Path 
(Emonds 2007:107).  
To theoretically support the distinction between (16c&e), Emonds appeals to a principle of the 
syntactic theory that will be able to predict (among other things) the presence of a null head, and 
more specifically here of a null PATH on top of PLACE. This is the Revised Theta Criterion that 
decrees that theta-relatedness is anti-transitive (ibid.:111). Let us see how this revision derives 
the structural difference of (16c) and (16e) and also blocks (16d). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 In the literature, PPs are often analyzed in a parallel fashion with verbal phrases. Similarly to 
Emonds’ parallelism, we find Ramchand (2008) and Lundquist&Ramchand (2012) who analyze 
to-PPs on a par with the syntactic projections of a verbal phrase. Ramchand (2008) analyzes the 
syntactic projection of argument based on event structure, which is comprised of three 
subevental components: causing, process, result. The category understood as V is ultimately 
comprised of a combination of some or all these three subevents. The directional structure where 
the PLOC is embedded under PPATH corresponds to a dynamic predicate procP which in turn 
selects for a result state resP that licenses the entity that holds the result state XP:  
[PpathP  Ppath  [PlocP  Ploc  [   LocationP  ]]]  Directional to-PP 
[procP   proc  [resP    res  [   XP ]]]  Accomplishment VP 
Higgibotham (2001) analyzes the combination of resP with the proc head as a “telic pair 
formation” which corresponds to Ramchand’s accomplishment/achievement verbs. This telic 
interpretation is carried over by analogy to the prepositional to-PPs. So in (12c), the kittens end 




The solid lines among heads in (16c–f) represent theta-role assignment by the verb, while the 
heads of the constituents of secondary predication are connected with their subject DPs with 
dotted lines. Although (16d) is arguably more economical than its counterpart (16c), its theta-
relatedness is “transitive”: In (16d), the V is both directly related to the object DP (solid line) and 
indirectly via the Pplace head that is predicated of that same object DP, hence an external theta-
role is assigned to it (dotted line). In other words, the V is related to the same argument twice. 
This then explains why (16d) is not the right structure. Banning the transitivity of theta-
relatedness accounts automatically both for (16e) and (16c): the transitivity effect is avoided in 
(16e) because the V only has 1 theta-role to assign, which targets the Pplace, which then relates 
to its subject ‘the child’, but crucially there is no theta-relation between the V with that internal 
subject. In (16c) because the second theta-role is assigned to the null Ppath head, it does not 
‘return’ to the object-DP (following the dotted lines via Pplace) since we had established that the 
Ppath head is not the predicate but Pplace is. Ultimately, this additional Ppath layer ensures that 
antitransitivity is observed and there are no theta-relatedness problems. 
Notice that the distinction between (16e,f) and (16c) make the right predictions about positional 
verbs like ‘hang’, which are correctly analyzed as copular verbs in the sense that they take a 
small clause to which they assign their only theta-role according to Hoekstra&Mulden (1999). If 
Emonds (1997) is on the right track, then in ‘hang the clothes on/onto the line’ there is no 
thematic relation between ‘hang’ and ‘the clothes’. The lexical meaning of ‘hang’ in H&M is 
responsible for the selectional requirement on the predicate of the small clause. This means that 
‘hang’ selects for a small clause headed by a locative P, exactly as predicted by Emonds.  
Importantly, this PP (even if lexicalized as ‘onto’) is not directional nor is there any PPATH 




from world knowledge rather than a PPATH. Den Dikken notices that this can syntactically be 
verified by the unavailability of a postpositional preposition in Dutch, since postpositional Ps are 
possible only in directional readings (cf. ch.4:(32a&b)): Hing hij de kleren <aan> de lijn 
<*aan>. 
In sum, the structures Emonds submits for (16c&d) reveal two crucial assumptions: The 
obligatory existence of a null P head (to avoid theta-relatedness of the same argument with two 
different heads in a sentence), at least in certain structures, and their relative position with regard 
to the locative PLACE head. Thus the additional layer of PATH is obligatorily superimposed on 
certain PLACE PPs59 not only based on overt morphological indications but also based on 
theoretical considerations.  
5.3 FURTHER STEPS FOR AN ACCURATE DIAGNOSIS 
Although the literature on the distinction and ordering of directional and locative expressions is 
extensive (see for example, Jackendoff 1983; Wunderlich&Herweg 1991; Koopman 1997; Fong 
1997; van Riemsdijk&Huijbregts 2001; Helmantel 2002; den Dikken 2003; Zwarts 2005; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Not all PLACE PPs require a PATH structure. For example, instances of post-verbal particles 
occur in PLACE contexts and not PATH (Emonds 2007:104): 
(i) The management always stores appliances off.   The appliances are off. 
(ii) The salesman found John in.   John was in. 
Such particles differ from (16c) semantically and syntactically. Firstly, they have a more specific 
meaning i.e., in means ‘in the office/the house’ and off means ‘disconnected/not scheduled’. 
Secondly, they relate to the direct object as secondary predicates giving out the paraphrases as 
shown next to each example and the tree below where there is only one semantic theta-role 
assigned from the V to the object DP1. Thus the Pplace can now establish a predication relation 





Svenonius 2006; Pantcheva 2009, a.o.), it is converging on one fact, that directionality is 
expressed compositionally in prepositional phrases with PLACE (or Location) being adjacent to 




sequence, but their projections encode their conceptualization in space.	  This prepositional make 
up of Path and Place as well as their distribution is fully aligned with the proposed treatment of 
directional ‘from’, for which I claim that it always selects for a locative prepositional layer either 
overtly lexicalized or not (nonetheless always present). Importantly this will also be the 
distinctive parameter in the interpretation of SOURCE between a causative and a spatial reading 
(an observation distilled from my meetings with Marcel den Dikken). Unlike spatial ‘from’-PPs, 
which seem to always select another PP, causative ‘from’-PPs directly select a DP-argument. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 I would like to distinguish Direction from Path at this point, although I will have to reserve the 
details for future work. This distinction, however, is valuable and will be used in section 5.3.2 to 
refer to directional particles and path-denoting prepositions, as in ‘come up from the basement’. 
So the preposition ‘from’ always lexicalizes the head PATH, or as encoded here for simplicity 
reasons, SOURCE. Its directional interpretation, however, is contingent on whether it projects up 
to a DirP or not. Notice the difference between come up from the 4th floor vs. come from the 4th 
floor. It is only in the former example that we know the direction of the movement (up or down 
for example), while in the latter we only know the path onto which the movement takes place.  
This distinction faithfully mirrors the division of Euclidean Vectors into the sum of direction and 
phora (Sourlas 2010) or direction and sens in French, direzione and verso in Italian, dirección 
and sentido in Spanish (Kassetas 2004). Each direction by definition has two phoras. This 
distinction is better portrayed in a tug of war game where there is one direction (the straight line), 
but two opposite forces are applied on it representing each phora. Note that the distinction has 
been lost in the Anglosaxonic school of physics, which treats these two as one entity. This entity 
is the Vector in English or Richtung in German (Kassetas 2004) and illustrates Path+Direction as 
one arrow.  
I have abstracted away from specific labels assigned in different 
works in the literature and kept only the general function of 




The trees in the table below exhibit the argument structures for the two main types of ‘from’ that 
participate in non(lexical)-verbal configurations:	  
(18) SPATIAL  SOURCE       CAUSAL SOURCE   
	   	   	  	   	  	  
Structural difference between spatial SOURCE and causal SOURCE. 
At this point let us take a quick look at the roadmap. The sections up to now seem to concur with 
the suggested proposal that directional ‘from’ is different from causative ‘from’ with regard to its 
phrasal selection. The main arguments were drawn from distribution patterns and their syntactic 
behavior. Although we could theoretically close the books on the disambiguation of ‘from’ here, 
I believe that the claim for any silent head should be argued for further given its elusive nature. 
In the following sections I investigate the suggested locative layer selected only by directional 
‘from’ and reinforce the arguments for its existence by:  
(a) Showing that in case of radical absence of a locative layer, the DP alone fails to deliver 
spatial interpretations (section 5.3.1). 
(b) Providing overt morphological evidence from Germanic languages, namely 
Scandinavian, which lexicalize that locative layer in directional readings, whereas the 
Germanic languages under consideration here do not (section 5.3.2).  
5.3.1 ARE DPS LOCATIONS? 
Up to now the main discussion argued for the presence of some locative prepositional head in 
directional interpretations. In this subsection I will adopt the opposite approach to this issue and 




DP, with an eye to proving it unattainable. In the absence of P-locative, ‘from’ would select the 
DP directly, which would then be called upon to perform location-denoting duties, a property 
traditionally assigned to prepositions. Depending on whether DPs are in fact capable of denoting 
location will either make or break the initial proposed syntactic distinction of the interpretations 
of ‘from’. If DPs indeed manage to deliver Location, then no P-locative is necessary for 
directional readings and the proposal in (18) fails. If on the other hand DPs fail to consistently 
deliver a location denotation, then the need for additional structure will be imperative and the 
proposal stands. In the following section I will briefly examine the nature of DPs based on 
Kracht (2002) and test whether they can denote Location on their own in examples that only 
license space-denoting phrases.   
5.3.1.1  LOCATIONAL NOUNS: A FALSE POSITIVE?  
Trying to ascertain whether a DP can denote location, Kracht (2002) starts with an exploration of 
the nature of space in language. An important observation he makes is that in natural language 
we do not speak of regions in an absolute way but they are defined by means of objects that 
occupy them (Kracht 2002:182). In other words, we do not need to separately indicate that our 
home is an object and incidentally a location too, because the noun home already encodes some 
region, namely the one it physically occupies. In this respect, he claims that locatives and DPs 
are similar. A second observation is that although DPs can perform double-duty (denoting 
objects and locations), there are linguistic items that are assigned exclusively to regions and 
similarly to objects, which indicates that regions should be treated as independent entities. 
Kracht offers as an example the words there or where which are reserved for locations only 
distinguishing them from objects, which are related to words like: that or what. I will discuss 




Kracht, following an analysis that is along the lines of the first observation, claims that nominals 
belong to the set of entities that denote objects, but there is a subset that can also denote 
locations. The following discussion will evaluate the arguments for this claim and will ultimately 
favor a separation of spaces and objects in language concluding that DPs can neither 
idiosyncratically nor optionally have spatial interpretations.  
Firstly, the observation that in language we can refer to spaces by means of the objects that 
occupy them seems to be correct if we consider that (19a) is interpreted as going to a specific 
location: 
(19) a. I went to [DP the bank].    [space] 
b.  They painted [DP the bank] white.   [object] 
However, compared to (19b), we see that the same DP denotes an object and not a location any 
more. So the problem that arises is how can one DP have two very different meanings and what 
is responsible for their disambiguation. To answer this, we will have to rely on the syntactic 
structures these DPs are found in, as there is nothing else that could point us to the right direction 
for disambiguating the bank in (19a) from the bank (19b). This avenue will give us an 
explanatory account for how each example can acquire a different meaning without appealing to 
lexical knowledge.  
Secondly, with regard to the argument that language has meaning-specific items, thus, it is 
logical to assume that spaces and objects are also distinct linguistic entities, Kracht submits cases 
that show how location-specific morphemes are used to encode space. This becomes interesting 
when in the absence of those locative elements, spatial meaning still ensues. This is attributed to 
the nature of the noun, namely it can be inherently locational (Dench 1995). This means that 




examples offered in support of these nouns, but also offer a possible re-analysis of the facts, as 
well as considerations regarding the conclusions Kracht draws from the behavior of certain 
nouns.   
The first datum Kracht reports is from Dench’s (1997) example in Martuthunira showing that a 
locative layer in directional ‘from’ is necessary. In table 5.3 I presented how Pama–Nyungan 
languages (Martuthunira being one of them) overtly distinguish spatial vs. temporal 
interpretations by adding the locative morpheme to the ablative nguru.  
(20) a. kayara-li-nguru   [directional]  MARTUTHUNIRA 
       person-LOC-ABL 
       ‘away from the person’    
The important observation here is that the spatial meaning is conveyed by an overtly lexicalized 
locative layer and that in the absence of li, the phrase acquires a different interpretation, namely a 
temporal one. Dench (1995) provides the following example: 
b.   kanyara-nguru    [temporal] 
         person-ABL 
         ‘after [the time] they were people’    
At this point Dench adds a provision which ensures that some nouns will still be able to denote 
location even if the locative morpheme is missing. In these cases, the ablative signals coinitial 
mode and is attached directly onto the noun. These are categorized as inherently locational 
nominals. Kracht reports an example from Dench (1995) of an adnominal ablative describing the 
immediate prior location of a linked argument, which in this example happens to be a ‘centipede’ 
that is responsible for a bite, hence the Effector case61. So (21) questions the place that the 
centipede came from: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




(21) Wanthala-nguru-lu?      MARTUTHUNIRA 
Where-ABL-EFF 
‘Where from?’ 
Kracht (2002:184) takes (21) to be the consequence of the existence of inherently locational 
nouns, which pre-empt the presence of a locative layer on DPs. Crucially, however, the spatial 
meaning of this example is conveyed by the wh-word itself, which morphologically contains a 
locative head (as was also argued in 4.3.8 for English, Dutch, and German). According to Dench 
(1995:131), wanthala means ‘somewhere’ and always refers to “a (unknown) place, an entity is 
located in”. So an overt locative morpheme in these cases is present, namely the -la62 we find 
attached in wanthala. We can be sure of that since the root wantha, which is the 
“morphologically unmarked and semantically more general”, indicates a “generalized notion of 
unknown location”. Ultimately, in (21) we are dealing with a wh-word that is overtly composed 
by ‘place+LOC’63 and not any special kind of nominal that has inherent locative denotation, 
contra what Kracht takes it to show.  
To close the Martuthunira case, let me submit the two other examples of locational nominals 
according to Dench (1995): (i) compass terms. Here we find the four points of the horizon. 
These, however, come in three different forms representing: locative (wartantu ‘in the north’), 
allative (wartantari ‘away from the north’) or centripetal (wartantarni ‘away from the ‘north’ 
and towards the speaker) meanings. Although they are categorized as nominals, they always 
appear marked by a location suffix (ii) locational ‘adverbs’. Dench puts them in the nominal 
category but indicates that they perform adverbial function. They indicate a direction of 
movement or relative position and they all interestingly exhibit some relation to the compass 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Other than –li and –la, we also find –ta, and –ngka as LOC suffixes. 
63 Quite similarly to the A. Greek entha ‘where’, which was the combination of ‘in+locative 




terms as Dench discusses (1995:128). For example, kankarni ‘above’ is marked by the 
centripetal –rni as seen above in wartantarni.  
An interesting parallel to the analysis of those locational adverbs can be drawn for the English 
left, back, front as pointed out to me by McClure (p.c.). These clearly lack any sort of over case-
marking, yet they can convey space or direction autonomously. Additionally, we cannot rely on 
their distribution to ascertain their syntactic identity because they distribute both like PPs and 
adverbs.  
(22) a.  He turned { to the left / left / abruptly} 
What offers more dependable evidence for their syntactic structure is phrases like “left of the 
road” or “north of the town”, which behave like locatives64, and locatives are by definition PPs. 
This can be attested by the fact that they can undergo Locative Inversion with stative verbs 
(22b), just like their P-overt counterparts (22b): 
b.  [Just north of the house] stands a crenellated gate house.  
[http://www.nationalregister.sc.gov/charleston/S10817710002/index.htm] 
c.  [Just to the north of the Cathedral] stands a bronze statue of Queen Victoria  
[http://www2.newcastle.gov.uk/core.nsf/a/maintenance] 
LI will be a useful diagnostic and I will return to it in chapter 6. What it shows in (22b) is that 
given that “north of the house” can undergo LI (unlike adverbs that do not), it has to be a PP that 
starts out as the predicate of a small clause and then raises triggering inversion of the verb and its 
theme (Hoekstra&Mulder 1990). Example (22b) then syntactically distinguishes left, right from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Unlike their counterparts “right/left of center” which, as den Dikken notices, are commonly 
used in a political context and have a different distribution. They are never selected by other Ps 
like their spatial counterparts (i), and they invite modification by very (ii), which is suggestive of 
their adjectival use: 
(i) We drove up north of the town of Oregon.    
[http://augustana-lutheran.org/blog/2012/07/02/131/] 





the category of locational adverbs by showing that they have properties exclusively ascribed to 
PPs. 
In sum, all cases of inherently locational nominals in Martithunira (the wh-word for ‘where’, the 
compass terms, and locational adverbs) cannot constitute evidence for nouns denoting location 
since each one of them is overtly marked with some location-denoting suffix (locative, allative, 
or centripetal) which is ultimately responsible for the location-meaning. Importantly, in the 
absence of those case morphemes, in English for example, these same words behave as 
prepositional elements. So up to now we can conclude that there are no strong evidence to 
support the existence of locational nouns and that locational meaning is contingent either on case 
morphemes or prepositional structure. 
This is not the only argument Kracht submits for inherently locational nouns. He draws support 
from Chinese examples, which I will discuss after I briefly introduce his space-denoting model, 
which will be necessary in the discussion.  
In Kracht’s model in (23) we find a Localizer which denotes a stable location as a function of the 
noun. Localizers are an enhanced version of Zwarts&Winter (2000) including time dependencies 
and projective properties. They are built on top of an object, which is called Landmark, and they 
return a function from regions to a set of regions, what Kracht calls neighborhoods. When a 
Modalizer merges to this constituent, it adds a notion of movement with respect to the location 
conveyed by the Localizer. So the Modalizer describes an event which starts from inside the 




(23)  [Modalizer [Localizer [Landmark]]]65 
Available Localizers are common locative Ps like ‘in, on, at, between, under’. Kracht makes a 
crucial and clear-cut distinction between Localizers and causative ‘because’. He claims that 
‘because’ is deprived of spatial meaning, hence it cannot be a Localizer. To take this a step 
further, what it ultimately implies is that cause-denoting elements lack a spatial layer, which is 
responsible for turning Landmarks into regions. This is, in fact, congruent with the proposal in 
(1). Of course Kracht (2002) only looks into locative elements, so prepositions like from or to are 
not included in his study, but the provision for causative denotation is certainly of great value to 
this thesis.  
Returning to the discussion about the status of locational nominals, Kracht wants to show that 
these nouns do not need a Localizer to convey location. If this is indeed possible, then the 
contrast between spatial and non-spatial interpretations based on their structure is jeopardized 
since this means that the locative layer, which I consider responsible for the spatial meaning, can 
sometime go missing. So let us put Kracht’s arguments under the microscope like we did for (22) 
and try to evaluate their validity. 
Nominals that are claimed to be inherently nominal are of two types, those that denote cities and 
those that denote buildings. Kracht reproduces the following sentences from Chinese: 
(24) zaiMOD  zhuozi-shangLOC ‘on the table’     CHINESE 
(25) daoMOD  huochezhan-∅ ‘to the train station’ 
(26) wangMOD  Beijing-∅ ‘toward Beijing’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Not far from what we have already seen in previous chapters regarding the structure of PPs, 
for example: 
FIGURE [Vector    [ Region       [DP GROUND ]]]     OR 




In (24) the Localizer shang attaches to the Landmark zhuozi to define a location. In (25&26), 
however, the Localizers are missing, yet the noun is still understood as a location in these clearly 
directional phrases. The questions I will address here are:  
• Is the spatial meaning necessarily attributed to the exceptional nature of the nouns ‘train 
station/Beijing’ and what sort of consequences would this have?  
• Could some syntactic mechanism be responsible for the spatial interpretation in the 
absence of an overt LOC morpheme?  
First let us focus on the modalizers. Kracht notes that the order of these modalizers and localizers 
is unexpected since they appear on each side of the noun, nonetheless no further emphasis is 
given on this observation. Remember that van Riemsdijk&Huybregts (2002) argue for a surface 
order where locative elements always appear closer to the stem and directional elements are built 
on top of Place based on empirical and theoretical cross-linguistic evidence—although they 
suggest that their conclusions should be taken with a grain of salt for there is always the 
possibility of exceptions. In none of the possible configurations predicted by van 
Riemsdijk&Huybregts can a directional element (here I treat Kracht’s modalizers on a par with 
the directional elements based on his analysis on the function of a modalizer) be attached or 
adjacent to the noun in the presence of LOC. Obviously the empirical observations in (25&26) 
cannot be overlooked, but we should make sure that the observations are correctly identifying the 
elements showing up in as modalizers.  
Up to now, the assumption that zai, da, and wang are modalizers is challenged on theoretical 
grounds due to their relative position to the noun. A second challenge comes from Kracht’s 
formalization of Modifiers, which by definition require a necessary change of location. In 




denoted by the noun. Although this is true for (25–26), we cannot claim the same for (24), since 
zai participates in a clearly stative interpretation. So by Kracht’s definitions zai does not qualify 
for a modalizer. But what about dao and wang? 
A possible scenario that can explain the locative denotation in the absence of an overt localizer is 
incorporation. In this case, the modalizers dao and wang (unlike zai) would be responsible for 
the spatial interpretation by incorporating the localizer in a way parallel to the English complex 
prepositions into and onto (Svenonius 2004):  
 (25′)  
 
 
The considerations reviewed here raise the question: are those elements really modalizers in 
Kracht’s sense or more generally directional morphemes? Although it is beyond the scope of this 
section to investigate exactly what these Chinese morphemes are or what their function and 
distribution is, it is nonetheless important to point out that they do not share some crucial 
properties with directional elements, i.e., their surface position and their semantics, both of 
which are be taken care of in (25′). So investigating the function of these elements further would 
be necessary before concluding that the nouns in (24–26) denote location on their own. 
Let us evaluate Kracht’s examples more broadly now—beyond Chinese. Granting to some nouns 
the property of denoting space without the aid of any locative elements raises questions about the 
denotations of this lexical category in general, which would then be expected to be found cross-
linguistically. So if we allow toponyms to double as place- and an object-denoting entities (after 
all, had there not been such a distinction, we would not have had locative morphemes at all), the 
The localizer in (25′) is silent so the derived surface 
word order faithfully reflects (25) and (26). The 
locative layer is preserved, which albeit null, is 





first logical consequence would be an ambiguity. This, however, is not the case in (25&26) nor is 
it the case in other languages66. 
If we were to follow Kracht, we would have to necessarily consider the properties of the DP 
entirely responsible for the disambiguation and not the localizers. In this case we would have to 
decree a provision that separates object-denoting from place-denoting objects, thus leaving only 
one possible interpretation for each toponym. But this would also lead to an impasse: If a 
toponym always denotes place, then we would not be able to explain its distribution in 
configurations that resist a location interpretation as in (27a&b) which are both acceptable: 
(27) a.  Beijing annoys me.  
b. Beijing organized the Olympic games.  
 [http://www.thedailytravelblog.com/exploring-china-at-its-best/] 
In (27) Beijing is not understood as the geographical area but as the city or the people or some 
other object-denoting entity as pointed out by den Dikken. On the assumption that it is an 
inherently locational noun, thus it is always understood as location, we would expect for (27) to 
be ungrammatical or at least infelicitous. But this is not borne out.  
At the same time, inherently locative nouns should be expected to be able to show up in positions 
that license only PPs given that they are understood as locations. But this is also not the case as 
(28) shows. Beijing can appear in the complement of these verbs only as the object of a locative 
or a directional preposition, but never as a bare noun: 
(28) *He {lives/died/stopped} Beijing. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Note that if we attribute the fact that (25&26) are not ambiguous to the morphemes dao and 
wang, this then leads us right back to the need for a more careful investigation of their semantics 




The last two examples (27&28) show that the option of an absolute separation of place- and 
object-denoting nouns does not give out the right predictions because (i) we want to be able to 
opt for an object reading of toponyms (when needed) (ii) we need to account for the fact that 
they cannot be construed with verbs that subcategorize only for locative-PPs and (iii) a 
convenient double-duty noun should raise ambiguities, which is also not the case. The logical 
conclusion then is that assuming DP to be able to be locational, and thus responsible for the need 
and distribution of localizers, is suboptimal, raising more problems than it actually solves.  
To summarize, it was shown that attributing the exceptional locative interpretation of toponyms 
and buildings to DP properties is dispreferred as it makes wrong predictions. On the other hand, 
a structure-based proposal as in (25′) could license empty localizers by incorporation, which 
accounts for their behavior in specific examples only, so we avoid overgeneralization. So we 
conclude that the locative layer in those location-denoting nouns or adverbs is responsible for 
their spatial interpretation. As an immediate consequence, provided that ‘from’ is not lexically 
marked for space and that a DP cannot denote location, the spatial interpretation has to be 
relegated to a locative syntactic layer, which is in accord with the proposal in (18). 
5.3.1.2 WHAT DOES WHERE QUESTION? 
Acceptable responses to ‘where’-questions can be revealing of the type of the denotation of DPs. 
If we accept that ‘where’ always questions location, it is logical that the set of admissible 
answers must be able to denote location as well. Failure to do so would result in a mismatch, 
sufficient to give out an unacceptable response. So although an AP cannot answer the question in 
(29a), the DP in (29b) is acceptable: 
(29) Where are you now?  




b. …✓[DP the library] 
 [http://fyreflybooks.wordpress.com/] 
c. …✓[NP library] 
One can make two observations based on (29): (a) certain grammatical categories, like AP, are 
incapable of answering where, suggesting that those categories cannot denote place. And (b) by 
the same token, since DP is an admissible category, we can tentatively conclude that it can 
denote location. This will be put to the test.   
If we take (29b) to suggest that a DP alone can denote location, then we should expect spatial 
from-PPs to be able to select these DPs directly, thus, ridding the need for a PLOC. Such an 
intermediate prepositional layer would be redundant since the DP would be able to convey a 
location meaning. This, however, would immediately be problematic for the causative from-PPs, 
since their crucial distinction with the spatial ones was the structure of their internal argument, 
namely, a DP vs. a PP. This is ultimately linked to the first main question of the thesis, namely 
how can we tell (30a) and (30b) apart?  
(30) a.  His passion for knowledge came from the local library. 
b. The students came from the local library. 
In this section, I claim that datum (29b) is not problematic and does not infringe on the main 
proposal, based on two arguments:  
(A) Examples like (29b) are in fact cases of ellipsis, and as such, there is a PP layer, which 
nonetheless is elided. The example in (29b) is a fragment answer that corresponds to: I am in/at 
the library. Given that English allows P-stranding and we can extract the DP complement out of 
that locative P, it is not surprising how we can end up with this fragment response. That fragment 




with its Greek and Dutch counterparts, that is, with languages that do not allow P-stranding67. In 
these cases, we are not able to extract the DP away from the P head, thus the corresponding 
fragment response in these cases is always ungrammatical: *De bibliotheek/ *tin vivliothiki ‘the 
library’. 
There is one more option, however, which I have not yet referred to, and that is the bare noun 
case in (29c). The acceptability of (29b) was attributed to extraction and P-stranding availability, 
yet we cannot claim the same for (29c), nonetheless it is surprisingly acceptable in all four 
languages. I will claim that these are cases of telegraphic speech because they are not sensitive to 
the distribution of P-stranding, and thusly they are acceptable in all languages considered above. 
So although the DP alone elicits a strongly unfavorable judgment in Greek, the bare noun is 
perfectly acceptable as a telegraphic response; compare the following Greek answer-pair to 
question (29): 
(29b′) *…tin vivliothiki  vs.  (29c′) ✓…vivliothiki 
      ‘the library’           ‘library’ 
In sum, the fact that we can find a DP or an NP alone as an answer to where-questions—which 
necessarily elicit location—does not constitute evidence for their locative nature.  
(B)  It is the relative pronoun and not the relativized noun phrase that satisfies the selectional 
restrictions imposed by the verb in the relative clause. So the interpretation of the DP as an 
object or location is contingent on the wh-word used. Consider the examples in (31) below: 
(31) a.  The library where I study __        → I study in/at the library.     [Place] 
b. The library that/which I study __ → I study the library (itself).  [Object] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 P-stranding is exceptionally licensed in Dutch for r-pronouns. For locative Ps, however, no P-




If DPs were able to denote location by themselves, then we would expect for (31b) to be able to 
have the same locative interpretation as (31a). But in (31a), the library is interpreted as a location 
because inside the relative clause there is a PP introduced by where. Remember that where is 
associated with locations only and that it projects to a PP. So in (31a) where can only be 
associated with a PP like ‘in/at the library’. On the contrary, in (31b) the DP has to be interpreted 
as ‘the object of my study’ and not ‘the location of my study’, so it is rendered as the direct 
object of the transitive verb. 
In conclusion I have shown that we cannot interpret DPs as locations unless there is some 
locative layer either overt or not. Cases where nominals appear without a preposition and still 
denote location were attributed to: (a) ellipsis or telegraphic speech or (b) the presence of a 
prepositional element in the relativizer. For the latter cases, I assume a DP in the head of a 
relative clause always denotes an individual or object, while the part responsible for its 
interpretation is only the relativizer i.e., where vs. which/that.  
5.3.1.3 LEXICAL CLONING CONSIDERATIONS 
Finally I would like to bring up an additional consideration in favor of opting against an 
idiosyncratic locative denotation of DPs. If nominals could convey location, we would be 
obliged to assume multiple lexical entries for each noun depending on its interpretation in 
different environments. This, however, is theoretically undesirable. 
Assuming for a minute that nouns can also denote location, we would need to posit at least two 
entries for every noun-candidate: a locational and non-locational one. For example, home would 
have to have two entries in the lexicon:  




home2: the space defined by the area occupied by the object home i.e., I came from my home. 
Additional nominal uses of home could also cover ‘the country one is a native of’ or ‘an 
institution one is admitted to’. The former, however, can be captured by home2 as homeland is in 
essence a defined space just like someone’s home. By analogy the latter could be conveyed by 
the lexical item home1. However, different lexical entries would have to be postulated for the 
verbal uses of home.  
If we allow the creation of distinct lexical entries for each interpretation, it could easily trigger an 
unrestricted and probably unregulated population of the lexicon where each entry would be 
maximally specified. As already stated in chapter 4, homonymy or polysemy will not be 
considered as possible scenarios as they go against the principles of conceptual economy and as 
such they are theoretically suboptimal within a framework that argues for an economic lexicon 
with as few structure and lexical entries as possible. 
In the sections under 5.3.1 I have shown that DPs do not denote location on their own proving 
Point (a) that was set forth in 5.3. This is important because it shows that not every DP can be 
plugged in a spatial sentence or be interchangeable with a causative DP. Eventually, this 
strengthens the proposal for additional PP structure on top of the spatially interpreted DP versus 
the causative ones. I the following section, I will discuss Point (b), namely the availability of 
morphological evidence that support the existence of PP structure above spatially interpreted 
DPs.  
5.3.2 WHAT’S IN AN EMPTY HEAD 
The main difference between causatively and spatially interpreted ‘from’s was suggested to lie in 




examples submitted here will offer grounds for the presence of an ‘invisible’ prepositional layer, 
showing that it is always semantically meaningful and in some languages lexicalized. In either 
case, the locative P is an active prepositional head which takes an object-denoting DP and gives 
out a space-denoting entity.  
The evidence presented is based on Lundquist&Ramchand’s (2012) comparative analysis of 
English and Scandinavian SOURCE vs. VIA structures, who also offer support for a silent IN 
occupying the Locative head based on the semantics of directional particles in SOURCE 
interpretations. 
5.3.2.1 TRICEPHALOUS REGIONS  
The conceptualization of spatial PPs presented in chapter 4 involves projecting from the DP 
GROUND argument (Talmy 2000) up to a PLACE/REGION, that is a continuous set of points in 
space (Creary et al. 1989, Nam 1995), and from there to a VECTOR (Zwarts 1997, 
Zwarts&Winter 2000), with each vector pointing to a possible point in space towards a specified 
direction. The FIGURE is ultimately located in or moving towards the set of points defined by the 
Vectors stemming from the Region of the DP Ground:    
(32) FIGURE [ VECTOR [ REGION  [DP  GROUND ]]]]        
Moving from Ground to Region is a conceptually and semantically important step as it expresses 
a transition from objects to locations. Wunderlich (1991:597–8) discusses this region from two 
different points of view: the conceptual and the semantic. Conceptually, he refers to it as the 
eigenplace, a function which takes any object x and yields the place it occupies r, that is, its 
region. Such conceptual relations denote “within a homogeneous sortal field”, that is, between 




r), which is interpreted as ‘x is located in r’ and which encodes the cross-sortal relation between 
objects and regions. For example, for Locations, the conceptual relation has to be between two 
regions (same sortal field), while the semantic relation can span across sortal fields from an 
object to a region. Similarly, for Causation, the conceptual relation pertains to the relation 
between two events, while the semantic one can connect an object (cause) with an event (causee).  
Although Wunderlich explicitly claims that the eigenplace cannot be lexicalized—which is the 
reason he introduced the LOC function—its name has nonetheless been associated, in later 
syntactic accounts, with the head responsible for the sortal shift. Svenonius (2006, 2008), for 
example, introduces a function similar to eigenplace, namely K: “K returns what Wunderlich 
(1991) calls an eigenplace, the space occupied by the Ground” (Svenonius 2008:7). 
Semantically, K sortally shifts the DP from the domain of objects to the domain of regions. 
Syntactically, it hosts genitive case-markers (K being a mnemonic for case) and can be overtly 
lexicalized in many languages. Once the sortal shift takes place, the rest of the projections 
specify the subpart or extend of that REGION. The AxPart hosts words like front or top and 
refers to a subpart of the eigenplace defined by K. And finally, the PlaceP identifies a projected 
REGION on the basis of vectors68. Ultimately, REGION is a syntactically complex function 
which takes an object and returns a space that may also include information about some specific 
subpart of the Ground or some projected region. The main components of REGION can be seen 
in (33a) below: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 This includes the region of the object (Ground) plus the region in relation to it i.e., above the 
table is the region that begins at the table top and extends up to a certain degree (if not specified 
then it is constrained by pragmatic considerations) and into the air towards all possible different 
directions. The endpoints of those vectors mark the extended region beyond the table. In other 
words, the PlaceP takes a region defined by the KP, gives the vector space of the Loc, and 




(33a) [PlaceP  Place  [AxPartP  AxPart  [KP  K  [ DP ]]]] 
Lundquist and Ramchand (2012) also project three distinct heads for REGION: 
(33b)  [PlocP  Ploc  [LocationP  Location  [KP  K  [ DP ]]]] 
According to Lundquist&Ramchand (p.c.), KP and LocationP are different with respect to their 
output. Although the first takes an object and returns its Ground, a LocationP takes the output of 
K and returns a new location related to that Ground. If Lundquist&Ramchand’s (2012) analysis 
is on the right track, we will have more instances of lexicalization of the eigenplace. Although 
this proposal is still in the making, I will present some of its main points in the next section with 
more emphasis on its interrelation with the Path projection, as this is where we would expect to 
find ‘from’.    
Clearly there is variation in the labeling and analysis of these location-related heads, while their 
presence can be contested on the grounds of non-overtness. Nonetheless the main function of the 
REGION part in the structure in (32) remains the same cross-linguistically: The sortal switch 
from object to region has to be structurally reflected and a deeper exploration of the syntax of 
REGION helps establish its presence even when phonetically null. Ultimately this cross-sortal 
relation will project a locative layer on top of the Ground DP, which will be precisely the locus 
of the spatial and causative difference in the interpretation of ‘from’. 
5.3.2.2 LOCATIVE MUTATIONS  
Lundquist&Ramchand’s analysis is based on the general conceptual framework as described in 
(32). For a more specific syntactic analysis of directional PPs, they follow an adjusted version of 
Svenonius (2006, 2008). The cases under consideration will all involve a directional particle, 




that is) for examples where the element that lexicalizes the location head (we shall see which 
one) cannot contribute a spatial interpretation on its own. The parenthetical items are provided as 









The two are different in that only prepositions can license a DP Ground, while particles act 
simply as a sort of modifier to the Path denoted by the Ppath head. An important assumption they 
make is that these particles are not simply homophonous with the corresponding prepositions, 
but they are directional elements that obligatorily combine with a PathP69. When these particles 
are used in directional environments (unlike their intransitive uses as in he passed out, she locked 
up), they exhibit selectional properties with regard to the kind of DP Ground they are compatible 
with70. So (a) is acceptable but (b) is not:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Although there is no explicit argumentation for this statement, notice that it in accord with the 
earlier suggested division of vectors into two components necessarily present: the direction and 
the phora.  
If this is true, then the condition of building DirP on a PathP is automatically derived even if the 
latter remains null. A direction alone (>/<) cannot contribute any meaning unless there is a 
predefined path (——) in a pre-defined space to give out the complete VECTOR:  ——> 
70 These properties are contingent not only on the physical geometry of the object, but also on 
world knowledge. One can carry a box up a table for as long as the size of the table relative to 
the size of the carrier of the box is such that ‘carrying’ is a felicitous verb. So if the carrier of a 
This structural representation intuitively suggests that 
the particle up contributes the direction to an already 
defined PPPath over which it takes scope. 
Lundquist&Ramchand argue that the particles ‘up, 
down, in, out’ are found under this directional 





(35) a.  She carried the box up [DP the hill]. 
b.  # She carried the box up [DP the table]. 
The main chance in Lundquist&Ramchand (2012) is that although in English and Norwegian 
these directional particles appear to be construed directly with the DP Ground argument, in 
Danish and Swedish an overtly realized preposition intervens between the particle and the DP 
Ground. Their observations are summarized below: 
               DIR PRT                
(36) a. I     chased  him out71     [Path   [Ø      [DP the door].  ENGLISH 
 b. Jeg  jaget  ham ut/in       [Path   [Ø      [DP døren].    NORWEGIAN 
 c. Jeg  jagede ham  ud/ind    [Path    [ad      [DP døren].    DANISH 
d. Jag  jagade    ut/in   honom  [Path    [genom [DP dörren].   SWEDISH 
                  DIR PRT 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(37) a.  They carried  him  down/up   [Path [Ø  [DP the stairs].  ENGLISH 
 b. De  bar  ham  ned/opp    [Path [Ø   [DP trappen].    NORWEGIAN 
 c. De  bar  ham  ned/op    [Path [ad   [DP trappen].   DANISH 
 d. De  bar   ner/upp   honom [Path  [för   [DP trappan].   SWEDISH 
Lundquist&Ramchand adopt one and the same underlying syntax for all these four languages 
which will account for the distribution of locative prepositions. Firstly, a similar cross-linguistic 
variation with regard to lexicalizing locative prepositions is also found in verbs of contact. These 
verbs select for a locative complement and the inanimate direct object DP has to be understood 
as a location. According to Lundquist&Ramchand’s observations, English and Norwegian pair 
together in contradistinction to Swedish and Danish, which exhibit a different pattern in terms of 
the lexicalization of a locative layer in the complement of a verb of contact as summarized 
below: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
tiny box is an ant, then carrying it up the table is a possible scenario where the ant is climbing up 
a leg of that table.   
71 The corresponding version of English in does not exhibit the same property so it was left out 




(38) a. I kicked   the table in frustration.    ENGLISH 
 b. Jeg sparket  (til)  bordet i frustrasjon.    NORWEGIAN 
 c. Jeg sparkede     * (til)  bordet  i frustration.    DANISH 
 d. Jag sparkade     * (på)  bordet  i frustration.   SWEDISH 
Lundquist and Ramchand (2011) concluded that the non-affected inanimate objects are in fact 
under a prepositional layer, which is responsible for their conversion into the location they 
occupy. They argued that English and Norwegian can get away with a null locative head because 
their eigenplace is featurally rich, which enables it to convert the object DP into the place it 
occupies. On the other hand, Danish and Swedish have a featurally poor eigenplace, which 
means that their prepositional sequence has to come bag and baggage with all prepositional 
heads lexicalized (til and på).  
The same assumptions are carried over to (36−37) where the Ground DP can be licensed in 
directional environments by an independent locative prepositional element that governs it (see 
highlighted parts in (36&37)). The function of this locative preposition is to convert the 
denotation of that DP from Object into Location (Ground to Region). This preposition is 
considered to remain silent in English and Norwegian but is lexicalized in Danish (ad) and in 
Swedish (genom, för). With the locative layer (some incarnation of the eigenplace head) 
denoting an extended location, the Ground DP is now of the correct and compatible semantic 
type to combine with the Path head directly as its complement.  
These observations and their analysis constitute overt morphological evidence for the existence 
of a locative layer between directional prepositions and their DP complement. In other words, the 
complement of a directional preposition (with an eye to extending such assumptions to the 




and semantically (cross-linguistically) fully functional locative prepositional layer (highlighted 
in (39)) that contains the Ground DP:   
(39)       VECTOR        REGION  GROUND   [Spatial PPs] 
[Direction  [Path     [ Location    [  DP     ]]]] 
This notion of ‘compatibility’ translated as a locative prepositional layer is the crux in this 
account and also in the proposal of this thesis. L&R (2012) argue that if any (spatial) path-
denoting preposition must combine with something of the sortal type of ‘locations’, then the 
selected functional structure in the complement of Ppath will have to be a LocationP72. The name 
of this head will not be relevant; what is of great importance is its presence and function in 
spatial PPs, in contradistinction to its radical absence in non-spatial ones.  
5.3.2.3 NATURAL SELECTION UNDER HOMOMORPHISM  
Let us now see what the proposed syntax is for directional PPs and what is special about them. 
Provided that directional particles always encode some Path information, which is syntactically 
represented as selection of PpathP by DirP, L&R (2012) suggest that DirP and PpathP can be 
lexicalized together by one directional particle, following the principle of homomorphic unity, 
stemming from Krifka (1992, 1998),73 and syntactically extended in Ramchand (2006) and 
Ramchand&Tungseth (2006).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 It is not definitive yet whether it will be the LocationP or the KP. Lundquist&Ramchand (p.c.) 
predict the variation to be attributed to the KP/eigenplace, which is either lexicalized or null 
depending on the strength of each language’s features. In the trees provided, I will follow the 
notation used in Lundquist&Ramchand (2012) with the understanding that it is currently under 
revision. 
73  Krifka (1992) proposes an object–to–event mapping model for analyzing incremental 
(cumulative) propositions. For example in the sentence John is drinking a glass of wine, the 
predicate drink a glass of wine exhibits its own semantic properties, separate from the semantic 
composition of the whole sentence. The main idea is that there is an event (drink) and an object 




Homomorphism, as Ramchand (1997) explains, is found in certain event–object relations where 
the properties of the object (i.e., cumulative like water, running or quantized like 5 apples) are 
acquired by the verb that is thematically related to that object. So for cumulative objects, every 
subpart of the event will correspond to a subpart of the object. Argument-to-event 
homomorphism is found in creation or consumption verbs that give out atelic predicates, where 
the properties of the argument are reflected on the properties of the event it participates in. In this 
context, homomorphism relates in two ways:  
(A) It exhibits how the cumulative constitution of mountain maps onto climbing in he 
climbed up the mountain. Here homomorphism suggests that the progress of the event 
climb is equal to the accumulation of the area climbed at each point in time. Importantly, 
the event climb is constantly in contact with and measured by the object mountain. On 
the other hand, in a non-homomorphic relation like he climbed up the table, we do not 
map the event onto every single point of the table. We rather interpret this as a telic 
predicate, where the table is the end point of the event, which started somewhere not on 
the table and ended up on it. 
(B) According to the homomorphic Unity (Ramchand 2006): When two event descriptors are 
syntactically Merged, the scalar structure of the complement must unify with the scalar 
structure of the head by means of homomorphism i.e., the relevant scales must be 
synchronized and unified to describe the complex event. Ramchand and Tungseth (2006) 
show how this principle can extend to cover different syntactic constituents i.e., V and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the glass of wine being drunk (the incremental theme) is reflected on the progress of the drinking 
(the event). The degree of wine being drunk (object) represents the degree of completion of the 
drinking event (Wechsler 2005), so object and event are constantly reflected onto each other at 




PPATH or PLOC and DP. By extension then, Lundquist and Ramchand (2012) will apply 
this same principle of homomorphism to the PPATH and DIR. For the remaining sections, I 
will assume that homomorphism is lexicalizing the Dir+Path and provide a discussion on 







Danish, unlike English and Norwegian. This layer (be it the KP or the LocationP) takes the DP 
that denotes individuals and returns a LocationP that denotes space (non-atomic locations). The 
importance of (40) is that it exemplifies how the presence of the Location head is forced by the 
selectional properties of PathP. Although this is not always immediately evident, the Swedish 
and Danish examples bring this fact up by lexicalizing the Locative layer.  
The Path head denotes an “extended sequence” (i.e., a line) and combines with a Ground DP that 
can be converted into an extended ordered location. This is possible only for VIA interpretations 
because the “material constitution of the DP is mapped to, or somehow defines the Path travelled 
by the Figure”. In other words, the path traveled by the Figure in (40) is an inherent part of the 
greater area defined by the mountain. Consequently if you are climbing up the mountain, you are 
heading upwards (up) at every single point of your path, which is always traced onto (or 
touching) the mountain. Homomorphism ensures that the progression of “moving upwards along 
your path” is reflected onto the progression of your “climbing up the mountain”. 
up/down 
The particles up and down can serve both as particles 
and prepositions as they are drawn from the same 
lexical inventory. The tree in (40) gives the syntactic 
treatment of up/down pointing out the parametrized 





This further explains why it is we can say that we have climbed up to different points of a 
mountain, but cannot say we have climbed up to different points of a table. Given that the 
mountain can be cumulative, we can have gradations of the path climbed and by extension the 
mountain, i.e., I climbed further up the mountain, but *I climbed further up the table. The 
unavailability of the latter sentence can be illustrated by the fact that to the extend we can climb 
a table, what happens is that we start from a place that is not the table and we end up on top it. 
So tracing the path onto the table is not possible and consequently modification of the 
progression of climbing in this case is not possible.  
Turning now to a different selection under homomorphism we will compare a VIA and SOURCE 
configuration under the directional particle out. These cases are different because the directional 
P out is not scalar as up/down are. This difference will ultimately account for the distinct 





He tossed the cat out the window. 
Another important difference is that the directional scale of the Particle out is ‘absolute’. So for 
the sentence he tossed the cat out the window, there is a complete transition through the material 
location of the DP (similar to climb the table). The directional particle is used as the PATH and 
the DP is understood as the transition point. In (41) the window has a portal-like interpretation 
describing the transition from one phase of the path to the other. The transition path does not 
  out  
The tree in (41) represents a VIA intereptation, very much 
like (40) with the same structural requirements with regard 
to selection of the LocationP head. L&R note that the 
PATH head here is triphasal indicating the two phases of 





always need to be punctual, however, but can have an extended meaning as in he carried the 
treasure out the tunnel. But how is this different from a SOURCE structure? 
Lundquist&Ramchand isolate the difference in an additional locative layer, namely the PLOC as 






Pantcheva (2009, 2011) provides evidence for such an analysis from languages that can 
lexicalize all three distinct heads. The Papuan language Hua, for example, offers such a 
transparent lexicalization, where each of the three heads is spelled-out by an independent 
morpheme: 
(43) zu-ro(-ga)-ri’   oe.      HUA 
work-AT-TO-FROM  come  
‘I have come from work.’           (example originally in Haiman 1980:234) 
Closing this parenthesis and focusing back on (42), what is important is that we find a PLOC head, 
which is missing from (40&41). Most importantly, this head is not null, but has a silent IN which 
is not accidental but has a semantic function74. So what are the conditions and consequences of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 L&R additionally suggest that the PLOC head is incarnated as the preposition in due to the fact 
that its directional scale is ‘absolute’; giving out the meaning ‘the Figure is in something’. In fact, 
they characterize in as “profoundly locative”. I would like to submit a possible explanation as to 
what this might mean, concluding that its realization as in is not a necessary condition, but it 
might be language specific. Nonetheless, this does not infringe on the presence of the PLOC or its 
semantic function. 
A first approach in translating in as “profoundly locative” could be the fact that it is usually the 
interpretation of the Locative case in languages that have such a case, like Yanesha (repeated 
from (11)) or Martuthunira, among others. In all these language it is systematically the case that 
  out  
The tripartite representation of the semantics of out is 
attributed to the structure of source prepositions by 
Pantcheva (2011) who maps source-denoting from 





L&R suggest that the PLOC head is directly connected to the semantics of the directional particle 
when used as a preposition and the nature of the PATH: 
• Directional particles with ‘absolute scales’ have a PLOC use, which returns an absolute 
location for the Figure. IN is used to represent the property of absolute containment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
LOC is systematically translated as in without there being any other element specifying for 
containment or inclusion for example: 
(i) a. Ngayu  tharnta-a nhuwa-lalha parla-ngka. MARTUTHUNIRA 
1SG.NOM euro.ACC spear.Part hill.LOC (Dench 1995) 
‘I speared a euro in the hills.’ 
 b. Ngayu  pawulu nyina-nguru ngaya-rra maya-ngka-rru 
that.NOM child  sti-PRES cry-CTEMP house.LOC.NOW 
‘That child is crying in the house now.’   
(ii) nonyty-o      YANESHA 
 canoe-LOC     (Pantcheva 2009) 
 ‘in the canoe’  
(iii) Utavalu-pi kawsa-ni.      IMBABURA QUECHUA 
Otavalo-LOC live-1    (Cole 1985) 
‘I live in Otavalo.’      
(iv) a.aç-ta       TURKISH 
tree-LOC      (van Riemsdijk&Huybregts 2002) 
‘in the tree’ 
But this is not always true. For instance, in English we find two other locative prepositions: at 
and on, which also give out slightly different meaning of location with at being the less marked 
location. Compare, for example, (43a&b): 
(v) a. I am at school   (somewhere in the vicinity of the school)  
b. I am in school.  (inside the building defined as school) 
Moreover, in other languages, we find this same locative meaning being conveyed by 
prepositions which are otherwise directional. Some languages which utilize the same P for ‘to’ 
and ‘at/in’ are M.Greek, Bellinzoneze, Paduan and Venician (Terzi 2010). The rendering of a 
more specific ‘in’ meaning would require the use of the locative adverb mesa ‘inside’:  
(vi)  Ime  sto sxolio. vs. Ime  mesa sto sxolio. GREEK 
1SG.PRES to-the school  1SG.PRES  inside to-the school 
‘I am at school.’ ‘I am in(side) the school.’ 
These examples show that it that PLOC does not necessarily have to be IN, as Location is 
conveyed in different ways cross-linguistically. On the other hand, it seems that IN would indeed 




(something is either in or not). This gives the SOURCE interpretation of out. 
• Directional particles with ‘relative scales’ do not contain a PLOC and have a PPATH use. In 
these cases the Ground defines the Path onto which the Figure is moving or passing 
through, which also accounts in some cases for the gradable properties of the Prt. This 
gives the VIA interpretations for up/down/out. 
If this is on the right track, we can predict two things: (i) only directional particles with ‘relative 
scales’ to invite scalar modification and (ii) ‘from’-paths to be impossible to combine with 
particles with ‘relative scales’ due to the fact that the former requires a PLOC, a head that is 
missing from the latter. Through the following Danish examples75 (44–45), I will show how both 
these predictions are borne out. 
Directional particles with ‘relative scales’ are deprived of the PLOC layer because there is no 
position in which the Figure can be found in its entirety. The ‘relative scale’ of the particle 
implies that the Figure can be more or less down/up the location defined by the Ground, which 
for (44) is the hole. The interpretation of (44) is that he crawled up inside the hole, but we do not 
know whether he actually made it out or not, so there is no accomplishment. Also based on the 
homomorphic relation of the event and its object, the amount of crawling should reflect the 
progress of completion of the event, which by extension should be modified accordingly. Indeed 
we see in (44) that we can optionally have the modifier ‘further’: 
(44) Han kravlede (videre) op ad hullet.   [VIA]   DANISH 
‘He crawled (further) up (inside) the hole.’ 
In the SOURCE interpretation in (45a), there is a clear understanding of an accomplishment. The 
event of “crawling the hole” has reached an end. Importantly, the Figure (in its entirety) is found 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




in a difference location from the location the hole occupies as he is now entirely out of the hole. 
Since the DP is not traced onto the Path any more, gradation is also not possible. This is shown 
in (45a), where ‘further’ is illicit.  
(45) a. Han kravlede (*videre) op fra hullet.  [SOURCE]  DANISH 
b. * Han kravlede op fra ad hullet.   
‘He crawled (further) up from the hole.’ 
The major difference between (44) and (45a) lies in the semantics of the directional particle, 
which has either a PATH use or a LOC use. Ultimately (44&45a) prove prediction (i) right, 
namely that only directional particles with ‘relative scales’ invite scalar modification.  
Turning to the second prediction now, let us focus on (45b). In this example the Particle has a 
‘relative scale’, just like (44), but this time, there is a directional ‘from’ as well. Although the 
combinations “op ad” and “op fra” were acceptable, it is impossible for the three of them to 
appear together. This confirms our prediction regarding their incompatibility based on the 
semantic contribution of PLOC head, forced in the presence of ‘from’-PATH, but absent in 
directional particles with relative scale. This proves prediction (ii) right, namely ‘from’-Paths do 
not combine with particles with ‘relative scales’ because source paths require an internal PLOC 
which the specific particles resist. 
To sum up this lengthy analysis, L&R provide evidence based on a comparative study of 
Germanic languages, which show that the lexicalization of directional PPs, that is Dir+Ppath, 
demonstrate selectional criteria on the categorial nature of their complement. Firstly, 
independently of their spatial interpretation (GOAL, SOURCE, VIA), they always select a phrase 
of the sortal type ‘location’. Although in English and Norwegian this locative layer always 




elements. Secondly, contingent on the type of the directional particle, two internal structures 
were identified: (a) for particles with relative scales (up/down), the PathP selects a LocationP 
which is the minimal locative structure while the Ground defines the Path that the Figure moves 
on. This makes gradation of the directional particle possible with regard to the Path travelled; (b) 
for particles with absolute scales (in/out), the PathP selects a silent PLOC headed by IN. Because 
its directional scale is absolute, IN is responsible for rendering the location of the Figure in its 
entirety, thus pre-empting any modification. 
These conclusions will be vital plug-ins for the proposed structure of spatial ‘from’ because they 
ensure that spatial ‘from’ always comes equipped with a PLOC layer (lexicalized or not), which I 




CHAPTER 6 THE PROPOSED TREATMENT UNDER THE MICROSCOPE 
In this chapter I will focus explicitly on causative ‘from’. Based on the proposal in chapter 2 
regarding the predicative nature of the ‘from’-PPs, I will explore the underlying ‘microsyntax’ of 
‘from’ across Greek, English, German and Dutch. This will be useful in explaining how particle 
verbs are able to encode a Causee–Cause relation even in the absence of an overt ‘from’.  
 
6.1 FROM’S ANATOMY  
The preposition apo from in Greek, based on its different semantic uses, may denote two types of 
relations with the noun phrases it combines (Holton et al. 1997): (i) Concrete relations, which 
convey the meaning of space, time, direction, or origin and (ii) Abstract relations. In these 
relations apo can have an extensively varied range of meanings i.e., causative, partitive, material, 
ablative, comparative, distributive, medium, and change of state. Here, the focus will be on 
causative apo which typically assigns accusative76 in Modern Greek.  
Causative apo combines with simple or particle verbs as in (1a,c)77: 
(1) a. i megales idees {erxonte / (pro)erxonte } apo   mia  plousia fantasia.              GREEK 
             the bigFEM.PL.  ideas    {come    / outflow      }  from aACC richACC   imaginationACC 
 b. i     megales idees (ek)pigazoun  ek mias plousias fantasias. 
 the  bigFEM.PL. ideas    outspring   from aGEN  richGEN   imaginationGEN 
 c. i     megales idees (ek)pigazoun apo   mia  plousia fantasia. 
 the  bigFEM.PL. ideas    outspring   from aACC  richACC   imaginationACC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 This is in contrast to ancient Greek, where apo always assigned genitive. In its other semantic 
uses, apo may also assign accusative or genitive (aparhis ‘from the beginning’, apo ghenisimiu 
‘from birth’, apo kardhias ‘from the heart’, afenos-afeterou ‘on the one (hand)-on the other 
(hand)’). 
77 apo- can also give particle verbs, but it is not optional like pro- and ek-. So although aporreo 
‘outflow’ is etymologically and morphologically related to reo ‘flow’, there are pragmatic 
restrictions that disallow them to be used interchangeably (ideas *(out)flow from imagination ). 
It is the case, however, that in PØ constructions apo particle verbs do pattern alike with other 
particles verbs. Since these restrictions are not within the scope of the syntactic analysis of this 





 d. i     megales idees {*erxonte /ekpigazoun/aporeoun } Ø mias plousias fantasias.78 
 the  bigFEM.PL. ideas    {  come    /outspring  /outflow    } Ø aGEN    richGEN  imaginationGEN 
The particle verbs used interchangeably in examples (1a–c) feature different combinations of 
particles, like ek-, pro-, and apo-, which all convey the meaning ‘from’ and combine either with 
‘come’ or other lexical verbs. Although these particles are historically prepositions themselves, 
after their lexicalization as preverbal particles, they seem to have lost their independent case 
assigning function. Notice that the presence of an overt preposition is necessary in (1a–c), 
independently of the presence of a particle, which is optional. Ultimately, the case of the final 
DP-argument solely depends on the P head that selects it. This becomes clear in (1b&c), where 
different prepositions, namely ek and apo, are associated with different cases, which are reflected 
on their arguments, to wit, accusative in (1b) and genitive in (1c). So in the presence of an overt 
preposition, the DP’s case depends exclusively on that preposition while the particle does not 
participate in any Case-assigning process. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 I am providing some additional examples in Greek because such sentences tend to be less 
common as they have a more archaic tone. So the prepositional version has become more 
dominant in colloquial use. 
(i) I anikanotita proerxete tis psixosis. 
the incompetence Prt-comes the psychosisGEN 
‘The incompetence comes from the psychosis.’ 
[http://www.zougla.gr/blog/article/498825]  
(ii) To “edo” ekpigazi tis fantasias   ton anthropon…  
the “here” Prt-springs the imaginationGEN  the people 
‘The “here” out springs from the imagination of the people…’ 
[http://amonibooks.blogspot.com/2010/03/blog-post_21.html] 
(iii) i xorotaxiki katanomi pou aporei aftis tis antagonistikis drastiriotitas  antikimenopii  
the county planning that Prt-flows thisGEN competitiveGEN activityGEN  objectifies  
afton ton nomo. 
this D law 
‘County planning that comes from this competitive activity makes the law objective.’ 
[https://athens.indymedia.org/local/webcast/uploads/h_arnisi_tis_arnisisewyucu.pdf] 
(iv) O Jigger tha analavi ti ritra pou aporei tis symvasis         me tin eteria Actor 
D Jigger will take-up D clause that Prt-flow theGEN contractGEN with the company Actor 






Causative ‘from’-PPs are also observed in the following Germanic languages (2–4), where they 
seem to behave similarly with regard to the type of verbs they can appear with:  
(2) Eine geniale Idee kommt      von  einemDAT wirren Kopf.          GERMAN 
 Eine geniale Idee  entspringt     Ø einemDAT wirren Kopf. 
 ‘an ingenious  idea {comes from/outsprings} aDAT   mazy  head.’ 
(3) Grote ideeën    komen  van  een  rijke  verbeelding.      DUTCH 
 Grote ideeën    ontspruiten aan    Ø     een  rijke  verbeelding. 
‘big      ideas {come from/outspring Prt}  a  rich   imagination.’ 
(4) Great ideas come  (out)  from  a rich imagination.              ENGLISH 
 Great ideas come  out  of     a rich imagination. 
What is interesting in (1–4) is that the preposition ‘from’ may be left out only under certain 
restrictions and with repercussions on the case of the P’s argument or the addition of other 
morphemes. For the P-less cases, the common restriction across this set of languages is the 
obligatory presence of a particle. This can be observed in (1d&2–4), where the PØ alternants are 
grammatical only with particle verbs and not with the simple verb ‘come’ any more. Also the 
alternation of causative ‘from’ with PØ comes with an interesting morphosyntactic repercussion: 
contingent on language-specific parameters, we observe either a change in the morphological 
case or the emergence of functional elements. The observed patterns for each language are as 
follows:    
 For Greek—compare the minimally different (1a&1d)—the alternation of causative apo with 
PØ consistently covaries with a change in the case of the DP-complement, more specifically 
from accusative (1a) to genitive (1d).  
 In German (see (2)), the simple verb kommen ‘come’ necessarily takes an overt preposition 
von ‘from’. In the absence of von, the structure requires a particle, in this case ent-, in order 
to be grammatical. Although German also overtly reflects case, no change parallel to Greek 




 For Dutch similar restrictions apply. In (3), the simple verb komen ‘come’ requires an overt-
P, van ‘from’, while it is only particle verbs that yield grammaticality in the absence of that 
preposition.  
 For the English example in (4), the simple verb come must be construed with the overt 
preposition from. Similar to the Greek example in (1a)—but unlike the overt-P cases of 
(2&3), which ban the co-existence of lexical particle verbs with overt prepositions—the 
aspectual come may optionally appear with a particle (come or come out) when construed 
with a preposition. I will assume that out in (4) does not act as a full-fledged preposition, but 
as a particle parallel to the particles ek/apo-, ent-, ont- that show up in all the other languages 
under consideration here. The distribution of out further supports its non-prepositional (in the 
sense of Case-assigning) function in these examples. For example, in the absence of from: (i) 
out is unable to stand alone (ii) it becomes obligatory just like all particle example in (1–3). 
Let us turn now to the additional elements aan and of that show up in (3&4). Since neither Dutch 
nor English overtly inflect morphological case on determiners, adjectives, or nouns79, case 
marking of the argument DP is not possible. Instead it seems that aan and of perform a function 
similar to the morphological cases instantiated in (1d) and (2). Note that it is not uncommon for 
English and Dutch to employ prepositional elements where German uses morphological marking 
instead (Emonds 1985). Another similar morphological marking pattern is found in indirect 
objects marked with dative in German V>DOACC>IODAT, while the corresponding English and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 With the exception of proper nouns that inflect for genitive as in John’s for English or Jans 





Dutch example would employ an overt prepositional element (to and aan) (McFadden 2004)80. 
To summarize, the presence of a particle, the absence of the overt ‘from’, and a morphosyntactic 
case reflex all seem to be correlated:	  
Language Type of V Povert/ PØ Case 
V/PrtV Povert ACC Greek 
PrtV PØ GEN 
V Povert DAT German 
PrtV PØ DAT 
V Povert – Dutch 
PrtV PØ aan 
V/V-Prt Povert – English 
V-Prt PØ of 
Table 6.1: Simple vs. Particle verb alternations. 
A bird’s eye view of all the observations in examples (1–4). 
6.2  VITAL SIGNS FOR PREDICATION 
The central argument in support of the predicative nature of causative ‘from’-PPs in chapter 2 
and 3 was based on the fact that in the non-verbal examples under consideration the ‘from’-PP 
was the predicate per se, hence its obligatoriness. The same holds for (5a–d) below, where the 
copula connects the two arguments in an unequivocally causal relation: on the one hand, the 
argument of ‘from’ is understood as the cause and, on the other hand, the subject is the causee. 
Interestingly these ‘from’-PPs are not optional or replaceable by other prepositions as was the 
case with the verbal causatives discussed in chapter 3:  
(5) a. o piretos ine apo to krioma.    GREEK 
 ‘the fever is from the cold.’  
  b. Die Verbrennung ist von der Sonne.   GERMAN81 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 This correspondence should be taken as a rough approximation and not as a generalization that 
holds among these languages. Ditransitive constructions are contingent on many independent 
syntactic, semantic, and lexical considerations. So, for example, German does have a 
prepositional counterpart to the dative construction, while Dutch may occasionally allow the 
second object in a V NP NP configuration to be a Goal/Beneficiary.  
81 Such copular examples in German but mostly in Dutch—although not ungrammatical—have a 




 ‘the burning  is from the sun.’ 
  c. De koorts is van de griep.    DUTCH 
 ‘the fever  is from the flu.’  
  d.  Her fever is from the flu shot.    ENGLISH 
Crucially, these are stative predicates without lexical verbs, which means that causation cannot 
be attributed to any causative head in some projection of the lexical verb or to the verb’s 
semantics/encyclopedic meaning even, since there is a radical lack of any lexical verbal material. 
A causative interpretation, however, is rendered for all the examples in (5). This 
straightforwardly has led to two core assumptions up to now: (i) The preposition ‘from’, being 
the only causatively interpreted element in these cases must be responsible for causation and (ii) 
this relation is structurally represented in the form of a predication configuration, abstractly 
illustrated in (2.17) and repeated below as (5′), where the PP-cause is predicated of the subject-
causee:  
(5′)  CAUSEE  [PredP  [PP  ‘from’  CAUSE ]] 
Adopting a predicational analysis for the causative ‘from’-PPs will ultimately be the key to the 
source of causation in non-verbal or non-lexical verbal environments, which radically lack the 
intricate underlying syntax associated with causation in the work of Alexiadou et al. (2006 et 
seq.). Instead the interpretation of causation is now relegated to the interplay of the semantic 
properties of ‘from’ and its argument structure that directly establishes a relation between its 
components (subject–predicate). These were the main points of the analysis up to now. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘come’ are more preferable than the copula. Also Ramchand (2006) attributes this to a general 
incompatibility of stative verbs to combine with PathPs (like ‘from’) due to the incompatibility 
of the PPs structure, which is scalar, and that of the stative event. 
This phenomenon is not always observed however. Compare for instance the Dutch (also used in 
German, but without explicit preference) ‘I come from NY’ to the English and Greek equivalent 
‘I am from NY’. But independently of lexical preferences, both von and van are used in causative 




section will attempt to strengthen this line of argumentation by providing further syntactic 
evidence which will squarely put causative ‘from’-PPs in the predicate category. 
One compelling syntactic piece of evidence is the fact that causative ‘from’-PPs can undergo 
Locative Inversion. More specifically, skeletal configurations of the type: ‘x comes from y’ can 
undergo Locative Inversion, giving out ‘from y comes x’. McClure (p.c.) correctly points out that 
examples (1−5) do not faithfully reflect the non-verbal configurations ‘x is from y’ used in the 
previous chapters. The reason I had to resort to come in order to use LI as a diagnostic for 
predication is because copular examples, in general, seem to resist Locative Inversion. This is 
true not only for causative ‘from’-PPs, but also for locative and more so for directional Ps: ?on 
the corner is a house, *from Africa are the two zebras. Notice also that although the copula 
resists LI, stative (analyzed on a par with the copula i.e., Hale&Keyser 1997) or locational verbs 
readily accept it, so the acceptability is systematically improved: on the corner stands a house, in 
the box slept a cat. Ultimately LI is valuable as a predication diagnostic, which nonetheless 
comes with a general restriction for copular examples. 
The examples in (1–4) as well as those in (6c,d) all readily allow the ‘from’-PP undergo Locative 
Inversion across all four languages:  
(6) a. [PPapo mia plusia fantasia ]  erxonte  megales idees.  GREEK 
  ‘ from a rich imagination  come great ideas.’   
 b.  [PP from a rich imagination] come great ideas.     ENGLISH 
 c. [PP van uitstel]    komt afstel.        DUTCH 
 ‘from  postponement comes cancellation.’ 
 d. [PP von nichts] kommt nichts.         GERMAN 
 ‘from  nothing comes nothing.’ 
That all these examples can undergo Locative Inversion suggests that these causative-PPs are 




(Hoekstra&Mulder 1990). The fact that LI is restricted to predicative small clauses only can be 
attested by the unacceptability incurred when fronting a PP that is not a predicative complement. 
Compare (7a) and (7b) and their unacceptable non-predicative counterparts in (7c) and (7d): 
(7) a. ✓From debt comes distress.  
  [http://www.cyberprop.com/cyber1_06052010_8.shp]  
 b. ✓From incite comes insight.  
  [http://duckdown.blogspot.com/]  
 c. *with a cane walked a man 
 d. *in anger left the man 
According to Hoekstra & Mulder’s (1990) analysis of the syntax of Locative Inversion, the PP 
originates as the predicate of a small clause and then undergoes A-movement to SpecIP or to 
some other sentence-initial position. Although the concise landing site or derivation varies across 
the literature on LI, what is crucial  is that this PP is a predicate: 
(8)  [IP  [PP  P  DP ]i  [ I  [VP V  [SC DP   [PP  ti  ]]]]] 
If we accept that (8) is on the right track, it could be used as a platform for a predicational 
analysis of all causative ‘from’-PPs, whose underlying structure was sketched only in broad 
strokes in (5′). Of course, the challenge for any predicational model now would ultimately be to 
accommodate all the observations in Table 6.1. 
6.3 THE RECEPTOR OF PREDICATION (RP) 
Having established that the examples in (1–4), similarly to the ones in (5), can undergo Locative 
Inversion and they are, thus, predicative in nature, let us now focus on the (micro)syntax of the 
configuration that relates the source-PP (more specifically its cause argument) with the theme 
(causee). The predicational small clause model proposed in den Dikken (2006) captures the 






(9) RP                RP 
    XP          R′            CAUSEE        R′ 
              R            PP               R              PP 
           P          YP       ‘from’        DP 
      CAUSE 
With the copula traditionally being treated as the mediator of predicational structures, we can 
interpret (9) as a predicational relation with the copula realizing the R head that connects the 
cause and the caused event constituents. For the purposes of this work, I will refer to both cause 
and causee as DPs, without suggesting that these are the only possible syntactic categories that 
can be found in causative constructions. 
The RELATOR is an abstract head that mediates predicative relations. Depending on the structures 
it participates in, it can be occupied by the copula, prepositional elements, T, or any head that 
relates subject and predicate. Additionally, the R head is able to accommodate case particles 
which assign morphological case to the predicate. Such cases are discussed in É. Kiss (2002) for 
Hungarian, where the R head instantiates the dative case by lexicalizing R as nek: Mari Jánost 
rámenős-nek tartja ‘Mary considers John pushy’. Den Dikken (2006) parallels the distribution of 
the Hungarian dative marker to that of the English RELATORS lexicalized by as, for, and of (i.e., I 
take him for/regard him as a fool, idiot of a doctor). 
In sum, the R head can be occupied by different functional elements. When spelled-out, it can be 
instantiated by the copula or other prepositional elements. When not overtly pronounced, it can 
be occupied by some functional head, like T, or be realized as morphological case. Specifying 
the nature and the restrictions of the underlying representation is essential in order to best 
accommodate the structures of (1–4) and account for the observations regarding the presence of 




6.3.1 FIRST TRIAL: POVERT 
Having established some necessary theoretical and empirical background in terms of the 
structure and the nature of causative constructions, I will tentatively adopt the predicative small 
clause analysis for all examples in (1–4) and based on the properties of a RELATOR small clause 
structure I will attempt to encapsulate the facts and restrictions as described in the previous 
sections and more specifically the distribution facts in (1).  
Let’s first turn to the Povert versions of (1–4). Each one of them describes a relation between the 
cause XP (instantiated here as as a DP) and the causee YP. Acording to the predicative model 
adopted, the two constituents are generated in a small clause headed by a RELATOR, which will 
establish a syntactic and semantic connection. Importantly it will also be able to accommodate 
the predicate inversion facts. 
(10) [RP  CAUSEE  [R′  R  [PP  ‘from’ CAUSE]  ]]        ➮  
 [ [PP  ‘from’  CAUSE]j  [TP  [ TEPP ] [VP V  [RP CAUSEE [R′  R [ tj   ] ]]]]]    
For the Povert cases the R head straightforwardly mediates a causal relation between DPCAUSEE and 
DPCAUSE, either being overtly realized as the copula—deriving the example set in (5)—or being 
null in the presence of external verbal material—instantiating the examples in (1–4).  
The next step is to check whether licensing considerations are fulfilled in order for the derivation 
to converge. Both DP constituents are in need of checking their Case features against some Case 
checking head. In this case the Cause in the predicate can check its Case features against the P 
head, since P is an overt θ-role assigner. The Causee, however, is still not Case-licensed. This 
will have to be taken care of by a head external to RP. Since the small clause is selected by the 
aspectual verb come the DPCAUSEE raises out of the Spec of the small clause to a structural 




(11) … DPCAUSEE   [V COME   [SUB  DPCAUSEE  [R′ RELATOR= Ø    [PP from  [  DPCAUSE ]]] ] ] 
The configuration in (11) encapsulates the predicational nature of the relation between cause and 
causee, while, at the same time, successfully licenses both nominal constituents. This, 
admittedly, does not come as a surprise, since it is commonplace for any predicational model to 
accommodate such structures. But if (11) looks unnecessarily complex, the prepositionless 
(1d)&(2–4) raise the ante of expectations for any predicational model which is expected not only 
accommodate P-less cases but also to correctly predict their behavior as summarized in Table 
6.1.  
6.3.2 SECOND TRIAL: PNULL 
6.3.2.1 THE INVISIBLE PØ ATOM 
The proposed structure in (9) readily accommodates the Povert cases in (1−4), satisfying the 
licensing conditions. On the other hand, this is not the case for their Pnull counterparts. So it is 
surprising that the Pnull cases are not ‘penalized’ since the same licensing conditions do not 
obtain in the absence of an overt P. 
Although a null P has been postulated for the prepositionless examples, this is not immediately 
evident. There is, however, suggestive evidence for the presence of a null P coming from 
restrictions on Locative Inversion. Showing that the examples in (1–5) undergo Locative 
Inversion was used as an argument in favor of the predicational nature of the relation between 
the two major constituents of these sentences, namely the cause and the causee. Nevertheless not 
all examples in (1) undergo Locative Inversion. More specifically, examples (1a–c) with a Povert 





(12) a.  [PP apo mia plusia fantasia]i  [T [VP ekpigazun [RP megales  idees [ R  ti ]]]] 
   from  aACC  richACC imaginationACC  outspring  bigPL/NOM ideasPL/NOM      
 b. * [PP Ø mias plusias fantasias]i [T [VP ekpigazun [RP megales  idees [ R  ti ]]]]  
    aGEN   richGEN imaginationGEN  outspring  bigPL/NOM ideasPL/NOM  
The challenge in (12) is two-fold: to respect the conclusion drawn from the previous sections, 
namely that P establishes a causative relationship and to account for the ungrammaticality of 
(12b). Example (12a) converges with the PP on the left edge of the sentence being co-indexed 
with its trace ti which, in turn, is licensed by the R head in the small clause. Since (12a&b) are 
minimally different, it suggests that this difference, namely the absence of an overt P, is most 
probably the locus of the ungrammaticality of (12b).  
One possible scenario is the radical absence of prepositional structure. This effortlessly explains 
why (12b) is unacceptable: If Locative Inversion by definition involves fronting the locative 
argument over the subject, then in the absence of a PP, LI is simply not available any more. This 
scenario, however, is not able to encompass the grammatical (1d) as well as the PØ counterparts 
of (2–4), which crucially involve unaccusative verbs, unable to take the cause-DP as a direct 
argument. Additionally, all these examples convey a causative interpretation which was 
attributed to the presence of a P head. Radical absence of the P head would have incurred not 
only grammatical but also semantic repercussions. 
The other scenario involves a null P in (12b), which, by definition, would require formal 
licensing by a locally adjacent head. In line with the small clause analysis postulated in (9), this 
head would be the RELATOR head. Performing Locative Inversion of the null P, however, 
immediately forfeits this possibility, since R would not locally c-command the prepositional 




to license a null P head82, thus, deriving the ungrammaticality in (12b). Since a null-P head in 
(12b) is in consonance with the proposal that P is responsible for establishing a causative 
relationship and, at the same time, its nullness helps us explain the ban on Locative Inversion, I 
will proceed to the analysis of particle verbs considering that there is a Pnull in all prepositionless 
cases.  
6.3.2.2 DISSECTING PARTICLE VERBS 
With some indication for the presence of a null P head in place, we can now proceed to the 
analysis of prepositionless cases. One major consideration in these cases is licensing: the 
complement of the null P (the cause) cannot be Case licensed any more, unlike in (11). 
Additionally, since the other licensing path involves the unaccusative ‘come’, we are led to an 
impasse because it cannot case-license the cause-DP. So there remains no other proper licenser 
in the sentence to take care of that DP.  
It is in these cases that the RELATOR head is called upon as a last resort mechanism in order to 
check Case features. In (13) below, the RELATOR head is the closest possible head that could 
check the Case features of the DPCAUSE: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Unlike cases of “beheaded” PPs (see discussion in den Dikken 2006) that can undergo 
Locative Inversion without the P head being necessarily fronted as well: 
(i)  [PP   tP  this issue]k has been paid little attention toi tP  in the literature.  
Such examples are considered LI constructions with the exception that their P head is extracted 
from the PP before the inversion. What is crucially different between “beheaded” cases and 
(12b) is that the reversed PP in the former contains a trace of the moved P (tP), while a P head in 
the latter would have be radically null (PØ). This minimal difference then accounts for the 
different judgments based on the fact that traces are subject to different licensing requirements 
compared to null-heads. If traces are processed via reconstruction, structural adjacency of the 
licenser and the trace is not required (and is not even possible if there is more than one trace). On 
the contrary, null heads must be locally bound by their proper licenser, a restriction that is not 




(13) DPCAUSEE  [V  come  [Prt *(Prt=ek-/ont-/ent-/out)  [RP  DPCAUSEE  [ R=GEN/DAT/aan/of   
 [PP  P=Ø  [ DPCAUSE ]]]]]] 
The different cases in Hungarian and English, which were presented above, indicate that the R 
head can be lexicalized by prepositional or morphological particles. In causative constructions of 
the type in (13) then, it is not surprising that the R head can overtly accommodate the functional 
prepositions aan in Dutch and of in English, as well as overt morphological case reflected in the 
cause in Greek and German. The prepositional nature of these Case markers endows the 
RELATOR with a Case feature and, in turn, enables it to check the Case features of the cause 
embedded in the complement PP.  
What is important to note here is that while the particle may optionally emerge in Povert cases, it 
is always obligatorily present in Pnull cases across-the-board. I will argue that the necessity of a 
particle, when there is no overt preposition, is correlated to the activation of the R head, and 
subsequently to its ability to perform Case-licenser duties. The relevant theoretical precedent to 
this mechanism is found in Chomsky (2005, initially explored in 2001), who proposes that all 
operations are triggered by phase heads (PH), like C or v*. Only phase heads have the necessary 
features that mediate agreement and trigger raising. These features can be inherited by the head 
each PH selects i.e., from C to T or from v* to V. Feature Inheritance activates the selected head, 
which can then act as a “proxy” of its PH. So T has no Agree or Tense features in and of itself, 
but must inherit them from the local C phase head. In other words, T can trigger syntactic 
operations only after C has been merged. Once T inherits C’s features, it can then enter into an 
Agree relation with a goal in its c-commanding domain in order to value the goal’s uninterpreted 




So in the same way T remains ‘defective’ unless selected by C, the R head remains inactive83, in 
terms of checking Case or agreement unless strictly locally c-commanded by a head with such 
features. This head is the Particle which I base-generate in a head position immediately outside 
RP. From there the Particle will activate the R head as suggested to me by den Dikken. As a 
result, the R head can now enter into a Case/agreement relation with its complement. Thus, the 
Pnull manages to get licensed via agreement with the activated R head. This scenario 
straightforwardly explains the obligatoriness of the particle for the prepositionless cases: 
Although the particle is incapable of licensing the null P, it is, nevertheless, able to select and 
activate the RELATOR, which can then participate in a Case/agreement structure with the null PP 
that contains the cause DP.  
To recapitulate the analysis proposed for P null cases, let us examine the assumptions that the 
structure in (13) yields for each language: (i) For Greek and German, when the obligatorily 
present particle activates the R head, we expect morphological case to be overtly reflected on the 
nominal and adjectival elements of the cause. (ii) For Dutch and English, on the other hand, 
there is no overt case-marking available for the respective elements (i.e., ‘a rich imagination’), so 
we would anticipate for case to be lexically instantiated. This is indeed the case since R ends up 
being spelled-out as a functional particle—aan and of. These general predictions follow directly 
from the underlying structure that was adopted in (9) and then adjusted in (13) to reflect the P 
null cases. Note that these predictions have now come full circle since they are readily borne out 
by the empirical observations as summarized in Table 6.1.    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




6.4 WHAT WE SAW UNDER THE MICROSCOPE 
The main focus in this section was the underlying syntax of causative ‘from’-PPs in Greek, 
English, German and Dutch. Based on the facts that causative ‘from’-PPs: (a) are licensed in 
copular sentences (both non-verbal configurations as well as non-causative verbal ones) and (b) 
undergo Locative Inversion, I have concluded that they have to be predicative in nature. 
Following den Dikken’s (2006) predication model, I have represented the causative ‘from’ as the 
head of a prepositional small clause containing the cause and predicated of the subject-causee. 
This structure is not only able to accommodate the predicational relation between causee and 
cause and the Locative Inversion facts, but more importantly, to account for the licensing of P 
null cases. In these cases the Particle head was called upon as a last resort Case-checking 
mechanism to salvage the structure by activating the R head, which, in turn, licensed the null P 
head. In conclusion, the R head becomes activated only when the following two conditions 
apply: (i) the P head is null and there is no other proper licenser and (ii) the small clause RP is 
selected by a Particle head. Note that the latter is not a sufficient condition on its own to activate 
the RELATOR head, which may remain de-activated, hence accounting for the optionality of 





CHAPTER 7     CONCLUSIONS 
7.1  OVERVIEW DISCUSSION 
The main theme of this work is an investigation of the causative interpretation of the preposition 
‘from’ in terms of its meaning, source, and syntax. Unlike most previous systematic studies on 
causation, I have chosen to focus on non-verbal or non-lexical verbal causative constructions. In 
the absence of lexical verbal layers, language seems to resort to certain mechanisms and atoms 
equally able to convey causation. The syntax and function of these atoms, in this case ‘from’, is 
ultimately responsible for the distinction between causative and non-causative interpretations as 
well as their cross-linguistic distribution. This thesis has two main theme questions: 
(1) How does natural language manage to convey causation in non-verbal configurations, 
which are traditionally considered to be the locus of causation? 
(2) What is responsible for the causative vs. the spatial interpretations of ‘from’ in sentences 
like ‘X is/comes from Y’? 
With these general questions in mind, various other syntactic and semantic problems were 
addressed in passing, which I will briefly discuss below:  
The thesis starts with a historical flashback and cross-linguistic examples of the 
grammaticalization of Source as the preposition ‘from’. It also explores how Cause is spatially 
conceptualized as Source. So an important link between Cause and Space is established. Taking 
these two findings together, we derive that Cause, just like Space, can also be inherently encoded 




Empirical support for an explicit relation between prepositions and causation comes from the 
fact that in the absence of any lexical verbal projections, for example in ‘x is from y’, natural 
language can still convey a causative meaning, thus answering question (1).  
Chapter 2 presented the most important aspects of a seminal syntactic approach to lexical verbal 
causatives. The intent of this chapter was to give a snapshot of how verbal causation is broadly 
envisioned in syntax and where causative ‘from’-PPs fit in this schema. Some initial theoretical 
concerns if we were to extend the ‘from’ analysis to lexical causatives would be to reconcile the 
two Sources of Causation, namely a v and a P. With both heads available in cases like he wet his 
pants from fear, we are led to believe that the two heads can be reconciled in one sentence under 
the right structural configuration. More specifically, the ‘from’-PP is predicated of the entire vP 
acting as the Cause of the vP84 he wet his pants, while the v introduces the Agent responsible for 
the causative event described by the VP wet his pants (see the structure in (3.45)). Note, 
however, that Agentivity is not always required. In examples like he broke the vase from 
clumsiness, he is not acting willfully (also noted in Schäfer 2007). At the same time, certain 
restrictions apply to the kind of Causes available. It was shown that ‘from’ cannot introduce 
Agents, thus, replacing fear with the old lady, immediately yields a degraded outcome (??he wet 
his pants from the old lady).  
With question (2) in mind, chapter 2 set the stage for separating possible ‘from’ configurations 
and then ascertaining whether it is possible to categorize them according to their meaning. There 
the LCL (Law of Coordination of the Likes) was used as a first diagnostic to test which PPs were 
able to be coordinated and which not, thus pointing to their semantic proximity. Through the 
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judgments, it was confirmed that similarly interpreted PPs are available for coordination unlike 
PPs across semantic groups.   
Finally a closer investigation of past analyses (Solstad 2007, Rákosi 2010, and Roy&Svenonius 
2009) combined with the assumption that the copula in ‘x if from y’ relates a subject with a 
predicate, led to the formulation of the proposal that causative ‘from’-PPs introduce the Cause 
and are predicated of the Causee: 
(3) [ CAUSEE  [PredP   [PP  ‘from’  CAUSE ] ]] 
Chapter 3 provided an umbrella discussion on causation. One major concern was to establish a 
dependable diagnostic that would be inherent to causative constructions only. For this purpose, I 
tailored Levin’s (2007) alternations to make/be from alternation extending them to cause: the 
unemployments is from the crisis ↔ the crisis caused the unemployment. These bilateral 
alternations served well in distinguishing causatives from non-causatives, but also in shedding 
light on marginal cases like unergatives or internal change of state verbs—both traditionally 
resisting external causes.  
All examples tested confirmed that Causes are independent entities from Agents and that their 
difference is both semantic and syntactic. Causatively interpreted ‘from’-PPs introduce 
inanimate causes, which are always generated lower in the structure (in the PP) than their 
agentive counterparts that are introduced by verbal heads.  
Finding evidence for this structural distinction, and mostly for the low generation site of Causes 
introduced by ‘from’, fed most of the discussion in this chapter. I resorted to Connectivity 
Effects to show that their generation site is indeed a much lower one than that of Agents. The 




that these reciprocals have to be bound by their antecedents, it was argued that they had to be 
generated low and later moved up. This scenario conformed well with all causative examples 
used.  
Finally, chapter 3 was wrapped up by a reference to a theoretical consideration regarding both 
the generation site as well as the nature of Causes vs. Agents. The point of this discussion was to: 
(i) draw a line between the two thematic roles and (ii) to offer theoretical support to the low 
generation account for Causes. If there is a derivational relationship between make/be from 
alternations—which would also be desirable from a UTAH point of view—then the underlying 
structure would have to be the ‘from’-counterpart; otherwise its derivation would require 
downward movement to the complement of a P head, raising crucial theoretical concerns. 
Having identified the semantic variations of ‘from’ and proposed a predicative analysis, Chapter 
4 explored formal syntactic devices that could pinpoint the syntactic difference between 
causative vs. spatial uses—which are nonetheless identical on the surface. For example: the 
headache was from the wine vs. the wine was from Chile.  
Two tests, wh-word extraction and th-word compatibility, drew attention to the complement of 
‘from’. It was shown that causative vs. spatial complements consistently covary with ‘that’ vs. 
‘there’ (initially discussed in ch.2) and are extracted with ‘what’ vs. ‘where’. The next step was 
to analyze the syntactic identity of ‘that/what’ vs. ‘there/where’. This led to a fine-grained 
analysis of the nature of r-words, where it was shown that ‘there/where’ are underlying 
prepositional, but ‘that/what’ are nominal. This distinction indicated a crucial difference in the 




argument, while spatially interpreted PPs have a prepositional argument (the answer to question 
(2)): 
(4) SPATIAL SOURCE: [PPSOURCE ‘FROM’  [PP  LOC   [ DP ]]]    
CAUSATIVE SOURCE: [PPSOURCE ‘FROM’      [ DP ]] 
Chapter 5 was built on the proposal distilled from chapter 4, that the distinction between ‘from’-
PPs is syntactic in nature and contingent on the complement of the P-head. The purpose of this 
chapter was to reinforce this position with logical arguments and pre-empt other possible 
explanations.  
The first alternative that needed to be vetted was the possibility of the object DP itself to be 
responsible for the locative interpretation of the ‘from’-PP. If DPs can convey space, then there 
would be no need for an additional P head in the spatial source. This would be possible under 
either of these two conditions: (a) DPs that convey space and DPs that convey cause should be in 
complementary distribution in order to ensure the necessary semantic distinction of ‘from’ and 
(b) DP objects should be able to autonomously convey location for the spatial ‘from’-PPs. 
Condition (a) was proven to be false given that there are ambiguous cases of ‘form’-PPs that may 
carry either interpretation, for example the internet can be the argument of either a causative or a 
spatial PP. This shows that DPs are not ‘marked’ in any way to denote either space or cause. 
Condition (b) is also proven false based on evidence from cross-linguistic morphology i.e., cases 
of location-denoting nominals carry overt locative morphemes; and distributional patterns i.e., 
location denoting DPs still require the use of a P after stative verbs. So this alternative was 
abandoned. These observations gave useful insights on the status of “locational adverbs” in 




The second issue that had to be addressed was the necessary presence and nature of an 
unpronounced locative layer postulated for the spatial ‘from’. Its absence would render the 
proposed spatial structure equivalent to the causative one, hence the syntactic distinction would 
fail. Two arguments were mostly stressed in support of the presence of a PLOC even if 
unpronounced:  
(a) Overt morphological evidence for lexicalization of a locative P layer in the complement of 
directional Ps in Scandinavian and Pama–Nyungan languages. 
(b) The PLOC head was shown to be semantically active in Source readings. Namely it values the 
scale of the directional head that selects it either as ‘absolute’ or ‘relative’. In other words, ‘from’ 
requires the presence of a PLOC not only for syntactic reasons, but also for semantic ones. The 
PLOC is responsible for conveying an absolute and distinct position of the Figure with regard to 
the Ground/Source.   
With the locative layer securely in place in the complement of PPATH, the burden of the causative 
interpretation falls entirely on the internal composition of an underspecified ‘from’-PP whose 
complement is nominal. 
Chapter 6 provided an even more microscopic analysis of the internal structure of causative 
PPs. I showed that causative ‘from’-PPs in non-lexical verbal configurations undergo Locative 
Inversion. This puts them squarely in the category of predicates—remember that this proposal 
was initially based on the fact that in the fever is from the flu the ‘from’-PP has to be the 
predicate. Another required errand was to discuss whether radical absence of PP structure or 




syntactic and semantic considerations pointed towards the presence of a null P for all the 
examples discussed. 
The ultimate challenge then was to find such a type of predication model able to accommodate 
all phenomena and their language-specific irregularities, namely: simple vs. particle verb 
configurations; their ability to appear with or without an overt ‘from’; morphological case 
change effects on the cause argument in the absence of P; and the emergence of functional 
elements. The model followed was den Dikken’s (2006), which was able to accommodate 
Causee and Cause in a predicational relation, with the latter being necessarily introduced as the 
complement of a small clause prepositional phrase headed by ‘from’:  
(5) …. [RP [ RELATOR  [ PFROM   CAUSE ]]]     
 …PRT  [RP [ RELATOR  [ PØ      CAUSE ]]] 
The structure on (5) was able to accommodate not only the overt P cases, but more importantly 
their null P counterparts as well. For these latter cases, Chomsky’s (2005) activation mechanism 
of functional heads by their respective phase head via inheritance of Agree features was 
recruited. This accounted for the necessity of the particle in the absence of a preposition (or some 
other proper licenser) as well as for the existence and function of an abstract mediating head, the 
RELATOR. The line of argumentation was that just as C can activate T, so can the Prt activate the 
R head, but only as a last resort in the absence of P. With the particle being the activator in Pnull 
cases, the R head gets activated and consequently able to license the Pnull, thus yielding a 







7.2  GENERAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
In a verbo-centric theory of causation, the proposal that CAUSE can be attributed to more than 
one grammatical sources poses theoretical and empirical puzzles. Examining non-verbal 
causative sentences like my headache is from the wine, it was shown how natural language uses 
prepositions, more specifically ‘from’, to independently convey CAUSE. In such sentences, the 
preposition ‘from’ can autonomously convey causation, in the same way the v of break is 
responsible for the causative meaning of John broke the vase. This makes important assumptions 
about how natural language grammaticalizes causation, something traditionally considered a 
verbal prerogative. 
Importantly the causative interpretation was attributed to ‘from’ when it enters a configuration. 
The semantic interpretation of ‘from’ is contingent on directly selecting for a nominal phrase, 
while the spatial interpretation requires selection of a prepositional layer. Ultimately, the 
causative vs. spatial demarcation between my headache was from the wine vs. the wine was from 
Chile can be attributed to the internal syntax of their ‘from’-PPs. This provides a straightforward 
connection between semantic interpretation and syntactic structures. 
This close semantico-syntantic relation has further bearings on the lexical nature of the category 
P itself. I am not making the claim that all prepositions are lexical, for example, we saw the use 
of “up, down, out” as directional particles projected by Path Ps or the use of “of” lexicalizing the 
R head (a finctional head) in examples like great ideas came out of a rich imagination. The 
preposition ‘from’ in the causative cases, however, shares many important properties with lexical 
heads, namely: (i) it has semantic content related to Source (ii) it can license empty heads, a PLOC 
for the spatial cases (iii) it has aspectual layers that can host modifiers like and (iv) it assigns 




however, is established syntactically via a predication relation and not thematically by the P 
head. These constitute solid arguments for arguing for the lexical nature of Ps, more specifically 
for ‘from’ in causative contexts. 
Examining the distinction between spatial and causative interpretations brought to light another 
important conclusion about the nature of nominals. In semantic literature, we find analyses that 
treat adverbs like “north, left, right” or nominals like “Beijing, bank, school” as locational in the 
sense that they denote location/space inherently. This, however, was challenged by looking more 
closely into the morphology of Pama–Nyungan languages which were claimed to have locational 
nominals. It turned out that the spatial semantics was closely related to the presence of case 
morphemes, which along with prepositions, are responsible for spatial denotations. For 
languages like English, on the other hand, where morphological transparency is not available, we 
had to rely on distributional and syntactic grounds. It was shown that what are considered to be 
locational adverbs (‘left, right’), are in fact prepositional in their syntactic configuration because 
they exhibit a syntactic behavior idiosyncratic to PPs only. For example, they are able to undergo 
Locative Inversion, a syntactic mechanism available only to predicates of prepositional small 
clauses. Thus these so-called locational adverbs are in fact PP predicates. The upshot of this 
investigation was to show that nominals are restricted to objects or individuals and not locations, 
which always require the presence of some prepositional structure, even when not phonetically 
realized.  
7.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
One of the main diagnostics in this thesis for ascertaining whether a ‘from’-PP is causative was 
based on Levin’s (2007) alternations with the inherently causative verb “make” (or “cause”, 




diagnostic as it separates the wheat from the chaff, so to speak, by showing that only causative 
uses of ‘from’ can participate in these alternations:  
(6) The unemployment is from the crisis ⇔ The crisis caused the unemployment  
but never spatial ones: 
(7) Elizabeth is from London ⇐⇏ *London caused Elizabeth.  
To enhance its validity, I showed that such alternations are in fact syntactic in nature by 
appealing to connectivity effects showing that the Cause can bind a reciprocal in the theme 
position. In other words causatively ‘from’-PPs are derivationally related to their make/cause 
alternants.  
The derivational relation also finds theoretical support in the UTAH. On the assumption that the 
crisis in each alternant in (6) has the same thematic role, namely Cause, then according to the 
UTAH, it should originate in the same underlying position. This position then was proven to be 
in the complement of the P (‘from x’) and not the external argument position of the verb (‘x 
causes’), since the latter would require downward movement in the argument of ‘from’ which is 
blocked. If this analysis is on the right track, as syntactic and theoretical argumentation has 
indicated up to now, it opens up a wide avenue of research on whether there are indeed two 
different sources of causation or not. 
If we accept that there is a unified source of cause, then we could envision an analysis for Agents 
and Causers along the lines of Causes, namely that they start low and move higher in the 
structure to derive the alternant. This is not impossible for Agents as they can also appear low in 




find the well-know derivational relation between passive and active voice. So if we assume that 
the source of causation is always in a low prepositional position and that Agents follow the 
‘course’ of Causes, then the direction of the active−passive derivation would have to be from 
passive to active in the same way VCAUS was derived from “be from”. 
The discussion in this thesis leads me to believe that a prepositional approach to causation is 
attractive because it can offer an underlyingly uniform syntax for causative constructions, while 
at the same time it can accommodate connectivity effects (discussed in 3.2.4) and abides by the 
UTAH (see 3.4). Based on the fact that be from alternates and is syntactically related to 
make/cause (which are verbal elements) we can assume that prepositional causatives could 
derive verbal causatives, but importantly not the other way round. This is an important 
observation of an explicit link between non-verbal and verbal configurations. 
A similar derivational proposal is also found in the literature, where according to Benveniste 
(1966), Freeze (1992) and Kayne (1993), verbs like be and have are also derivationally related. 
Freeze (1992) argues that possessive and existential have is syntactically derived by the 
incorporation of BE+P. The structure for each type of have is abstractly rendered in Bhatt (1998) 
as follows: 
(6) a.  John has a book.   
b. BEpossessive [(book) (to John)] 
c. There is a book on the table. 
d. BEexistential [(book) (on the table)] 
Kayne (1993) extends this analysis to the auxiliary have, which he derives by incorporating the 
P, sitting in a small clause in the complement of BE, into the BE head. The complex head is then 




point out is that Kayne (1993) suggests that the incorporated P into BE is not thematically related 
to the possessor in subject position. Parallel to this proposal, we notice that the copula in the 
causative constructions ‘x is from y’ also selects a small clause PP, while the relation of the 
subject Causee and P is not thematic (‘from’ does not assign a Causee role). Ultimately we could 
envision a BE+‘from’ incorporation scenario in causative constructions which is then spelled out 
as cause: 
(7) a. The wine caused the headache. 
b. BECAUS [(the headache) (from the wine)]85 
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